Using a sample of loan facilities from 30 countries around the world, we investigate how national cultures affect the relationship between a firm's corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance and its bank borrowing costs. We find that firms with superior CSR performance are more likely to enjoy lower loan interest spreads in countries that exhibit higher levels of egalitarianism and harmony and/or lower levels of hierarchy and mastery. Further analyses reveal that the impact of national culture on the relationship between CSR performance and loan interest spreads is especially significant for borrowing firms with higher customer awareness, heavier R&D intensity, and more opaque information environment. We find national culture of the bank lender itself play an important role in shaping the relation between CSR performance and loan contracting as well. Overall, our findings highlight the important role of national culture in determining the economic consequences of CSR commitments and provide implications for corporate managers who make decisions about CSR strategies.

Using multiple measures of attack proximity, we show that CEOs employed at firms located near terrorist attacks earn an average pay increase of 12% after the attack relative to CEOs at firms located far from attacks. CEOs at terrorist attack-proximate firms prefer cash-based compensation increases (e.g., salary and bonus) over equity-based compensation (e.g., options and stocks granted). The effect is causal and it is larger when the bargaining power of the CEO is high. Other executives and workers do not receive a terrorist attack premium.

This study attempts to identify the connection between the board of directors (BoD) and the controlling shareholder. We investigate how this connection affects the corporate governance practice and market performance of Hong Kong listed firms. Our results reveal that close connections between the BoD and the controlling shareholder have a negative effect on corporate governance practice. Our findings also indicate a lower market valuation for firms with a connected BoD. The evidence suggests that the market discounts the value of firms with a connected BoD. The evidence seems to reinforce the importance of the role of independent non-executive directors (INEDs) to enhance the independence of BoD.

We examine how the market values operating assets in the presence of time-varying ex ante risk that these assets may be tunneled away. We analyze pairs of Chinese publicly listed firms and their non-listed parents and examine the market valuation of current assets (cash balances, trade receivables, receivables due from the controlling shareholders, inventories) and fixed assets on the publicly listed firm's balance sheet. Our results show that in periods when the risk of tunneling from the publicly listed firm to its controlling shareholder increases, operating assets that are easy to tunnel (cash and receivables due from the controlling shareholder) are valued at larger discounts, while operating assets that are not easy to tunnel (trade receivables, inventories, fixed assets) are not valued at such discounts.

Using a sample of loan facilities borrowed by firms that share directors with bankrupt firms, this study investigates whether the overlapping directors are a transmission channel of the bankruptcy contagion effect in the bank loan market and, if so, what the underlying mechanism is. We find that firms are charged higher loan spreads in the period following the bankruptcy filing of a firm with a common director and that overlapping directors are a relevant channel for the bankruptcy contagion effect, in addition to other channels identified in literature. We also find that the negative contagion effect on loan pricing is most likely driven by the overlapping directors' reputation loss due to their involvement in bankruptcy events, and not by competing hypotheses, such as director distraction and director career concern/experience. Further analyses reveal that the adverse contagion impact on loan spreads is more pronounced when overlapping directors have greater influence over corporate policies or when their reputation is more seriously damaged. Meanwhile, the contagion effect is mitigated when interlocked firms have a higher-quality board. These results further support our evidence of the director reputation loss hypothesis. We strengthen the identification strategy to establish causality. In sum, our study identifies common directors as a channel of bankruptcy contagion effects on loan pricing and director reputation loss as an underlying mechanism.

This article provides first evidence on the capital market effects of the EU Taxonomy Regulation (TR). The TR introduced a new classification scheme to identify companies with environmentally sustainable economic activities. The results offer support for a significant estimated TR alignment premium, compatible with the interpretation that investors already apply the TR and allocate capital to TR-aligned companies. This effect strengthens with an increase in investor attention. We also find significant cross-sectional variation in abnormal stock returns surrounding the publication date of the TR conditional on the degree of estimated TR alignment. Traditional ESG ratings cannot explain the TR premium.