Estimates of the intertemporal labor supply behavior of males in Canada using micro data are reported. Individuals make the intertemporal labor supply decision on the basis of annual hours and weeks. Precision of the parameter estimates is improved by using tenure variables as instruments for the wage. Further, the age and tenure variables are allowed to have taste parameters in the structural equations. The evidence suggests that this is required only for the two age variables. Elasticity evidence suggests that evolutionary changes in the wage cause changes in the number of weeks with the elasticity being 0.6 and statistically significant.

We analyse renegotiation in a hidden action principal-agent model. Contract renegotiation offers are made by the agent. A refinement is imposed on the principal's beliefs: if precisely one action is optimal with respect to both the principal's and the agent's contracts, the principal believes that that action has been taken. With the refinement imposed, perfect-Bayesian equilibrium allocations are identical to the second best in the classical principal-agent model without renegotiation. When renegotiation is led by the agent and when equilibria satisfy the refinement, equilibrium allocations are ex ante efficient.

From in-depth interviews with public accounting personnel, Dirsmith & Covaleski [Accounting, Organizations and Society (1985) pp. 149–169] concluded that mentoring exists in large public accounting firms and benefits the mentor, protégé and the firm. Based on a national survey of public accounting employees, the current study uses quantitative data analysis to identify public accounting mentoring functions, their effect on employee turnover intentions, and their association with specific organizational variables (protégé organizational level, protégé gender, mentor's position, and audit firm structure). The study found that public accounting mentoring consists of three separate functions: social support, career development, and role modeling. Path analysis indicated that employees with lower turnover intentions received more career development support from their mentor and had a partner as a mentor. The level of social support provided by partner mentors tended to be less than that provided by manager mentors. Female protégés, who tended to have managers as mentors, received more social support when their mentor was also female. The role modeling function did not differ across organizational variables. The results of the study indicate that while social support is a key factor in defining the mentoring process for public accounting employees, the career development function is associated with lower protégé turnover intentions.

Pieter T. Elgers, May H. Lo, Reductions in Analysts' Annual Earnings Forecast Errors Using Information in Prior Earnings and Security Returns, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Autumn, 1994), pp. 290-303

Economists now appreciate that resource allocation in less economically developed economies is profoundly influenced by nonfirm economic institutions. However, our theories of nonfirm institutions often suggest different answers to many questions including those of policy. This paper illustrates a method for discriminating between alternative theories using data from German credit cooperatives from nineteenth and early twentieth century Germany. We build a model of credit cooperatives designed to provide monitoring incentives and test this using nineteenth century data.

Census reports can be interpreted as providing nearly exact knowledge of moments of the marginal distribution of economic variables. This information can be combined with cross-sectional or panel samples to improve accuracy of estimation. In this paper we show how to do this efficiently. We show that the gains from use of marginal information can be substantial. We also discuss how to test the compatibility of sample and marginal information.

Consumption taxes of various forms are of increasing importance worldwide. This study employs a laboratory market design to investigate differential market reactions to three consumption tax forms while holding all other factors constant. Ten laboratory markets were conducted, each involving nine volunteer participants. Market participants were randomly assigned to roles analogous to wholesalers, retailers, or consumers of a market good. The three tax forms were (1) a sales tax imposed on retail consumers of a commodity, (2) a gross‐receipts tax imposed on retail sellers, and (3) a value‐added tax imposed on sellers at two levels of production. At least three markets were conducted under each tax regime as a basis for experimental comparison. The tax rates used in each structure were chosen so that a competitive model would predict different equilibrium prices but the same tax burdens (the sum of explicit and implicit taxes) across the three tax regimes. Results generally support these predictions, with somewhat stronger support for equivalent tax revenues (explicit taxes collected) than for equivalent tax incidence (distribution of tax burdens after price adjustments). Observed tax incidence differences suggest that market agents who are called upon to explicitly pay taxes actually bear relatively lower tax burdens after implicit tax price adjustments. In general, however, price shifting is consistent with the competitive model, supporting the economic dictum that the choice among alternative designations of taxpaying agents is more a question of form than of economic substance. Résumé. Les taxes à la consommation revêtant diverses formes augmentent en importance à travers le monde. Les auteurs ont conçu un modèle de marché expérimental dans le but d'étudier les différentes réactions du marché à trois formes de taxe à la consommation, tout en maintenant constants l'ensemble des autres facteurs. Dix marchés expérimentaux ont été créés, chacun d'eux faisant intervenir neuf participants volontaires à qui étaient attribués aléatoirement des rôles analogues à ceux de grossistes, de détaillants ou de consommateurs d'un marché de produits. Les trois formes de taxe étaient les suivantes: (1) une taxe de vente s'appliquant aux consommateurs d'un bien sur le marché de détail, (2) une taxe sur les encaissements bruts s'appliquant aux détaillants et (3) une taxe sur la valeur ajoutée s'appliquant aux vendeurs, à deux échelons de production. Au moins trois marchés sous chaque régime fiscal ont servi de base de comparaison expérimentale. Les taux utilisés dans chaque structure ont été choisis de telle sorte qu'un modèle concurrentiel arrive à des prix d'équilibre différents mais à une fardeau fiscal identique (la somme des taxes explicites et implicites) sous les trois régimes. Dans l'ensemble, les résultats obtenus confirment ces prédictions, plus encore dans le cas des recettes fiscales équivalentes. Les différentes incidences fiscales observées donnent à penser que les agents du marché de qui l'on réclame explicitement des taxes supportent, en réalité, un fardeau fiscal relativement moins élevé, une fois opérés les ajustements de prix relatifs aux taxes implicites. De manière générale, cependant, les variations de prix sont conformes au modèle concurrentiel, ce qui corrobore cet axiome économique selon lequel le choix des agents à qui doit être attribué le rôle de contribuable est davantage une question de forme que de substance économique.