We use administrative data on the quarterly employment and earnings of Pennsylvanian workers in the 1970s and 1980s matched to Social Security Administration death records covering 1980–2006 to estimate the effects of job displacement on mortality. We find that for high-seniority male workers, mortality rates in the year after displacement are 50%–100% higher than would otherwise have been expected. The effect on mortality hazards declines sharply over time, but even twenty years after displacement, we estimate a 10%–15% increase in annual death hazards. If such increases were sustained indefinitely, they would imply a loss in life expectancy of 1.0–1.5 years for a worker displaced at age forty. We show that these results are not due to selective displacement of less healthy workers or to unstable industries or firms offering less healthy work environments. We also show that workers with larger losses in earnings tend to suffer greater increases in mortality. This correlation remains when we examine predicted earnings declines based on losses in industry, firm, or firm-size wage premiums.

In this paper we exploit a unique database that merges longitudinal earnings data on Pennsylvanian workers with national death records to study the detailed nature of the correlation between earnings and mortality. We find that the estimates typically reported in the literature, which are based on single years of earnings data, are likely to understate substantially the strength of the association between income and mortality. In particular, relative to a single year of earnings, the average of earnings over a six-year period predicts a 70 percent greater impact of income on mortality. In addition, controlling for the mean level of earnings over a period, we find that greater earnings volatility is associated with higher mortality. We also examine the lag structure of the relationship between earnings and mortality. We find that conditional on a small number of years of recent earning levels, there is little or no correlation between earnings levels in earlier years and current mortality. This runs counter to the interpretation of the earnings-mortality correlation that views workers as "buying health" by allocating a steady fraction of their earnings to the accumulation of a health stock. It is also inconsistent with interpretations of the earnings- mortality link emphasizing the correlation of both variables with an unobserved, time-invariant trait, such as the rate at which workers discount the future. We find that explaining the patterns of correlation appears to require a relatively complex theory that we leave to future research.

This paper proposes a new measure of the disincentive cost of unemployment insurance (UI): the ratio of the behavioral cost (BC) to the mechanical cost (MC) of a UI reform. This measure represents the labor supply distortion relative to the additional (mechanical) transfer from the UI reform. We show the BC/MC ratio naturally arises from a model of optimal UI and can be readily computed and compared across different types of reforms and labor market contexts. We summarize the evidence regarding the BC/MC ratio for existing studies and relate it to typical measures of employment effects of UI.

Longitudinal administrative data show that rejected male applicants to the Disability Insurance (DI) program who are younger or have low-mortality impairments such as back pain and mental health problems exhibit substantial labor force attachment. While we confirm that employment rates of older rejected applicants are low, continued high numbers of younger and low-mortality beneficiaries have raised the potential employment of DI beneficiaries. Three findings support economic inducement to apply. Mean preapplication earnings have fallen, rejected applicants experience preapplication declines in earnings, and beneficiaries whose first applications were rejected at the DDS level but who ultimately received benefits exhibit substantial employment. JEL: H55, J14, J28, J31

This paper studies the differential persistent effects of initial economic conditions for labor market entrants in the United States from 1976 to 2015 by education, gender, and race using labor force survey data. We find persistent earnings and wage reductions, especially for less advantaged entrants, that increases in government support only partly offset. We confirm that the results are unaffected by selective migration and labor market entry by also using a double-weighted average unemployment rate at labor market entry for each birth cohort and state-of-birth cell based on average state migration rates and average cohort education rates from census data.

Forward-looking behavior on the part of the monetary authority makes it difficult to estimate the effect of monetary policy interventions on output. We present instrumental variables estimates of the impact of interest rates on quarterly real output for several European countries, using German interest rates as the instrument. These estimates confirm a strong forward-looking bias in least squares estimates that persists even conditional on standard controls for the history of the system. Due to the potential for correlation of output shocks across countries, we interpret our estimates as lower bounds for the effect of monetary policy on real output.

We document the sources behind the costs of job loss over the business cycle using administrative data from Germany. Losses in annual earnings after displacement are large, persistent, and highly cyclical, nearly doubling in size during downturns. A large part of the long-term earnings losses and their cyclicality is driven by declines in wages. Key to these long-lasting wage declines and their cyclicality are changes in employer characteristics, as displaced workers switch to lower-paying firms. These losses increase with duration of nonemployment. Changes in characteristics of displaced workers or displacing firms, and other post-job loss career outcomes explain little of the cyclicality.

This paper obtains comparable estimates of the effect of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits on labor supply throughout the unemployment spell and over the business cycle using a regression kink design and 20 years of administrative data from California. For a given unemployment duration, the behavioral effect of UI benefit levels on labor supply does not vary with the business cycle from 2002 to 2019. However, due to increased coverage from extensions in benefit durations, the duration elasticity of UI benefits rises during recessions. The behavioral effect during the start of the COVID-19 pandemic is substantially lower at all unemployment durations.

We exploit administrative data on young German workers and their employers to study the long-term effects of an early job loss. To account for non-random sorting of workers into firms with different turnover rates and for selective job mobility, we use changes over time in firm- and age-specific labor demand as an instrument for displacement. We find that wage losses of young job losers are initially 15% but fade to zero within five years. Only workers leaving very large establishments suffer persistent losses. A comparison of estimators implies that initial sorting, negative selection, and voluntary job mobility may have biased previous U.S. studies finding permanent effects of early displacements.