This paper analyzes the role of financial intermediaries as marketmakers in the market for interest rate swaps. We argue that intermediaries which hold large nontraded portfolios of swaps are efficient alternatives to direct hedging by counterparties in publicly traded cash and futures instruments. The efficiency afforded by the swap marketmaker derives from reduction in transactions costs, diversification of basis risk, and reduced agency costs of debt. The analysis provides an explanation for the existence and success of the swaps market as a means for spreading risk and for its dominance by large financial institutions.

Tim S. Campbell, William A. Kracaw, Optimal Managerial Incentive Contracts and the Value of Corporate Insurance, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Sep., 1987), pp. 315-328

This paper presents a model of equilibrium in a capital market for linear shares of risky firms andin a market for managerial labor in which market participants function as both investors and managers. The model yields interesting and relevant equilibrium conditions that integrate earlier separate treatments of the capital market with human capital and the incentive contracting problem regarding shirking.The theory developed here provides a microeconomic explanation of how the price of risk established in the capital market is relevant to the labor contracting problem. The analysis also provides a logical rationale for the division of responsibilities between a board of directors and the management of the firm.

Tim S. Campbell, William A. Kracaw, Sorting Equilibria in Financial Markets: The Incentive Problem, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 16, No. 4, Proceedings of 16th Annual Conference of the Western Finance Association, June 18-20, 1981, Jackson Hole, Wyoming (Nov., 1981), pp. 477-492

The authors analyze the effect of financing announcements of highly leveraged transactions on the stock prices of the banks that lead highly leveraged transaction lending syndicates. For their sample of forty-one highly leveraged transactions, the authors document that the first highly leveraged transaction and bank financing announcements result in positive wealth effects for the lending banks. They also find that these wealth effects are lower in 1985, for smaller highly leveraged transactions, and for banks with a high loan loss reserve to total asset ratio. Finally, they report that leveraged buyout targets gain about 2 percent, whereas leveraged recap targets lose about 2 percent, when the first bank financing agreement is announced.

We analyze the effect of financing announcements of highly leveraged transactions (HLTs) on the stock prices of the banks that lead HLT‐lending syndicates. For our sample of 41 HLTs, we document that the first HLT and bank financing announcements result in positive wealth effects for the lending banks. We also find that these wealth effects are lower in 1985, for smaller HLTs, and for banks with a high loan loss reserve to total asset ratio. Finally, we report that Leveraged Buyout (LBO) targets gain about 2 percent, whereas leveraged recap targets lose about 2 percent, when the first bank financing agreement is announced.

We analyze the effect of financing announcements of highly leveraged transactions (HLTs) on the stock prices of the banks that lead HLT-lending syndicates. For our sample of 41 HLTs, we document that the first HLT and bank financing announcements result in positive wealth effects for the lending banks. We also find that these wealth effects are lower in 1985, for smaller HLTs, and for banks with a high loan loss reserve to total asset ratio. Finally, we report that Leveraged Buyout (LBO) targets gain about 2 percent, whereas leveraged recap targets lose about 2 percent, when the first bank financing agreement is announced.

This paper demonstrates how the incentive of manager-equityholders to substitute toward riskier assets, commonly referred to as the “asset substitution problem,” is related to the level of observable risk in the firm. When observable and unobservable risks are sufficiently positively correlated, increases (decreases) in observable risk generate the incentive for manager-equityholders to increase (decrease) unobservable risk. Thus, credible commitments to hedge observable risk can benefit the firm's manager-equityholders by reducing the incentive to shift risk and the associated agency cost of debt. This provides a positive rationale for hedging diversifiable risk at the firm level.

This paper demonstrates how the incentive of manager‐equityholders to substitute toward riskier assets, commonly referred to as the “asset substitution problem,” is related to the level of observable risk in the firm. When observable and unobservable risks are sufficiently positively correlated, increases (decreases) in observable risk generate the incentive for manager‐equityholders to increase (decrease) unobservable risk. Thus, credible commitments to hedge observable risk can benefit the firm's manager‐equityholders by reducing the incentive to shift risk and the associated agency cost of debt. This provides a positive rationale for hedging diversifiable risk at the firm level.