Portfolio performance measures using holdings data are panel regressions. The returns of a fund’s stocks are regressed on its lagged portfolio weights. Stock fixed effects isolate average performance from time-series predictive ability. Control variables condition for fund performance on the characteristics of the stocks held. The long-term performance of average holdings drives some of the classical measures, while predictive ability drives others. A “buy-and-hold drift,” where portfolio weights increase over time in the higher alpha stocks, affects performance measures. Investor flows respond to average performance net of the buy-and-hold drift.

Numerous trading strategies examined in options research exhibit remarkably high mean returns and Sharpe ratios. We show some of these seemingly “good deals” are due to look-ahead biases. These biases stem from using information unavailable at the portfolio formation time to filter out observations suspected of being noisy or erroneous. Our results suggest that elevated Sharpe ratios may serve as potential indicators of such look-ahead biases. Furthermore, deviating from previous literature findings, we show that illiquidity is not strongly priced in stock options and that only a small set of stock characteristics are in fact associated with option expected returns.

We develop methods for testing factor models when the weights in portfolios of factors and test assets can vary with lagged information. We derive and evaluate consistent standard errors and finite sample bias adjustments for unconditional maximum squared Sharpe ratios and their differences. Bias adjustment using a second-order approximation performs well. We derive optimal zero-beta rates for models with dynamically trading portfolios. Factor models’ Sharpe ratios are larger but standard test asset portfolios’ maximum Sharpe ratios are larger still when there is dynamic trading. As a result, most of the popular factor models are rejected.

The stylized fact that volatility is not priced in individual equity options does not withstand scrutiny. First, we show that the average return of heavily traded deep out‐of‐the‐money call options on stocks is −116 basis points per day. Second, Fama‐MacBeth estimates of the volatility risk premium in stock options are similar to those in S&P 500 Index call options. Third, the mean return of heavily traded delta‐hedged at‐the‐money calls (puts) is −23 (−30) basis points. Fourth, the variance risk premium in stock options is negative. Our analysis highlights the importance of microstructure biases and robustness in empirical work with options.