This paper studies the joint effect of borrowing and short-sale constraints under heterogeneous beliefs and risk aversions. Although the constraints never simultaneously bind in equilibrium, interesting economics emerge in the anticipatory effects of potentially future binding constraints. In particular, the risk-free rate and Sharpe ratio experience endogenous jumps at a critical state, where two equilibria coexist. Moreover, a short-sale ban can lead to a lower stock price and higher volatility depending on the relative tightness between the constraints, and tightening the borrowing constraint during a short-sale ban can also make returns more volatile.

This study considers the experience of china's one-child policy to examine how fertility restrictions affect economic and social outcomes over a lifetime. Using variations in these penalties across provinces and over time, we find that exposure to stricter fertility restrictions when young leads to higher education levels, more white-collar jobs, delayed marriage, and lower fertility rates. Further consequences include lower rates of residing with the elderly and higher household income, consumption, and savings. Finally, exposure to stricter fertility restrictions in early life increases female empowerment. Overall, fertility restrictions imposed when people are young have powerful effects throughout their life cycle.

Mutual fund returns are significantly related to stock characteristics in the cross-section after controlling for risk via factor models. We develop a new double-adjusted approach that controls for both factor model betas and stock characteristics in one performance measure. The new measure substantially affects performance rankings, with a quarter of funds experiencing a change in their percentile ranking greater than 10. Double-adjusted performance produces strong evidence of persistence in relative performance. Inference based on the new measure often differs, sometimes dramatically, from that based on traditional performance estimates. Received November 22, 2019; editorial decision June 28, 2020; Editor: Jeffrey Pontiff.

We use an exogenous event, namely, the spillover effects of Hurricane Katrina on corporate bonds through the liquidation of bond holdings by insurance companies, to study how companies react to temporary changes in the relative availability of bond and bank financing. We find that the negative shock on bonds induces firms to shift from bond financing to bank-based borrowing and to shorten the debt maturity. This shift in debt policy does not revert in the long term. There is no significant change in capital structure, suggesting that the substitution from bonds to bank loans is sufficient for the amount of borrowing.

We analyze the bank supply of credit under the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP). The literature emphasizes relationships as a means to improve lender information, which helps banks manage credit risk. Despite imposing no risk, however, the PPP supply reflects traditional measures of relationship lending: decreasing in bank size and increasing in prior experience, commitment lending, and core deposits. Our results suggest a new benefit of bank relationships: They help firms access government-subsidized lending. Consistent with this benefit, we show that the bank PPP supply, based on the structure of the local banking sector, alleviates increases in unemployment.

Why did the failure of Lehman Brothers make the financial crisis dramatically worse? Our answer is that the financial crisis was a process of a build-up of risk during the crisis prior to the Lehman failure. During the crisis market participants tried to preserve an option to withdraw by shortening maturities — the “flight from maturity”. We show that the flight from maturity was manifested in a steepening of the term structures of spreads in money markets. With increasingly short maturities, lenders created the possibility of fast exit. The failure of Lehman Brothers was the tipping point of this build-up of systemic fragility. A crisis is a dynamic process in which “tail risk” is endogenous.

The Chinese government broke its long-standing practice of bond bailouts in March 2014. The number and value of bond defaults increased substantially in the following years. We investigate bond defaults in China from 2014 to 2019 and examine the impact of no-bailout reform. We find significantly higher yield spreads on lower-rated bonds over AAA bonds after the policy change. Furthermore, we document much lower default rates for SOE bonds than non-SOE bonds and an increased funding advantage of SOEs after March 2014. Surprisingly, credit rating agencies loosened rating standards in response to the policy change, suggesting their caving into issuer demands for higher ratings.

This paper provides first evidence of negative peer disclosure (NPD), an emerging corporate strategy to publicize adverse news of industry peers on social media. Consistent with NPDs being implicit positive self-disclosures, disclosing firms experience a two-day abnormal return of 1.6–1.7% over the market and industry. Further exploring the benefits and costs of such disclosures, we find that NPD propensity increases with the degree of product market rivalry and technology proximity and disclosing firms outperform nondisclosing peers in the product markets in the year following NPDs. These results rationalize peer disclosure and extend the scope of the literature beyond self-disclosure.