This paper develops a partial equilibrium model of a banking firm to analyze how provisioning rules influence loan market fluctuations. We show that a backward-looking provisioning system amplifies the pro-cyclicality of loan market fluctuations. We demonstrate that, in a forward-looking provisioning system where statistical provisions are used to smooth the evolution of total loan loss provisions, the issue of pro-cyclicality of loan market fluctuations does not exist. Our results support the recent call of the Basel Committee for the implementation of a forward-looking provisioning system to address procyclicality.

This study examines how bank risk influences employee wage compensation, disentangling the effects of risk exposure and leverage. Using data from U.S. commercial banks (1990–2022), we find that higher bank risk—measured by earnings volatility, default probability, and credit risk—is associated with higher wages, alongside wage effects linked to monitoring incentives from greater capitalization. This relationship is most pronounced in smaller, less-capitalized banks, under favorable economic conditions, and when bank concentration is low—contexts where employees have greater bargaining power. Overall, bank wages reflect both compensation for job insecurity and monitoring-related incentives, offering insight into employee pay as a signal of bank fragility.

We investigate whether excess control rights of ultimate owners in pyramids affect banks׳ capital ratio adjustments. When control and cash flow rights are identical, to boost capital ratios banks issue equity without cutting lending. However, when control rights exceed cash flow rights, instead of issuing equity, banks downsize by reducing lending. Such a finding is mostly prevalent in countries with weak shareholder protection or for family-controlled banks. Other factors also explain the extent to which such banks reduce lending. Our findings contribute to the capital structure adjustment literature and have critical policy implications for the implementation of Basel III and the debate on capital requirements and bank lending.

Our study of 602 European banks over 1996–2002 investigates how the banks’ expansion into fee-based services has affected their interest margins and loan pricing. We find that higher income share from commissions and fees is associated with lower margins and loan spreads. The higher the commission and fee income share, moreover, the weaker the link between bank loan spreads and loan risk. The latter result is consistent with the conjecture that banks price (or misprice) loans to increase sales of other services. That loss leader (or cross selling) hypothesis has implications for bank regulation and competition with (non-bank) lenders.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between bank risk and product diversification in the changing structure of the European banking industry. Based on a broad set of European banks for the period 1996–2002, our study first shows that banks expanding into non-interest income activities present higher risk and higher insolvency risk than banks which mainly supply loans. However, considering size effects and splitting non-interest activities into both trading activities and commission and fee activities we show that the positive link with risk is mostly accurate for small banks and essentially driven by commission and fee activities. A higher share of trading activities is never associated with higher risk and for small banks it implies, in some cases, lower asset and default risks.

We empirically examine whether the way a bank might use loan loss provisions to smooth its income is influenced by its ownership concentration and the regulatory environment. Using a panel of European commercial banks, we find evidence that banks with more concentrated ownership use discretionary loan loss provisions to smooth their income. This behavior is less pronounced in countries with stronger supervisory regimes or higher external audit quality. Banks with low levels of ownership concentration do not display such discretionary income smoothing behavior. This suggests the need to improve existing or implement new corporate governance mechanisms.

Using detailed ownership data for a sample of European commercial banks, we analyze the link between ownership structure and risk in both privately owned and publicly held banks. We consider five categories of shareholders that are specific to our dataset. We find that ownership structure is significant in explaining risk differences but mainly for privately owned banks. A higher equity stake of either individuals/families or banking institutions is associated with a decrease in asset risk and default risk. In addition, institutional investors and non-financial companies impose the riskiest strategies when they hold higher stakes. For publicly held banks, changes in ownership structure do not affect risk taking. Market forces seem to align the risk-taking behavior of publicly held banks, such that ownership structure is no longer a determinant in explaining risk differences. However, higher stakes of banking institutions in publicly held banks are associated with lower credit and default risk.