A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
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Many Keynesian macroeconomic models are based on the assumption that firms change prices at different times. This paper presents an explanation for this "staggered" price setting. The authors develop a model in which firms have imperfect knowledge of the current state of the economy and gain information by observing the prices set by others. This gives each firm an incentive to set its price shortly after other firms set theirs. Staggering can be the equilibrium outcome. In addition, the information gains can make staggering socially optimal even though it increases aggregate fluctuations. Copyright 1988 by American Economic Association.
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The efficiency effects of redistributive policies are analyzed using a computational general equilibrium model, based on U.S. data for 1979. For parameter values considered most reasonable, a tax-financed universal cash grant generates losses for the higher-income groups that exceed the gains of the lower-income groups by 50 to 130 percent. These efficiency costs are substantially below those calculated by other authors. The marginal efficiency cost of redistribution through wage subsidies is near zero and can be negative. Social preferences regarding inequality need not be anywhere near Rawlsian in order for society to prefer further redistribution. Copyright 1988 by American Economic Association.
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In this paper, the authors criticize the view that the presence of altruism either increases the benefits of group interactions or improves the allocation of resources within families. They demonstrate first that altruism can alter the social utility possibility frontier in surprising and sometimes unfortunate ways. Next, they argue that, in a variety of situations, altruism entails exploitability and therefore causes family members to behav e in ways that leave all parties worse off. Specifically, an altruist may take u ndesirable actions in order to discourage subsequent exploitation. In addition, altruists have difficulty enforcing agreements in that they may be extremely reluctant to punish betrayals. Copyright 1988 by American Economic Association.
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Airlines are insured against most direct costs of an accident, but they cannot insure against demand loss. Some have argued that such consumer reaction will discipline unsafe operations. The authors' estimation of deviations from expected demand following accidents finds little or no effect prior to airline deregulation and weak indication of a response to recent crashes. These results are consistent with the changes the authors find in an airline's equity value following an accident, which are statistically significant, but quite small relative to the total social cost of the accident. Copyright 1988 by American Economic Association.
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