This study examines the effect of inside debt arising from CEO compensation deferral policies on shadow banking. We construct a parsimonious model that shows that increased bank inside debt leads to increased shadow banking. Using a CEO compensation deferral policy imposed on the Chinese banking industry in 2010, we empirically test our theoretical prediction on the effect of inside debt on shadow banking proxied by non-principal-guaranteed wealth management products. We find that banks that adopt the CEO compensation deferral policy exhibit higher levels of shadow banking than their counterparts and that this result is not contingent on bank size or the extent of government control. Moreover, the effect of inside debt on shadow banking is stronger in banks with higher loan-to-deposit and non-performing-loan ratios and in banks with CEO turnover, suggesting that the compensation deferral policy induces CEOs, especially newly appointed CEOs, to do more shadow banking to circumvent regulations regarding the balance-sheet risk and to boost performance.

In this study, we examine the effectiveness of the China Securities Investor Services Center (CSISC), a new minority shareholder protection mechanism promoted by the China Securities Regulatory Commission, in constraining earnings management. Employing a difference-in-differences analysis for a sample of Chinese listed companies during 2015–2017, we find that CSISC shareholding reduces earnings management. We also find that this effect exists in firms with weaker internal or external corporate governance mechanisms and in firms without political connections. The additional analyses show that the difference in earnings management between the treatment firms (i.e., CSISC-holding firms) and control firms is diminishing after the CSISC shareholding pilot program was promoted nationwide, and that CSISC shareholding also constrains controlling shareholders' tunneling. Our findings have important policy implications for emerging markets that attempt to improve minority shareholder protection.

Using a sample of non-U.S. firms from 22 countries during 2003–2007, we examine the effect of firm-level governance on various features of loan contracting in the international loan market. We find that banks charge lower loan rates, offer larger and longer-maturity loans, and impose fewer restrictive covenants to better-governed firms. We also find that the favorable effect of firm-level governance on some loan contracting terms is stronger in countries with strong legal institutions than in countries with weak legal institutions. Our results suggest that banks view a borrower's internal governance as a factor that mitigates agency and information risk, and that country-level legal institutions and firm-level governance mechanisms complement each other in influencing loan contracting terms.

We examine the effects of a multinational firm's subsidiary operations in offshore financial centers (OFCs) on bank loan contracting terms. Using a propensity score matched cross-country sample of firms with and without OFC subsidiaries, we find that firms with OFC subsidiaries receive less favorable loan terms than firms without OFC subsidiaries. The results from a difference-in-differences analysis and an analysis of a firm's mutation from a non-OFC firm to an OFC firm support the causal effect of offshore operations on the unfavorable loan terms. Furthermore, focusing on firms with OFC subsidiaries, we find that the intensity of offshore operations affects loan terms unfavorably. We also find that the unfavorable effect is more pronounced for more opaque firms and for firms that are headquartered in countries or jurisdictions with weaker legal enforcement. Our findings indicate that banks view offshore operations of borrowers as a credit risk-increasing factor.