We find that connections CEOs develop with top executives and directors through their appointment decisions increase the risk of corporate fraud. Appointment‐based CEO connectedness in executive suites and boardrooms increases the likelihood of committing fraud and decreases the likelihood of detection. Additionally, it decreases the expected costs of fraud by helping conceal fraudulent activity, making CEO dismissal less likely upon discovery, and lowering the coordination costs of carrying out illegal activity. Connections based on network ties through past employment, education, or social organization memberships have insignificant effects on fraud. Appointment‐based CEO connectedness warrants attention from regulators, investors, and corporate governance specialists.

= 0 against sparse alternatives where the null hypothesis is violated only by a couple of components. Existing tests based on quadratic forms such as the Wald statistic often suffer from low powers due to the accumulation of errors in estimating high-dimensional parameters. More powerful tests for sparse alternatives such as thresholding and extreme-value tests, on the other hand, require either stringent conditions or bootstrap to derive the null distribution and often suffer from size distortions due to the slow convergence. Based on a screening technique, we introduce a "power enhancement component", which is zero under the null hypothesis with high probability, but diverges quickly under sparse alternatives. The proposed test statistic combines the power enhancement component with an asymptotically pivotal statistic, and strengthens the power under sparse alternatives. The null distribution does not require stringent regularity conditions, and is completely determined by that of the pivotal statistic. As specific applications, the proposed methods are applied to testing the factor pricing models and validating the cross-sectional independence in panel data models.

This article studies socially responsible behavior in markets. We develop a laboratory product market in which low-cost production creates a negative externality for third parties, but where alternative production with higher costs mitigates the externality. Our first study, conducted in Switzerland, reveals a persistent preference among many consumers and firms for avoiding negative social impact in the market, reflected both in the composition of product types and in a price premium for socially responsible products. Socially responsible behavior is generally robust to varying market characteristics, such as increased seller competition and limited consumer information, and it responds to prices in a manner consistent with a model in which positive social impact is a utility-enhancing feature of a consumer product. In a second study, we investigate whether market social responsibility varies across societies by comparing market behavior in Switzerland and China. While subjects in Switzerland and China do not differ in their degree of social concern in nonmarket contexts, we find that low-cost production that creates negative externalities is significantly more prevalent in markets in China. Across both studies, consumers in markets exhibit less social concern than subjects in a comparable individual choice context.

This paper presents theory and evidence from disaggregated Chinese data that tariff reductions induce a country’s producers to upgrade the quality of their exports. We first document stylized facts regarding the effect of trade liberalization on export prices. Next, we develop an analytic framework that relates a firm’s choice of quality to its access to imported intermediates. In the model, a reduction in import tariffs induces a firm to increase export quality and raise its export price in industries where the scope for quality differentiation is large and lower its export price in industries where the scope is small. The predictions are consistent with the stylized facts and are highly robust econometrically.