Robert S. Harris, The Cities Service Takeover: A Case Study: Discussion, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 38, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings Forty-First Annual Meeting American Finance Association New York, N.Y. December 28-30, 1982 (May, 1983), pp. 345-347

This paper examines foreign direct investment by studying shareholder wealth gains for 1273 U.S. firms acquired during the period 1970‐1987. Three findings stand out. First, cross‐border takeovers are more frequent in research and development intensive industries than are domestic acquisitions; furthermore, in three‐fourths of cross‐border transactions the buyer and seller are in related industries. These industry patterns suggest that costs and imperfections in product markets play an important role in foreign direct investment. Second, targets of foreign buyers have significantly higher wealth gains than do targets of U.S. firms. This cross‐border effect is comparable in size to the wealth effects of all‐cash and multiple bids, two effects receiving substantial attention in the finance literature, and is robust to inclusion of these two variables. Third, while the cross‐border effect on wealth gains is not well explained by industry and tax variables, it is positively related to the weakness of the U.S. dollar, indicating a significant role for exchange rate movements in foreign direct investment.

We examine compensation for endowment Chief Investment Officers (CIOs) overseeing portfolios with significant allocations to alternatives. We find widespread use of bonuses and that large endowments with high alternative allocations hire CIOs with stronger backgrounds, pay them more, and have higher pay-for-performance sensitivity. We find weak evidence of a relationship between compensation and future performance. Our results align with contract theory predictions but differ from empirical findings on pension funds. Endowments pay CIOs more, rely more on bonuses, attract more experienced professionals, and have lower turnover than pensions. This suggests more effective talent management compared to politically influenced public pensions.

This paper examines the effects of over 1,800 U.K. takeovers on shareholder wealth in the period 1955–1985. It shows that around the merger announcement date targets gain 25 to 30 percent and bidders earn zero or modest gains. The U.K. data allow independent tests of many issues addressed in studies of U.S. takeovers. Target gains are higher in the U.K. after 1968, suggesting that increases in U.S. target gains at the same time may not be attributable to the Williams Act. Postmerger share-price performance suggests that acquisitions follow favorable developments in bidder's equity prices.

Robert A. Eisenbeis, Robert S. Harris, Josef Lakonishok, Benefits of Bank Diversification: The Evidence from Shareholder Returns, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 39, No. 3, Papers and Proceedings, Forty-Second Annual Meeting, American Finance Association, San Francisco, CA, December 28-30, 1983 (Jul., 1984), pp. 881-892

We study the pricing effects of dividend and earnings announcements by taking advantage of the unique setting in Japan where managers simultaneously announce the current year's dividends and earnings as well as forecasts of next year's dividends and earnings. Defining surprises as deviations from analysts' forecasts, we find that share price reactions are significantly affected by earnings surprises, especially management forecasts of next year's earnings. The information content of dividends is marginal and is restricted to announcements of next year's dividends. Consistent with Modigliani and Miller's dividend irrelevance proposition, current dividend surprises have no material impact on stock prices in Japan.