This paper investigates whether banking liberalization affects corporate tax planning by exploiting China's two interest rate deregulations as quasi-natural experiments. We find that firms reduce their level of tax avoidance following banking liberalization and that the identified effect is concentrated in firms with more bank borrowing after liberalization, firms located in non-financial centers, as well as non-SOE firms and firms with fewer political connections. In addition, we find that firms reduce their use of related party transactions and tax-related bribery after banking liberalization. Our results suggest that firms engage in less tax avoidance with more available/cheaper external financial resources and that, on average, the costs of engaging in tax avoidance are higher than the costs of borrowing from banks.

We investigate the effect of agency conflicts between shareholders and debtholders on aggressive tax avoidance using a unique setting of dual holders who simultaneously hold equity and debt of the same firms. We find robust evidence that firms with dual holders exhibit more aggressive tax behavior even after controlling for endogeneity, suggesting that shareholder-debtholder conflicts induce firms to underinvest in tax aggressiveness. In addition, there exists a concave relation between tax aggressiveness and dual owners’ debt exposure relative to their overall debt and equity exposures to the investee firms. Further tests show that the effect of dual ownership on tax aggressiveness is more pronounced among firms with higher risk-shifting tendencies and higher managerial risk-taking incentives. Finally, our bond borrowing cost test shows that dual holdings mitigate the increased cost of borrowing due to aggressive tax avoidance.