An extensive review of the evidence related to the 2007–09 crisis reveals that it was an insolvency risk crisis, not a liquidity crisis. The appropriate post-crisis regulatory reform should therefore focus on increasing capital requirements. The Basel III liquidity requirements do not serve a useful economic purpose in dealing with the root causes of the stresses that led to the 2007–09 crisis, and unnecessarily constrain the asset transformation and liquidity creation roles of banks to the detriment of economic growth.

We conduct a field experiment, based on a registered report accepted by the Journal of Accounting Research , to test performance effects of setting a high reference point for peer‐performance comparison. Relative to providing the median as a reference point for online students to compare themselves to, providing the top quartile: damps performance for those below the median, boosts performance for those between the median and top quartile, and, in the case of outcome but not process comparison, boosts performance for those above the top quartile. We do not find that either reference point yields a greater average performance effect. However, providing the more effective reference point in each partition of initial performance yields a 40% greater performance effect than providing either reference point uniformly. Students access the online courses intermittently over the span of a year. Our effects derive from small portions of our treatment groups—5% in the case of process comparison and 26% in the case of outcome comparison—who accessed treatment and who were, on average, more active leading up to and during our intervention.

I study whether the demand for monitoring explains the scope for renegotiation in private debt contracts. Theory suggests that renegotiation trades off the benefits of enhanced monitoring with the costs of creditor intervention. Consistent with this tradeoff, I show that monitoring demand proxies bear a positive association with renegotiation intensity. In contrast, the costs of creditor intervention are associated with less frequent renegotiations. I also find that contractual monitoring mechanisms, such as covenants and concentrated syndicate structures, are positively related to renegotiation intensity. Furthermore, renegotiations transmit new information to the market, in line with private creditors discovering information during renegotiations.

In this study we use the recently mandated risk factor disclosure to examine the spillover effect of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) review of qualitative corporate disclosure. We find that firms not receiving any comment letter (“No‐letter Firms”) modify their subsequent year's disclosures to a larger extent if the SEC has commented on the risk factor disclosure of (i) the industry leader, (ii) a close rival, or (iii) numerous industry peers. We refer to this effect as “spillover.” Further, we find that after SEC comments on the industry leader's disclosure, No‐letter Firms also provide more firm‐specific disclosures in the subsequent year. The increased disclosure specificity reduces these firms’ likelihood of receiving SEC risk disclosure comments on their new filings. Our evidence suggests an indirect effect of the SEC review of qualitative disclosure.

The U.S. bank stress tests aim to improve financial system stability. However, they may also affect bank credit supply. We formulate and test opposing hypotheses about these effects. Our findings are consistent with the Risk Management Hypothesis, under which stress-tested banks reduce credit supply−particularly to relatively risky borrowers−to decrease their credit risk. The findings do not support the Moral Hazard Hypothesis, in which these banks expand credit supply−particularly to relatively risky borrowers that pay high spreads−increasing their risk. Results are generally stronger for safer banks, banks that passed the stress tests, and the earlier stress tests.

This paper studies the effects of violent crime on market prices and size using plant-level panel data in Colombia. To estimate causal effects, I exploit reductions in violence driven by increases in security expenditures during Álvaro Uribe’s presidency; these resulted in greater violence reductions in municipalities that voted for him in the 2002 elections as he was looking for reelection. I find that firms that face higher violence also face lower output and input prices. Output prices fall more than the prices of inputs, which drives firms to reduce production, and some firms exit the market. Workers see reductions in their real income.

We study the role of borrowers’ balance sheet conservatism (i.e., conservatism in asset values) in debt contract design. We find that borrowing costs are decreasing in the degree of balance sheet conservatism, and this effect is stronger for firms with lower credit quality. This is consistent with balance sheet conservatism reducing lenders’ uncertainty about the liquidation value of assets, thus facilitating the ex ante screening of borrowers. We predict that better ex ante screening also reduces the need for ex post monitoring, and find that balance sheet conservatism is associated with less restrictive covenant terms. Further, we find that asymmetric timeliness in earnings is associated with lower borrowing costs only when balance sheet conservatism is not high. This result suggests that lenders appear to recognize the constraining effect of high balance sheet conservatism on future conservatism in earnings.

We examine the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) inside debt holdings and the firm's choice between debt and equity financing when it accesses external capital markets. We find positive relations between CEO inside debt holdings and both the firm's likelihood to issue debt and the proportion of debt of their total external financing. Additional analysis indicates that CEO inside debt is negatively related to the cost of debt and positively related to the stock price reaction around the public debt issue announcement. Our results are consistent with the argument that inside debt aligns managers' and debtholders' interests leading to favorable debt terms that motivate firms to raise debt to meet their capital needs.