I consider optimal nonlinear taxation of income and bequests with a joy-of-giving bequest motive and explicitly characterize the optimal estate tax rate. The optimal formula trades off correction of externality from giving and discouraging effort of children due to income effect generated by bequests. The analysis shows that optimality of a positive tax on bequests rests on the strength of the effect of bequests on behavior of future generations. The analysis also suggests that inheritance, rather than estate tax, is better suited to implement the optimal policy.

Because estate tax liability usually depends on how long one lives, it implicitly provides annuity income. In the absence of annuity markets, lump‐sum estate taxation may be used to achieve the first‐best solution for individuals with a sufficiently strong bequest motive. Calculations of the annuity embedded in the U.S. estate tax show that people with $10 million of assets may be effectively receiving more than $100,000 a year financed at actuarially fair rates by their tax payments. According to my calibrations, the insurance effect reduces the marginal cost of funds (MCF) for the estate tax by as much as 30 percent, and the resulting MCF is within the range of estimates for the MCF for the income tax.

We examine the effect of observed and unobserved heterogeneity in the desire to die with positive net worth. Using a structural life-cycle model nested in a switching regression with unknown sample separation, we find that roughly three-fourths of the elderly single population has abequest motive. Both the presence and the magnitude of the bequest motive are statistically and economically significant. On average, households with a bequest motive spend about 25% less on consumption expenditures. We conclude that, among the elderly single households in our sample, about four-fifths of their net wealth will be bequeathed and approximately half of this is due to a bequest motive.

This paper examines data from U.S. federal tax returns to shed light on whether the timing of death is responsive to its tax consequences. We investigate the temporal pattern of deaths around the time of changes in the estate-tax system periods when living longer, or dying sooner, could significantly affect estate-tax liability. We find some evidence that there is a small death elasticity, although we cannot rule out that what we have uncovered is ex post doctoring of the reported date of death.

Using estate tax returns data, we observe that the share of women among the very wealthy in the United States peaked in the late 1960s at nearly one-half and then declined to one-third. We argue that this pattern reflects changes in the importance of dynastic wealth, with the share of women proxying for inherited wealth. If so, wealth mobility decreased until the 1970s and rose thereafter. Such an interpretation is consistent with technological change driving long-term trends in mobility and inequality, as well as the recent divergence between top wealth and top income shares documented elsewhere.

Firms are, for the most part, absent from the modern theory of optimal taxation. Their disappearance dates from the foundational models developed by Peter A. Diamond and James A. Mirrlees (1971) in which firms are simply mechanical vehicles for combining productive inputs into output in cost-minimizing proportions. i In contrast, firms play a central role in all modern tax systems, mostly for a reason eloquently stated by Richard M. Bird (1996): “The key to effective taxation is information, and the key to information in the modern economy is the corporation. ” In most countries, firms remit the majority of tax revenues to the government, either with regard to taxes legally owed by businesses or through withholding of taxes legally owed by employees or other businesses. ii Even when businesses are not required to remit taxes, they are often required to file information reports that can facilitate monitoring of tax liabilities. The lack of a theoretical framework that features firms handcuffs rigorous welfare analysis of a number of important policy issues. One such example is the comparative evaluation of a uniform retail sales tax (RST) versus a value-added tax (VAT). In the standard model, these two taxes—both remitted entirely by businesses—are equivalent consumption

This paper uses Social Security Administration longitudinal earnings micro data since 1937 to analyze the evolution of inequality and mobility in the United States. Annual earnings inequality is U-shaped, decreasing sharply up to 1953 and increasing steadily afterward. Short-term earnings mobility measures are stable over the full period except for a temporary surge during World War II. Virtually all of the increase in the variance in annual (log) earnings since 1970 is due to increase in the variance of permanent earnings (as opposed to transitory earnings). Mobility at the top of the earnings distribution is stable and has not mitigated the dramatic increase in annual earnings concentration since the 1970s. Long-term mobility among all workers has increased since the 1950s but has slightly declined among men. The decrease in the gender earnings gap and the resulting substantial increase in upward mobility over a lifetime for women are the driving force behind the increase in long-term mobility among all workers.

Using Danish administrative data, we estimate the impact of bequests on the level and inequality of wealth. We compare the distributions of wealth over time of people whose parent died and those whose parent did not. Bequests account for 26 percent of the average post-bequest wealth 1-3 years after parental death and significantly affect wealth throughout the distribution. Bequests increase absolute wealth inequality (variance of the distribution censored at the top/bottom 1% increases by 33 percent), but reduce relative inequality (the top 1% share declines by 6 percentage points from the base of 31 percent).