To measure the benefits of formal contract enforcement for society, I create a market with merchants and buyers, in which buyers can choose whether to buy, and whether to pay. A set of multiple “state‐favored” ethnic groups control the state. I experimentally vary whether formal contracts are required and the composition of buyer‐merchant pairs. The design separately identifies the effect of the contracts on the buyers' incentive to pay and on their incentive to buy. I document two ways in which society limits the benefits of contracts. First, contracts reduce buyer cheating, thus increasing merchants' profits, if, and only if, the merchant is state‐favored. Buyers' beliefs suggest that the merchants can enforce the contracts if, and only if, the merchant is state‐favored. Second, holding constant whether the pair is state‐favored, contracts only influence buyer choices when the buyer and the merchant belong to two, different, state‐favored ethnic groups. Buyers' choices and beliefs confirm that, in that case, the contracts are expected to be enforceable, but they have no effect on buyers' choices because reputation already governs the incentives to cheat within groups. The findings temper the view of the state as independent from society, offer a rationale for why contracts are not adopted, and nuance the notion of state weakness.

A positive demand shock for coltan, a mineral whose bulky output cannot be concealed, leads armed actors to create illicit customs and provide protection at coltan mines, where they settle as “stationary bandits.” A similar shock for gold, easy to conceal, leads to stationary bandits in the villages where income from gold is spent, where they introduce illicit mining visas, taxes, and administrations. Having a stationary bandit from a militia or the Congolese army increases welfare. These findings suggest that armed actors may create “essential functions of a state” to better expropriate, which, depending on their goals, can increase welfare.

Across human societies, one sees many examples of deeply rooted and widely held beliefs that are almost certainly untrue. Examples include beliefs about witchcraft, magic, ordeals, and superstitions. Why are such incorrect beliefs so prevalent and how do they persist? We consider this question through an examination of superstitions and magic associated with conflict in the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Focusing on superstitions related to bullet-proofing, we provide theory and case-study evidence showing how these incorrect beliefs persist. Although harmful at the individual-level, we show that they generate Pareto efficient outcomes that have group-level benefits.

This paper provides insight into a corruption scheme in Kinshasa’s traffic police agency. First, various data collection branches show that the agency’s revenue is five times that from fines and is derived from a coalition of traffic police officials, their managers, and judicial police officers scheming to extort drivers. Second, the analysis of an experiment suggests that the scheme subverts service. Third, the scheme appears to be a rational response to the context, but its logic is widespread. The findings suggest that coalitions of officials, while being socially costly, can yield large illicit revenue, nuancing the notion of state weakness. (JEL D73, H76, K42, O17)

Abstract This study presents a new economic perspective on state-building based on a case study in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s hinterland. We explore the implications for the state of considering rebels as stationary bandits. When the state, through a military operation, made it impossible for rebels to levy taxes, it inadvertently encouraged them to plunder the assets of the very citizens they previously preferred to tax. When it negotiated with rebels instead, this effect was absent, but negotiating compromised the state’s legitimacy and prompted the emergence of new rebels. The findings suggest that attempting to increase taxation by a weak state in the hinterland could come at the expense of safety in the medium term and of the integrity of the state in the long term.