Many governments use fiscal transfers to reduce regional inequality, yet discretionary allocation may also depend on informal communication among officials. We examine this mechanism in a large central-to-provincial transfer system, using policymakers’ shared workplace, alumni, and hometown backgrounds to measure social ties. Exploiting ministerial turnover and controlling for provincial leadership, we find that prior workplace ties significantly increase transfers. We then embed these estimates in a quantitative spatial model with trade, migration, input-output linkages, and fiscal-productivity effects. Social ties redirect resources toward richer provinces with stronger fundamentals, raising welfare and output while weakening redistribution. Under egalitarian weights, however, removing ties improves welfare.

We survey 153 empirical studies of family firms and document 192 operational definitions representing 25 distinct definition types. These definitions can be decomposed into five recurring, codable dimensions: ownership, management, board representation, embeddedness, and succession. We relate these dimensions to economic mechanisms including agency conflicts, residual control rights, transaction costs, and dynastic control. Alternative definitions select systematically different populations and yield materially different estimates of firm performance and innovation. Definition choice is largely unrelated to the research question, except in succession studies. Ownership thresholds track private enforcement of self-dealing rules, but not statutory shareholder rights or rule of law. We conclude that the family firm is a family of related constructs rather than a single latent construct. Definitions should therefore match the family-firm construct implied by the research question, and results should be reported across alternative classification rules.

Developing countries face high pharmaceutical prices despite the presence of multiple generic producers. One key reason is excessive spending on sales and marketing by drug firms. This paper examines how centralized drug procurement can curb such marketing efforts and reduce prices, using a policy experiment in China where certain generics are procured through centralized auctions in pilot cities. Winning firms gain large market shares directly without high marketing costs. We find that the centralized auction significantly reduces both sales costs and prices, with winning firms experiencing notable decreases in marketing-related labor demand.

This paper identifies productivity gains from trade by studying the manipulation behavior of firms in response to regulatory policies on international trade in China. Bunching estimates show that participation in international trade increases firm productivity. The productivity gains increase over time, indicating dynamic learning from trading. Further exploration shows no effects on R&D investment, product rationalization, and markup. Young firms and nonstate-owned firms (non-SOEs) gain more from participating in trade. Workers share productivity gains through increased wages but not from increased employment.

Skill content varies enormously across industries and over time. This paper shows that import competition can explain a significant portion of the variation in various skill measures across manufacturing industries. Industries that face more intense import competition employ more nonroutine skill sets, including cognitive, interpersonal, and manual skills, and fewer cognitive routine skills. In addition, we find that the impact of import competition on skills is not driven by imports from low-wage countries or from China. A number of robustness checks also suggest that our results are unlikely to be driven by econometric problems.

This paper examines the role of teacher gender in education production. We extend student outcomes from traditionally focused academic achievement to noncognitive outcomes. Using a representative survey of middle school students in China, we focus on schools where student-teacher assignments are random. Our results show that having a female teacher raises girls’ test scores and improves their mental status and social acclimation relative to those of boys. There is evidence that female teachers provide feedback differently to girls and boys and that having a female teacher alters girls’ beliefs about commonly held gender stereotypes and increases their motivation to learn.

Court capture in developing countries is pervasive, yet its economic effects remain underexplored. We study a Chinese reform that transferred financial and personnel authority over local courts from local to provincial governments. Exploiting the staggered roll-out, we find a 7.3% decline in local defendants’ win rates against non-local plaintiffs, alongside improved judicial quality. The reform encouraged smaller non-local firms to litigate and attracted non-local investment, potentially raising GDP by 1.9%. Yet favoritism toward politically connected firms and inter-provincial protectionism remain, and centralization itself promotes less qualified judges— revealing both its promise and limits.

A key input to quantitative evaluations of transport infrastructure projects is their impact on transport costs. We propose a new method of estimating this impact relying on widely accessible customs data: by using the route choice of exporters. We combine our method with a spatial equilibrium model to study the effects of the massive expressway construction in China between 1999 and 2010. We find transport costs are 20% lower on expressways than on regular roads. The expressways construction increases aggregate exports by 10% and domestic trade by 14%. It generates 5.1% welfare gains, implying a 150% net return to investment.