Developing countries face high pharmaceutical prices despite the presence of multiple generic producers. One key reason is excessive spending on sales and marketing by drug firms. This paper examines how centralized drug procurement can curb such marketing efforts and reduce prices, using a policy experiment in China where certain generics are procured through centralized auctions in pilot cities. Winning firms gain large market shares directly without high marketing costs. We find that the centralized auction significantly reduces both sales costs and prices, with winning firms experiencing notable decreases in marketing-related labor demand.

This paper identifies productivity gains from trade by studying the manipulation behavior of firms in response to regulatory policies on international trade in China. Bunching estimates show that participation in international trade increases firm productivity. The productivity gains increase over time, indicating dynamic learning from trading. Further exploration shows no effects on R&D investment, product rationalization, and markup. Young firms and nonstate-owned firms (non-SOEs) gain more from participating in trade. Workers share productivity gains through increased wages but not from increased employment.

Skill content varies enormously across industries and over time. This paper shows that import competition can explain a significant portion of the variation in various skill measures across manufacturing industries. Industries that face more intense import competition employ more nonroutine skill sets, including cognitive, interpersonal, and manual skills, and fewer cognitive routine skills. In addition, we find that the impact of import competition on skills is not driven by imports from low-wage countries or from China. A number of robustness checks also suggest that our results are unlikely to be driven by econometric problems.

This paper examines the role of teacher gender in education production. We extend student outcomes from traditionally focused academic achievement to noncognitive outcomes. Using a representative survey of middle school students in China, we focus on schools where student-teacher assignments are random. Our results show that having a female teacher raises girls’ test scores and improves their mental status and social acclimation relative to those of boys. There is evidence that female teachers provide feedback differently to girls and boys and that having a female teacher alters girls’ beliefs about commonly held gender stereotypes and increases their motivation to learn.

Court capture in developing countries is pervasive, yet its economic effects remain underexplored. We study a Chinese reform that transferred financial and personnel authority over local courts from local to provincial governments. Exploiting the staggered roll-out, we find a 7.3% decline in local defendants’ win rates against non-local plaintiffs, alongside improved judicial quality. The reform encouraged smaller non-local firms to litigate and attracted non-local investment, potentially raising GDP by 1.9%. Yet favoritism toward politically connected firms and inter-provincial protectionism remain, and centralization itself promotes less qualified judges— revealing both its promise and limits.

A key input to quantitative evaluations of transport infrastructure projects is their impact on transport costs. We propose a new method of estimating this impact relying on widely accessible customs data: by using the route choice of exporters. We combine our method with a spatial equilibrium model to study the effects of the massive expressway construction in China between 1999 and 2010. We find transport costs are 20% lower on expressways than on regular roads. The expressways construction increases aggregate exports by 10% and domestic trade by 14%. It generates 5.1% welfare gains, implying a 150% net return to investment.

We examine whether local political corruption affects managers' discretionary disclosures of non-GAAP earnings. Using United States Department of Justice data on the number of corruption convictions of government officials, we find that firms headquartered in more corrupt districts (1) are less likely to report non-GAAP earnings, (2) have less aggressive non-GAAP earnings disclosures, and (3) experience a significant decline in the exclusion magnitudes of non-GAAP earnings. These results are more pronounced for firms with concentrated operations in their headquarter states and are robust to controlling for demographic characteristics, employing alternative corruption and non-GAAP measures, using the instrumental variable approach, and conducting a difference-in-difference analysis based on firms' relocation. Finally, we show that as local political corruption increases, managers exclude lower levels of both recurring and non-recurring items when calculating non-GAAP earnings. Overall, the results suggest that managing non-GAAP reporting is one channel through which firms could deter rent-seeking by corrupt officials.