Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 141 (SFAS No. 141)'s requirement that an acquirer in a business combination estimate the fair value of the target's separately identifiable assets and liabilities (including research and development capital) provides a rare occasion where estimated fair values of U.S. firms' research and development (R&D) capital based on private information about their R&D activities are publicly disclosed. The degree to which equity values impound the estimated fair values of R&D depends upon the extent to which the private information implicit in the R&D estimates is reflected in investor expectations. Financial statement recognition of R&D capital and analyst activities have been cited as alternative mechanisms by which private information about firms' R&D activities can be revealed to investors. I investigate the degree to which both mechanisms lead to the public revelation of the private information implicit in the R&D fair value estimates by examining whether financial statement recognition of R&D assets by the target prior to the merger announcement and/or analyst coverage of a target prior to the merger announcement influence the degree to which the target's pre-merger announcement equity value reflects the acquirer's subsequently disclosed estimate of the fair value of the target's R&D capital. I find that the degree to which a target's pre-merger announcement equity value reflects the estimated fair value of its R&D capital is increasing in the amount of R&D-related intangibles captured in the target's pre-merger announcement balance sheets and in the number of analysts covering the target prior to the merger announcement. This evidence is consistent with the notion that both financial statement recognition and analysts' private information search activities lead to the revelation of private information about the value of R&D assets that investors incorporate into equity values. I further find that the positive relation between analyst following and the market's valuation of R&D capital is strongest for the portion of the estimated fair value of R&D capital that is unrecognized by the target prior to the merger announcement. This finding is consistent with analysts filling in the information gap left by the lack of financial statement recognition. The results of this study confirm the theorized roles of financial statement recognition and analyst activities in aiding the market's valuation of intangible assets.

I extend prior research on the information content of conference calls by examining whether they accelerate analysts' and investors' responses to the future implications of currently announced earnings. I find that the initiation of conference calls is associated with a significant reduction in the serial correlation in analyst forecast errors, a measure of initial analyst underreaction. I also find that the initiation of conference calls is associated with significant reductions in two measures of initial investor underreaction: (1) post-earnings announcement drift and (2) the proportion of the total market reaction to firms' earnings announcements that is “delayed” (i.e., that is attributable to post-earnings announcement drift). The reduction in post-earnings announcement drift surrounding conference call initiation is concentrated in the set of sample firms where drift is most severe (i.e., the smallest, least heavily traded sample firms) while the largest, most heavily traded sample firms do not exhibit significant drift either before or after conference call initiation. Robustness tests, including analyses of matched samples of nonconference call firms, indicate that the results are not driven by general increases in analyst and investor sophistication over time or by contemporaneous increases in the information and trading environments of conference call initiators.

We find that bidders are more likely to hold conference calls at merger announcements when the mergers are financed with stock and when the transactions are large. After controlling for endogeneity, we also find that conference calls are associated with more favorable market reactions to merger announcements. A content analysis of merger-related information releases for a limited subsample indicates that the more favorable reaction is related to the fact that, compared to press releases, conference calls provide a greater volume of information and place greater emphasis on forward-looking details. We find no evidence that the superior announcement returns associated with conference calls subsequently reverse or that conference calls are positively associated with pre-merger announcement abnormal accruals. Overall, the results suggest that managers use conference calls around merger announcements to credibly convey favorable private information to the market.

Managers often explain their earnings forecasts by linking forecasted performance to their internal actions and the actions of parties external to the firm. These attributions potentially aid investors in the interpretation of management forecasts by confirming known relationships between attributions and profitability or by identifying additional causes that investors should consider when forecasting earnings. We investigate why managers choose to provide attributions with their forecasts and whether the attributions are related to security price reactions to management earnings forecasts. Using a sample of 951 management earnings forecasts issued from 1993 to 1996, we find that attributions are more likely for larger firms, less likely for firms in regulated industries, less likely for forecasts issued over longer horizons, more likely for bad news forecasts, and more likely for forecasts that are maximum type. Furthermore, attributions are associated with greater absolute price reactions to management forecasts, more negative price reactions to management forecasts (forecast news held constant), and a greater price reaction per dollar of unexpected earnings. Our findings hold after control for the aforementioned determinants of attributions and after control for other firm‐ and forecast‐specific variables that are often associated with security prices.

Seemingly self-serving attributions either attribute favorable performance to internal causes (enhancing attributions) or poor performance to external causes (defensive attributions). Managers presumably provide such attributions in earnings press releases to heighten (dampen) investors' perceptions of the persistence of good (bad) earnings news, thereby increasing (decreasing) the market reward (penalty) for good (bad) earnings news. Building on attribution theory and prior research on earnings commonality, this study investigates cross-sectional differences in investors' responses to quarterly earnings press releases that contain seemingly self-serving attributions. Using a random sample of press releases from 1999 to 2005, we find that firms that provide defensive attributions to explain earnings disappointments experience less severe market penalties when: (1) more of the their industry peers also release bad news, and (2) their earnings share higher commonality with industry- and market-level earnings. On the other hand, firms that provide enhancing attributions to explain good earnings news reap greater market rewards when: (1) more of their industry peers release bad news, and (2) their earnings share lower commonality with industry- and market-level earnings. Collectively, our results demonstrate that investors neither ignore seemingly self-serving attributions nor accept them at face value, but rely on industry- and firm-specific information to assess their plausibility. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the text.

Citing fear of legal liability as a partial explanation, prior research documents (1) managers' reluctance to voluntarily disclose management earnings forecasts, and (2) greater forecast disclosure frequencies in periods of bad news. We provide evidence on how management earnings forecast disclosure differs between the United States (U.S.) and Canada, two otherwise similar business environments with different legal regimes. Canadian securities laws and judicial interpretations create a far less litigious environment than exists in the U.S. We find a greater frequency of management earnings forecast disclosure in Canada relative to the U.S. Further, although U.S. managers are relatively more likely to issue forecasts during interim periods in which earnings decrease, Canadian managers do not exhibit that tendency. Instead, Canadian managers issue more forecasts when earnings are increasing, and their forecasts are of annual rather than interim earnings. Also consistent with a less litigious environment, Canadian managers issue more precise and longer-term forecasts. These findings hold after controlling for other determinants of management earnings forecast disclosure that might differ between the two countries—firm size, earnings volatility, information asymmetry, growth, capitalization rates, and membership in high-technology and regulated industries.

We examine whether management forecast errors (MFEs), which are traditionally interpreted as backward-looking indicators of how well forecasts preempted earnings announcements, also operate as forward-looking measures that aid with predicting future earnings. This possibility arises if an MFE represents unrealized revenues or expenses a manager originally anticipated to occur in the forecast period but that ultimately occur in subsequent periods. Consistent with this possibility, we document that optimistic MFEs contain incremental information over current earnings for predicting future earnings realizations. This finding does not extend to pessimistic MFEs, consistent with such errors reflecting expectations management. The predictive information in optimistic MFEs is negatively related to managers' incentives to intentionally bias the forecast and is positively related to managerial ability. Analysts' post-earnings announcement forecasts for the subsequent period overestimate the future realization of MFEs, but such overestimation is less severe when managers issue timely post-earnings announcement forecast revisions for subsequent periods. Data Availability: Data used in this study are publicly available from sources identified in the text.

We provide evidence from the first short-window event study of consumers’ perceptual responses to earnings announcements using daily consumer perception data. We document a positive association between the change in consumers’ overall perceptions of a brand at the time of the earnings announcement and the earnings surprise—that is, a positive consumer earnings response coefficient (CERC). CERC is larger when there is greater traditional news or social media activity, indicating that news dissemination is an important channel for consumers to respond to earnings news. Moreover, CERC varies based on brand and consumer characteristics. Changes in consumer perceptions at the time of the earnings announcement are positively associated with changes in purchase consideration and intent and with changes in realized future sales growth. To maximize identification, we document a positive and statistically significant CERC in a controlled experiment. Our findings demonstrate the importance of earnings to an important stakeholder. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources cited in the text.