Managers frequently cite the desire to mitigate asymmetric information as a motivation for increasing firm focus. The information benefits of focus appear relevant for the subset of firms that actually increase their focus; however, the relevance of focus-related information benefits for the population of diversified firms is an open question. This paper examines the relation between corporate diversification and asymmetric information proxies derived from analysts’ forecasts and abnormal returns associated with earnings announcements. I find that greater diversification is not associated with increased asymmetric information. These results call into question the notion that corporate diversification strictly exacerbates information problems.

Abstract We estimate the stock’s likelihood of extreme returns by measuring the extent to which the stock’s trades are correlated with market-wide and industry-wide trades during normal times, referred to as herding. We find that stocks whose trades herd most with aggregate-level trades experience most negative (positive) returns during market crashes (booms). While herding generates extreme returns in both sides, investors appear to demand compensation for the possibility of extreme low returns. This is the case even when we control for standard asset pricing variables and other tail risk proxies.

Abstract. Given the quantity of nonearnings data disclosed in firms' annual reports, and the many dimensions of performance measured, it is likely that such information is used in establishing equilibrium prices in the market for firms' shares. This study empirically tests the hypothesis that equity price‐relevant information conveyed by annual reports includes several measures other than earnings. The marginal impact of both earnings‐ and nonearnings‐based financial ratios is analyzed and reported. The ratio information is first partitioned into distinct sets using an a priori linear components (LISREL) model. Association tests then show incremental information effects for the earnings‐based ratio set as well as for several nonearnings‐based ratio sets. Résumé. Étant donné la quantité de données étrangères aux bénéfices présentées dans les rapports annuels des entreprises et les nombreuses dimensions sous lesquelles le rendement est mesuré, il est probable que cette information soit utilisée dans l'établissement de prix d'équilibre dans le marché des actions des entreprises. Dans la présente étude, les auteurs procèdent à des vérifications empiriques de l'hypothèse selon laquelle l'information pertinente aux prix relative aux participations que livrent les rapports annuels comporte plusieurs mesures étrangères aux bénéfices. Les auteurs analysent l'incidence marginale tant des ratios financiers basés sur les bénéfices que de ceux qui ne le sont pas, et ils en exposent les résultats. L'information indiciaire est d'abord partagée en jeux distincts à l'aide d'un modèle de composants linéaires a priori. Les tests d'association montrent ensuite les conséquences de l'information marginale pour le jeu des ratios basés sur les bénéfices ainsi que pour plusieurs jeux de ratios qui ne le sont pas.

The publication of Lester G. Telser's 1964 paper [52] was the starting point for much of the recent literature on advertising and competition. The major finding of that paper was that there is little empirical support for an inverse association between advertising and competition, despite some plausible theorizing to the contrary This review does not deal with the question of whether advertising is excessive, nor with the related issues of the welfare economics of advertising or product differentiation. Rather, it focuses on those papers which examine the impact of advertising on barriers to entry and on the extent of price competition. Advertising expenditures are designed to influence consumer demand for the firm's products. They may affect both direct and cross-elasticities of demand. Those who argue that advertising may limit competition maintain that the relevant demand curves[1] are more inelastic and that cross-elasticities are lower as a result, while those who dispute this contention suggest that advertising has no such influence or even that it leads to more elastic demands and higher cross-elasticities. Much controversy has therefore turned on the direction of the effects of advertising on demand elasticities. [Авторский текст]

Although the owners of publicly traded companies have had the right to offer shareholder proposals using Rule 14a-8 for several decades, the effectiveness of the rule has been frequently questioned because few of these proposals received substantial support from other shareholders and even fewer have been implemented by boards. Using new data from the 2002–2004 proxy seasons, we analyze shareholder voting patterns on these proposals, board reactions to them, and market responses. We find some big changes from earlier periods: many more proposals are receiving majority shareholder support during our sample period relative to earlier studies, and this support has translated into directors implementing more of the actions called for by shareholders. In particular, boards are increasingly willing to remove important anti-takeover defenses, such as the classified board and poison pill, in response to shareholders' requests, something rarely seen in the past. Despite the increase in support for shareholder proposals and board action in response, we find small and insignificant stock market reaction. We conclude that shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8 have an emerging role in reducing agency costs by increasing director responsiveness to shareholder concerns to open the market more fully to corporate control.

Using data from the 1998 proxy season, we find that higher levels of potential dilution from management-sponsored, executive-only stock option plans result in significantly negative cumulative abnormal returns in the 3-day period surrounding the proxy date. We also present evidence of a significantly negative relationship between the percentage vote against the option proposal and the percentage change in executive pay from the 1998 to 1999 compensation years. We interpret this finding to support the idea that boards of directors are responsive to shareholder concerns about CEO option awards following a high level of shareholder opposition.

We analyze trading speed and fragmentation in asset markets. In our model, trading venues make technological investments and compete for investors who choose where and how much to trade. Faster venues charge higher fees and attract speed-sensitive investors. Competition among venues increases investor participation, trading volume, and allocative e ffi ciency, but entry and fragmentation can be excessive, and speeds are generically ine ffi cient. Regulations that protect transaction prices (e.g., Securities and Exchange Commission trade-through rule) lead to greater fragmentation. Our model sheds light on the experience of European and U.S. markets since the implementation of Markets in Financial Instruments Directive and Regulation National Markets System.

Journal Article The Harvard Department of Economics from the Beginning to World War II Get access Edward S. Mason Edward S. Mason Thomas S. Lamont University Professor, Emeritus Harvard University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 97, Issue 3, August 1982, Pages 383–433, https://doi.org/10.2307/1885870 Published: 01 August 1982