Biomedical innovation suffers from a “funding gap” between the needs of drug development firms and the availability of funds. The requirement of large investments for drug development projects and the high pipeline risk associated with FDA approval causes this funding gap in part. In this paper, we propose a new financial instrument—the “FDA hedge”—that pays off upon FDA approval failure. We develop a theory to show that the FDA hedge can help eliminate the funding gap. Using novel project-level data, we establish empirically that FDA hedge risk is idiosyncratic, and show how better sharing this risk can spur welfare-enhancing R&D.

The debt-to-GDP ratio negatively predicts cumulative nominal consumption growth up to a 10-year horizon, resulting from the ratio’s ability to forecast lower inflation and real growth. Moreover, the debt-to-GDP ratio is positively associated with yield spreads. I rationalize these facts in a model in which positive shocks to government debt cause lower inflation and growth, making bonds attractive assets. Furthermore, because longer-term bonds are less exposed to current debt shock than are shorter-term bonds, they are better hedges, resulting in high yield spreads in high-debt states. The model highlights the importance of fiscal risk in understanding the Treasury bond market.

How does the shadow banking system respond to changes in capital regulation of commercial banks? We propose a quantitative general equilibrium model with regulated and unregulated banks to study the unintended consequences of regulation. Tighter capital requirements for regulated banks cause higher convenience yield on debt of all banks, leading to higher shadow bank leverage and a larger shadow banking sector. At the same time, tighter regulation eliminates the subsidies to commercial banks from deposit insurance, reducing the competitive pressures on shadow banks to take risks. The net effect is a safer financial system with more shadow banking. Calibrating the model to data on financial institutions in the US, the optimal capital requirement is around 16%.

We survey a large sample of Swedish households and connect the responses to administrative data to relate pro-environmental attitudes and values to actual investment decisions. Pro-environment households are not more likely to hold pro-environment portfolios. This results from financial disengagement: they are less likely to own stocks, check pension balances, or make green active retirement planning choices. Green financial engagement is stronger in settings where financial literacy is higher or where informational hurdles are lower. Informational barriers appear to prevent financial market prices and returns from fully reflecting household environmental preferences.

This paper investigates the effect of mandatory disclosure requirements for private firms on their decision to go public. Using detailed project‐level data for biopharmaceutical firms, we explore the effects of a legal reform that exogenously required firms to publicly disclose information regarding clinical trials. Exploiting cross‐sectional heterogeneity in firms' exposure to the regulation based on their internal development portfolios, we find that affected firms are significantly more likely to transition to public equity markets following the reform. Moreover, firms that go public because of the increased disclosure requirements subsequently reduce the size of their project portfolios while shifting to safer investments acquired externally. We provide additional evidence for the main hypothesis using a second setting: a 2006 German reform which enhanced the enforcement of mandatory disclosure requirements for private firms. The results suggest that private firms' general information environment and disclosure requirements influence the propensity of going public.

We introduce and quantify a new channel through which the housing market affects household spending: the home purchase channel. Households spend on average $8,000 more on home-related durables and home improvements in the 2 years following a home purchase. Expenditures on nondurables and durables unrelated to the home remain unchanged or decrease modestly. The home purchase channel played a substantial role in the Great Recession, accounting for one-third of the decline in spending on home-related durables and home improvements from 2005 to 2010.

In this article, we examine whether comovement in the stock prices of pairs of Chinese firms connected to the same political network are systematically shaped by the prevailing coordination versus competition incentives of that network’s politicians. We find strong evidence from 2000 to 2012 (Jiang’s and Hu’s regimes) that stock price comovement is affected by the embeddedness of the firm–politician ties within the network. Among pairs of firms connected to a network through a common politician, we document an increase in stock price comovement. For those pairs of firms connected to a common network via separate politicians (rather than a common politician), we document a relative decrease in stock price comovement. This negative effect suggests that politicians’ relationships within these political networks are generally adversarial rather than cooperative in nature. These results become significantly weaker during Xi’s regime from 2013 to 2017, suggesting that Xi’s anti-corruption campaign and state-owned enterprise reforms may have attenuated these political network effects on the firms. Our additional tests also show that stock price comovement becomes even more positive (negative) in settings which are expected to increase the coordination or decrease the competition (decrease the coordination or increase the competition) of the politicians.

This study investigates whether a private firm’s decision to go public affects the IPO decisions of its competitors. Using detailed data from the drug development industry, we identify a private firm’s direct competitors at a precise level through a novel approach using similarity in drug development projects based on disease targets. The analysis shows that a private firm is significantly more likely to go public after observing the recent IPO of a direct competitor, and this effect is distinct from “hot” market effects or other common shocks. Furthermore, our effects are centered on firms that operate in more competitive areas. We additionally explore peer effects in private firm funding propensities more broadly, such as through venture capital or being acquired, and find results consistent with a competitive channel.

We examine the relation between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and firm value using the takeover market as an empirical setting. Firms with high or low CSR scores experience a greater likelihood of takeover and lower wealth gains in takeovers relative to firms with moderate policies. These findings indicate that the takeover market acts as a corrective mechanism for firms that over- or under-invest in CSR. Our results are robust to controlling for governance and alternative motivations for mergers and are evident in sub-samples where CSR is arguably more important. Our findings are not driven by poor management of target firms. Overall, the evidence suggests that CSR generally benefits shareholders, however, very high or low CSR scores appear to be harmful.

The U.S. government uses its voting power to direct IMF loans to countries where U.S. banks are exposed to sovereign default (a de facto bailout). This effect is stronger in years when the costs of direct bailouts are higher and is also found among major European IMF members. We find that de facto bailouts reduce government incentives to default and that U.S. Congressional voting on IMF funding is consistent with a private interest view of government. Overall, we identify an alternative mechanism through which governments can backstop the losses of large multinational banks.