We study how firms set wages for their employees when they can legally age-discriminate across workers. We exploit an age-specific minimum wage change in the UK, which raised the minimum applying to workers aged 25 and over, leaving unchanged the minima for younger workers. Using matched employer-employee data on a low-paying sector, we show large, positive wage spillovers on workers aged under 25, which arise within firms from company wage policy. Pay equity norms offer the most parsimonious explanation for the emergence of spillovers. The effects that we document also operate in other low-paying sectors of the UK labor market.

How does firm value change in response to a minimum wage hike? This paper exploits the announcement of a big change in the UK minimum wage that was both totally unanticipated and free of uncertainty. The stock market response to this is examined in an event study setting. The analysis uncovers significant falls in the stock market value of low-wage firms. In light of this finding, the paper concludes by discussing magnitudes of response, including longer-term modes of firm adjustment to the cost shock induced by the minimum wage hike.

This article derives three dynamic models of worker effort determination, based on a shirking efficiency wage model, a compensating differentials model, and a union-firm bargaining model. It shows that all of these three models have the same long-run comparative statics but differ in their short-run dynamics. We use these different predictions about the dynamics as a basis for testing the models. Euler equations for each model are estimated using panel data on 486 U.K. companies. The evidence supports the shirking model in firms with low levels of unionization but the bargaining model in highly unionized industries.

The evolution of rent sharing is studied. Based on a panel of the top 300 publicly quoted British companies over 35 years and using excess stock market returns to patenting activity as an instrument for economic rents, the paper reports evidence of a significant fall over time in the pass-through from rents to wages. It confirms that wages do respond to firm-level shocks to economic rents, but by significantly less after 2000 than during the 1980s and 1990s. The evidence of decline is robust, corroborated with alternative instruments and industry-level analysis for the United States and the European Union.

To what extent does crime follow the pattern of potential gains to illegal activity? This article presents evidence on how criminals respond to this key incentive by reporting crime–price elasticities estimated from a comprehensive crime dataset containing detailed information on stolen items for London between 2002 and 2012. Evidence of significant positive crime–price elasticities are shown, for a panel of 44 consumer goods and for commodity related goods (jewellery, fuel, and metal crimes). The reported evidence indicates that potential gains are a major empirical driver of criminal activity and a crucial part of the economic model of crime. The changing structure of goods prices helps to explain over 10–15% of the observed fall in property crime across all goods categories, and the majority of the sharp increases in the commodity related goods observed between 2002 and 2012.

Demand for less-skilled workers plummeted in developed countries in the 1980s. In open economies, pervasive skill-biased technological change (SBTC) can explain this decline. SBTC tends to increase the domestic supply of unskill-intensive goods by releasing less-skilled labor. The more countries experiencing a SBTC, the greater its potential to decrease the relative wages of less-skilled labor by increasing the world supply of unskill-intensive goods. We find strong evidence for pervasive SBTC in developed countries. Most industries increased the proportion of skilled workers despite generally rising or stable relative wages. Moreover, the same manufacturing industries simultaneously increased demand for skills in different countries. Many developing countries also show increased skill premiums, a pattern consistent with SBTC.

Recent work on the economic effects of minimum wages has stressed that the standard economic model, where increases in minimum wages depress employment, is not supported by empirical work in some labor markets. We present a general theoretical model whereby employers have some degree of monopsony power, which allows minimum wages to have the conventional negative impact on employment but which also allows for a neutral or positive impact. Studying the industry-based British Wages Councils between 1975 and 1992, we find that minimum wages significantly compress the distribution of earnings but do not have a negative impact on employment. I.

In this paper we study the causal impact of police on crime, looking at what happened to crime and police before and after the terror attacks that hit central London in July 2005. The attacks resulted in a large redeployment of police officers to central London as compared to outer London. During this time, crime fell significantly in central relative to outer London. The instrumental variable approach we use uncovers an elasticity of crime with respect to police of approximately -0.3 to -0.4, so that a 10 percent increase in police activity reduces crime by around 3 to 4 percent. JEL: K42

Recessions lead to short-term job loss, lower happiness, and decreasing income levels. There is growing evidence that workers who first join the labor market during economic downturns suffer from poor job matches that can have sustained detrimental effects on wages and career progressions. This paper uses U.S. and U.K. data to document a more disturbing long-run effect of recessions: young people who leave school during recessions are significantly more likely to lead a life of crime than those entering a buoyant labor market. Thus, crime scars resulting from higher entry-level unemployment rates prove to be long lasting and substantial.

This paper focuses on empirical connections between crime and immigration, studying two large waves of recent U.K. immigration (the late 1990s/early 2000s asylum seekers and the post-2004 inflow from EU accession countries). The first wave led to a modest but significant rise in property crime, while the second wave had a small negative impact. There was no effect on violent crime; arrest rates were not different, and changes in crime cannot be ascribed to crimes against immigrants. The findings are consistent with the notion that differences in labor market opportunities of different migrant groups shape their potential impact on crime.