Research and firm size within industries, 640. — Research elasticities and average firm size, 644. — Market structure and the level of research, 645. — The role of technical entry barriers, 652. — Conclusions, 656.

IN recent years there has been a good deal of discussion concerning the relationships among market structure, research and development, and the rate of technical change. Much of this discussion has focussed on the question of whether large firm size is a necessary condition before firms will engage in research, and whether research and development (R and D) is likely to grow more or less than in proportion to increases in firm size. A further set of questions deals with the relationship between research and the rate of technical change experienced by the firm. Can variation in the latter be explained largely by differences among firms in the size and character of their research programs? Are economies of scale in R and D likely to be present? What is the effect of firm size on the productivity of a research establishment? This paper provides an empirical analysis, concerned with these questions, of the experience of the United States pharmaceutical industry during the period between 1955 and 1960.

The publication of Lester G. Telser's 1964 paper [52] was the starting point for much of the recent literature on advertising and competition. The major finding of that paper was that there is little empirical support for an inverse association between advertising and competition, despite some plausible theorizing to the contrary This review does not deal with the question of whether advertising is excessive, nor with the related issues of the welfare economics of advertising or product differentiation. Rather, it focuses on those papers which examine the impact of advertising on barriers to entry and on the extent of price competition. Advertising expenditures are designed to influence consumer demand for the firm's products. They may affect both direct and cross-elasticities of demand. Those who argue that advertising may limit competition maintain that the relevant demand curves[1] are more inelastic and that cross-elasticities are lower as a result, while those who dispute this contention suggest that advertising has no such influence or even that it leads to more elastic demands and higher cross-elasticities. Much controversy has therefore turned on the direction of the effects of advertising on demand elasticities. [Авторский текст]

William S. Comanor, Robert H. Smiley; Monopoly and the Distribution of Wealth: Revisited, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 94, Issue 1, 1 February 198

A model of monopoly and wealth, 178. — Estimation of parameters, 182. — The empirical findings, 189. — Conclusions, 194.

For many years, there were few distinctions drawn between horizontal and vertical agreements. Both were considered anticompetitive and subject to per condemnation under the antitrust laws. Recently, however, this approach has come under attack, and what was once the conventional wisdom is no longer so. Indeed, there is growing acceptance of the view that vertical agreements can rarely have anticompetitive consequences. Per legality would then be the appropriate standard. In this paper, we investigate the competitive implications of a particular vertical agreement: the imposition of dealing requirements by a manufacturer on his distributors. However, to maintain the focus of the analysis, we do not consider ultimate welfare gains or losses. In an early application of economic analysis to this practice, Aaron Director and Edward Levi (1956) suggest that dealing would be anticompetitive if it raised entry costs for rivals. Our object, following this conjecture (see their p. 293), is to examine the market conditions under which dealing impedes entry. Howard Marvel (1982) dealt with the practice of dealing. He provides an efficiency rationale for dealing, ignores the prospect that anticompetitive effects may follow, and concludes that exclusive dealing ought therefore to be treated as legal, per se (p. 25). This paper examines the possible anticompetitive effects neglected by Marvel. I. Market Conditions for Exclusive Dealing