Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDC) have attracted considerable interest and its deployment on a global scale is imminent. However, CBDC face several challenges. They include: legal, technological, and political considerations. We summarize those challenges and add a few more that have not received much attention in the literature. We then focus on two forms of CBDC: a narrow version that only replaces notes and coins and a broader form with a deposit feature. The narrow CBDC is the most likely one to be first introduced. Next, relying on evidence of past episodes of financial innovation, and using cross-country data, we explore the hypothetical impact of CBDC on inflation and financial stability, based on the historical behaviour of the velocity of circulation and incorporating a CBDC’s impact using McCallum’s policy rule which sets the stance of monetary policy based on money growth. Our simulations suggest that CBDC need not produce higher inflation, but financial stability remains at risk. We provide some policy implications.

We simulate the impact on the nonbank liabilities of banks in a multiplex interbank environment arising from changes in currency exposure. Currency shocks as a source of financial contagion in the banking sector have not, so far, been considered. Our model considers two sources of contagion: shocks to nonbank assets and exchange rate shocks. Interbank loans can mature at different times. We demonstrate that a dominant currency can be a significant source of financial contagion. We also find evidence of asymmetries in losses stemming from large currency depreciations versus appreciations. A variety of scenarios are considered allowing for differences in the sparsity of the banking network, the relative size and number of banks, changes in nonbank assets and equity, the possibility of bank breakups, and the dominance of a particular currency. Policy implications are also drawn.

In recognition of the severe consequences of the recent international financial crisis, the topic of macroprudential policy has elicited considerable research effort. The present study constructs, for 46 economies around the globe, an index of the capacity to deploy macroprudential policies. Building on elements that have been the subject of recent research, we develop an index that aims to represent the essence of what constitutes a macroprudential regime. Specifically, the index quantifies: (1) how existing macroprudential frameworks are organized; and (2) how far a particular jurisdiction is from reaching the goals established by the Group of Twenty (G20) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB). The latter is a benchmark that has not been considered in the burgeoning literature that seeks to quantify the role of macroprudential policies.

Short sellers are routinely blamed for destabilizing stock markets by exacerbating deviations from fundamental values. In response, regulators periodically impose short sale constraints aimed at preventing excessive stock market declines. One explanation is that policy makers regard short sellers as behaving like positive feedback traders. Relying on the theoretical model put forward by Sentana and Wadhwani (1992), which stresses the conditional nature of returns’ persistence, bans on selected financial stocks in six countries during the 2008/2009 global financial crisis are examined. These provide us with a setting to analyze the impact of short sale restrictions on feedback trading. Our findings suggest that, in the majority of markets examined, restrictions of this kind amplify positive feedback trading during periods of high volatility and, hence, contribute to stock market downturns. On balance then, short selling bans do not contribute to enhancing financial stability.

In this paper, we ask whether the Bundesbank, prior to the European Central Bank taking responsibility for monetary policy in 1999, reacted systematically to stock price movements. In contrast to the results for the US, our empirical findings show a generally weak relationship between German stock returns and short-term interest rates at the daily and the monthly frequency. The results are extremely robust to alternative model specifications. The evidence is inconsistent with the hypothesis of a systematic reaction of the Bundesbank to German stock prices. However, we do find that, as in the US, the Bundesbank may have reacted to the stock market crash of 1987 by loosening monetary policy.