Using a new narrative measure of fiscal policy shocks for the U.K., we show that households with mortgage debt exhibit large and significant consumption responses to tax changes. Homeowners without a mortgage, in contrast, do not adjust their expenditure, with responses not statistically different from zero at all horizons. We compare our findings to the predictions of traditional and newer theories of liquidity constraints, providing a novel interpretation for the aggregate effects of tax changes on the macroeconomy.

We investigate inflation predictability in the United States across the monetary regimes of the twentieth century. The forecasts based on money growth and output growth were significantly more accurate than the forecasts based on past inflation only during the regimes associated with neither a clear nominal anchor nor a credible commitment to fight inflation. These include the years from the outbreak of World War II in 1939 to the implementation of the Bretton Woods Agreements in 1951 and from Nixon's closure of the gold window in 1971 to the end of Volcker's disinflation in 1983.

Using household survey data for the U.S. and the U.K., we show that the aggregate response of consumption to interest rate changes is driven by households with a mortgage. Outright home-owners do not adjust expenditure at all while renters change their spending but by less than mortgagors. Income rises for all households as interest rate cuts directly affect firm investment and household consumption, boosting aggregate demand. A crucial difference between the housing tenure groups is the composition of their balance sheets: mortgagors hold sizable illiquid assets but little liquid wealth. Our results reveal that general equilibrium effects on household income coupled with balance-sheet-driven heterogeneity in the marginal propensity to consume play a key role in the transmission of monetary policy.

Military spending has large and persistent effects on output because it shifts the composition of public spending toward R&D. This boosts innovation and private investment in the medium term and increases productivity and GDP at longer horizons. Public R&D expenditure stimulates economic activities beyond the business cycle even when it is not associated with war spending. In contrast, the effects of public investment are shorter-lived, while public consumption has a modest impact at most horizons. We reach these conclusions using BVAR with long lags and 125 years of US data, including newly reconstructed series of government spending by main categories since 1890.

This paper looks at the voting patterns of internal and external members of the MPC to investigate how far there are differences between insiders and outsiders. We make three contributions. First, we assess the extent to which the Bank of England internally generated forecasts explain the MPC members' voting decisions. This is important as generating forecasts on a quarterly basis is a key part of the process used by the Bank of England. The forecast for inflation is made public in the Inflation Report while the output gap forecast is not. Second, we use a random coefficient method of estimation in which the parameters of the interest rate rule are allowed, but not required, to be different across members. Third, we find evidence of some heterogeneity in the intercept, a measure of experience on the MPC and the interest rate smoothing parameter, but no significant differences in the members' reaction to the forecasts of inflation and the output gap. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

A series of discontinuities in the allocation mechanism of federal transfers to municipal governments in Brazil allow us to identify the causal effect of public spending on local labour markets, using a “fuzzy” Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD). Our estimates imply a cost per job of about 8,000 US dollars per year and a local income multiplier around two. The effect comes mostly from employment in services and is more pronounced among less financially developed municipalities.

Most analyses of the U.S. Great Moderation have been based on structural VAR methods, and have consistently pointed towards good luck as the main explanation for the greater macroeconomic stability of recent years. Based on an estimated New-Keynesian model in which the only source of change is the move from passive to active monetary policy, we show that VARs may misinterpret good policy for good luck. First, the policy shift is sufficient to generate decreases in the theoretical innovation variances for all series, and decreases in the variances of inflation and the output gap, without any need of sunspot shocks. With sunspots, the estimated model exhibits decreases in both variances and innovation variances for all series. Second, policy counterfactuals based on the theoretical structural VAR representations of the model under the two regimes fail to capture the truth, whereas impulse-response functions to a monetary policy shock exhibit little change across regimes. Since these results are in line with those found in the structural VARbased literature on the Great Moderation, our analysis suggests that existing VAR evidence is compatible with the 'good policy' explanation of the Great Moderation.

By extending his data, we document the instability of low-frequency regression coefficients that Lucas (1980) used to express the quantity theory of money. We impute the differences in these regression coefficients to differences in monetary policies across periods. A DSGE model estimated over a subsample like Lucas's implies values of the regression coefficients that confirm Lucas's results for his sample period. But perturbing monetary policy rule parameters away from the values estimated over Lucas's subsample alters the regression coefficients in ways that reproduce their instability over our longer sample.

This paper examines how central bank policies influence mortgage pricing in the United Kingdom. It shows that lenders price discriminate by offering two-part tariffs of interest rates and origination fees, and during unconventional monetary policies like the Funding for Lending Scheme, lenders reduced interest rates while increasing fees. Using a model of mortgage demand and lender competition, we find that central bank policies increased mortgage lending. Additionally, banning origination fees would reduce lending, as fees help lenders capture surplus while allowing them to price discriminate across borrowers with different sensitivities to rates and fees.

This paper presents a new empirical regularity between the volatility of productivity growth and long-run unemployment for a given level of long-run productivity growth. A theoretical framework based on asymmetric real wage rigidities is shown to have the potential to rationalize this finding. The model tends to fit U.S. long-run unemployment better than a specification based on long-run productivity growth only, especially during the Great Moderation and the Great Recession.