As a result of poor asset allocation decisions by 401(k) participants, 72% of all plans now offer target date funds, and participants heavily invest in them. Here, we study the characteristics and performance of TDFs, providing a unique view by employing data on TDFs holdings. We show that additional expenses charged by TDFs are largely offset by the low-cost share classes they hold, not normally open to their investors. Additionally, TDFs are very active in their allocation decisions and increasingly bet on nonstandard asset classes. However, TDFs do not earn alpha from timing or their selection of individual assets.

We rely on a model with incomplete contracts and bargaining power to argue that trade credit (TC) can serve as a commitment device for making relationship-specific investments (RSIs). Unlike existing theories, we explain within a single theoretical framework why TC is affected by firms’ bargaining power and by the specialized nature of transacted goods. Using a large panel of publicly listed firms and innovation-based proxies for RSI, we find strong support for the model’s predictions: TC increases in upstream firm’s RSI and downstream firm’s market power. Endogeneity concerns are addressed by using the passage of innovation-increasing state laws to instrument for RSI and import penetration to instrument for bargaining power.

Using data from Securities and Exchange Commission filings, I show that the typical bank loan is renegotiated five times, or every nine months. The pricing, maturity, amount, and covenants are all significantly modified during each renegotiation, whose timing is governed by the financial health of the contracting parties and uncertainty regarding the borrowers’ credit quality. The relative importance of these factors depends on the duration of the lending relationship. I interpret these results in light of financial contracting theories and emphasize that renegotiation is an important mechanism for dynamically completing contracts and for allocating control rights ex post.

We study how firms engaged in both R&D and fixed investment manage liquidity and adjust real investment during the recent financial crisis. Among firms with positive R&D expenditures, cuts to fixed investment in the crisis are typically far more severe than cuts to R&D. These firms allocate cash reserves to buffer R&D but do not use cash to protect fixed investment. Some firms appear to go so far as to allow the stock of fixed assets to fall to stabilize R&D. The use of cash holdings and fixed assets to protect R&D is particularly strong among firms most likely to face financing frictions at the start of the crisis. We only find evidence that firms use cash to buffer fixed investment when we expand the sample to include firms with no R&D spending to compete for funds. Our study provides direct evidence on the real effects of liquidity management, highlights a key benefit of precautionary cash reserves, and illustrates the adjustments firms make to navigate a financial crisis.

We use a unique data set that contains information on more than 1,000 Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) around the world to investigate the degree to which executives delegate financial decisions and the circumstances that drive variation in delegation. Delegation does not appear to be monolithic; instead, our results show that it varies across corporate policies and also varies with the personal characteristics of the CEO. We find that CEOs delegate financial decisions for which they need the most input, when they are overloaded, and when they are distracted by recent acquisitions. CEOs delegate less when they are knowledgeable (long-tenured or with a finance background). Capital is allocated based on “gut feel” and the personal reputation of the manager running a given division. Finally, corporate politics and corporate socialism affect capital allocation in European and Asian firms.

It is frequently observed that fraud has a greater economic impact on society than any other category of crime. Arguing that both research and practitioner frameworks in auditing and forensic accounting have tended to adopt an individualizing perspective predicated primarily on solo offending, this article adopts an inductive approach to consider why individuals co‐offend in fraud. It reports the results of a set of interviews with 37 individuals convicted of a range of frauds including financial statement fraud, insider trading, credit card fraud, money laundering, and asset misappropriation. In each instance, the fraud was perpetrated by a group of two or more co‐offenders. Based on inductive, exploratory case coding, we find that reasons for co‐offending vary according to the type of bond that exists between co‐offenders. Two dimensions of fraudulent co‐offending are identified—the primary beneficiary of the fraud and the nature of group attachment—to derive three distinct archetypes of bonds between co‐offenders: (1) individual‐serving functional bonds, (2) organization‐serving functional bonds, and (3) affective bonds. Key elements of each archetype as well as their impact on the decision to co‐offend are examined. Our findings suggest that the social nature of fraud is not merely an incidental feature of the crime but is instead a potential key to understanding its etiology and some of its distinctive features. They also support the need for diagnostic tools to move beyond individualistic analyses of fraud toward a broader, group‐sensitive assessment of fraud risk.

The media has an incentive to publish sensational news. We study how this incentive affects the accuracy of media coverage in the context of merger rumors. Using a novel dataset, we find that accuracy is predicted by a journalist's experience, specialized education, and industry expertise. Conversely, less accurate stories use ambiguous language and feature well-known firms with broad readership appeal. Investors do not fully account for the predictive power of these characteristics, leading to an initial target price overreaction and a subsequent reversal, consistent with limited attention. Overall, we provide novel evidence on the determinants of media accuracy and its effect on asset prices.

The media has an incentive to publish sensational news. We study how this incentive affects the accuracy of media coverage in the context of merger rumors. Using a novel dataset, we find that accuracy is predicted by a journalist's experience, specialized education, and industry expertise. Conversely, less accurate stories use ambiguous language and feature well-known firms with broad readership appeal. Investors do not fully account for the predictive power of these characteristics, leading to an initial target price overreaction and a subsequent reversal, consistent with limited attention. Overall, we provide novel evidence on the determinants of media accuracy and its effect on asset prices.

Unregulated US corporations dramatically increased their debt usage over the past century. Aggregate leverage—low and stable before 1945—more than tripled between 1945 and 1970 from 11% to 35%, eventually reaching 47% by the early 1990s. The median firm in 1946 had no debt, but by 1970 had a leverage ratio of 31%. This increase occurred in all unregulated industries and affected firms of all sizes. Changing firm characteristics are unable to account for this increase. Rather, changes in government borrowing, macroeconomic uncertainty, and financial sector development play a more prominent role. Despite this increase among unregulated firms, a combination of stable debt usage among regulated firms and a decrease in the fraction of aggregate assets held by regulated firms over this period resulted in a relatively stable economy-wide leverage ratio during the 20th century.