This paper studies the joint effect of borrowing and short-sale constraints under heterogeneous beliefs and risk aversions. Although the constraints never simultaneously bind in equilibrium, interesting economics emerge in the anticipatory effects of potentially future binding constraints. In particular, the risk-free rate and Sharpe ratio experience endogenous jumps at a critical state, where two equilibria coexist. Moreover, a short-sale ban can lead to a lower stock price and higher volatility depending on the relative tightness between the constraints, and tightening the borrowing constraint during a short-sale ban can also make returns more volatile.

This paper defines asymptotic marginal expected shortfall (AMES) for banks within a financial system and provides corresponding estimation method based on multivariate extreme value theory. The estimation method does not assume a specific dependence structure among bank equity returns. Both theoretical AMES and the estimator possess additive property and thus can serve as a tool to allocate system-wide risk to individual institutions. We apply the AMES to 30 global systemically important financial institutions (G-SIFIs). We show that the AMES outperforms the MES in predicting extreme losses during extreme systemic events. By taking the AMES as the reference point for allocating systemic risk to individual institutions, we show that an allocation according to simple bank characteristics such as size and individual risk can be imperfect. The allocation unfairness of individual risk or size across all the G-SIFIs has increased since 2008.

We investigate whether suppliers adjust innovative supply chain investment following stock market signals about customers’ economic prospects. We show that suppliers increase R&D and investment in customer-related patents after positive market reactions to customers’ new product announcements. A battery of falsification tests suggest that spurious factors are unlikely to explain our results. Market signals about customers appear more important when information asymmetry is greater, when suppliers face greater competitive threats, and when suppliers are financially unconstrained. Our evidence suggests that the stock market can be a viable source of information to mitigate supply chain frictions.

We investigate the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on trade credit. We document that firms in countries that adopt IFRS receive more trade credit from their suppliers, consistent with improved financial reporting quality and comparability playing a role in facilitating informal financing. This increase is larger for countries with a low level of societal trust, a poor pre‐IFRS‐adoption information environment, and stronger legal enforcement. These cross‐sectional results suggest that the conditions under which higher‐quality information is made publicly available affect suppliers' decisions to provide trade credit. This increase is also larger for firms with greater exposure to foreign markets, a finding that highlights the importance of more comparable international financial reporting standards in facilitating cross‐country trade credit. We also find that IFRS adoption has a stronger positive effect on trade credit for firms with greater liquidity needs. Finally, we find that firms in countries that adopt IFRS also extend more trade credit to their customers. Overall, our results support the notion that financial reporting can have a causal effect on trade credit.

Firms rely on patenting and trade secrecy to protect their intellectual property. We study how changes in the trade-off between patenting and secrecy affect firms’ stock liquidity and financing outcomes. We show that an international trade agreement (TRIPS) that strengthened patent protection led to a 10.2% increase in patenting, accompanied by a 14.0%–27.1% improvement in stock liquidity for firms in patent-reliant industries. This in turn allows the affected firms to increase equity financing by 1.9% and reduce leverage by 5.9%. Our results suggest that policies that promote use of patenting over secrecy can reduce informational frictions in equity markets.

This study examines the nexus between Confucianism, the choice of the leadership successor, and firm performance in family firms in China. It provides original evidence that firm founders who are deeply influenced by Confucianism have a higher likelihood of choosing a family member or a guanxi-connected nonfamily member as the successor. Moreover, family/guanxi-connected successors have a positive effect on firm performance compared with their counterparts outside of the family/guanxi circle. One underlying reason is that, affected by Confucianism, only the family/guanxi-connected successors can acquire the founder's specialized assets via pre-succession internal managerial experience, which, in turn, enables them to outperform other successors.

We examine managers’' disclosure decisions in response to non-fundamental price shocks. Using mutual fund fire sales as a source of market disruption, we show some firms respond by issuing earnings guidance. Others, especially firms with weaker performance and more short-term-oriented investors, engage in accrual-based earnings management. To identify the efficacy of firm disclosure choices, we examine passage of Sarbanes-Oxley and Regulation Fair Disclosure and show that they increased reliance on guidance rather than earnings management. The shift is associated with faster post-fire-sales price recovery, suggesting enhancing information disclosure rather than manipulation is effective in mitigating the effect of market disruptions.

Using data on individual portfolio holdings and on mutual fund flows, we find that low interest rates lead to significantly higher demand for income‐generating assets such as high‐dividend stocks and high‐yield bonds. We argue that this “reaching‐for‐income” phenomenon is driven by investors who follow the “living off income” rule‐of‐thumb. Our empirical analysis shows that this preference for current income affects both household portfolio choices and the prices of income‐generating assets. In addition, we explore the implications of reaching for income for capital allocation and the effectiveness of monetary policy.

The seller of an asset has the option to buy hard information about the value of the asset from an intermediary. The seller can then disclose this information before selling the asset in a competitive market. We study how the intermediary designs and sells hard information to robustly maximize the intermediary's revenue across all equilibria. Even though the intermediary could use an accurate test that reveals the asset’s value, we show that robust revenue maximization leads to a noisy test with a continuum of possible scores. In addition, the intermediary always charges the seller for disclosing the test score to the market, but not necessarily for running the test. This enables the intermediary to robustly appropriate a significant share of the surplus resulting from the asset sale.