A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
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Results 250 resources
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The author studies models in which debt repudiation, openly or through inflation, is possible. The government maximizes the utility of the representative individual, and the author focuses on n o-precommitment equilibria of the Barro-Gordon type. He shows cases i n which the existence of government bonds generate multiple perfect-f oresight equilibria. However, price indexation and/or interest-rate c eilings are shown to be possible solutions of the equilibrium multipl icity problem. Copyright 1988 by American Economic Association.
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Optimal trade and industrial policies are derived for a home market that is supplied by a domestic firm and a foreign firm. The optimal policy combination can be quite sensitive to the nature of the duopoly's competition. For example, for some cost and demand s tructures, the optimal policy under Cournot competition consists of a domestic production tax and a tariff, but that under Bertrand compet ition consists of a production subsidy and free trade. Copyright 1988 by American Economic Association.
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An unemployment rate for the urban population living in the European U.S.S.R. for the late 1970s is calculated from a survey of 2,793 former Sovi et citizens residing in the United States. Patterns of unemployment i ncidence, frequency of multiple spells, and unemployment duration by demographic characteristics are compared with U.S. patterns. In contr ast, similar unemployment rates for Soviet men and women, and a posit ive relation between education and unemployment, are found. The Sovie t unemployment rate is low compared to Western rates for the 1970s, b ut has been matched by West Germany and Japan in high-employment year s. Copyright 1988 by American Economic Association.
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This paper studies the welfare consequences of inflation and disinflation in a model in which monopol istic firms incur a fixed cost of price adjustment. It is shown that a moderately increasing price level is associated with higher social welfare than a perfectly stable price level, and the model therefore provides theoretical support for the widespread belief that a little bit of inflation is good for the economy. Nevertheless, it is also tr ue that the eradication of a moderate inflation leads to an increase in social welfare. Copyright 1988 by American Economic Association.
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Was the Depression forecastable? After the crash, how long should it have taken contempo rary forecasters to realize how severe the downturn was going to be? These questions are addressed by studying the predictions of the Harv ard Economic Service and Yale's Irving Fisher during 1929 and the ear ly 1930s. The data assembled by the Harvard and Yale forecasters, tog ether with modern historical data, are subjected to statistical analy sis to learn whether their verbal pronouncements were consistent with the data. Both the Harvard and Yale forecasters were systematically too optimistic. Yet, nothing in the data suggests that the optimism w as unwarranted. Copyright 1988 by American Economic Association.
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This paper derives the essential elements of tax systems as the outcome of rational behavior in a model w here government maximizes expected support and where opposition to ta xation depends on the loss in full income. The analysis treats the le vel of expenditures as endogenous and integrates the influence of adm inistration costs with that of political and economic factors. Tax st ructure is shown to be a system of related components in equilibrium. A final section compares results to two alternative approaches, opti mal taxation and the Leviathan model. Copyright 1988 by American Economic Association.
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This paper is directed at explaining the political choice of voluntary export restr aints as means of restriction of international trade. Tariffs are com pared with voluntary export restraints in a setting of competition be tween candidates for political office who use trade-policy pronouncem ents as a means of seeking political support from foreign and domesti c producer interests. With tariffs, the candidates take politically d ivisive policy positions. Voluntary export restraints are politically conciliatory and can offer mutual gain to foreign and domestic produ cer interests. The potential for foreign producer gain underlies the voluntariness of voluntary export restraints. It is no candidate's po litical interest to choose a tariff to formulate a trade-policy posit ion if a voluntary export restraint is feasible. Copyright 1988 by American Economic Association.
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The authors present a new solution to the time-consistency problem that appears capable of enforcing ex ante policy i n settings where other enforcement mechanisms do not work. The soluti on involves a social contract that specifies the optimal ex ante poli cy and is effectively sold by successive old generations to successiv e young generations, who pay for the social contract through intergen erational transfers. Both old and young generations have an economic incentive to fulfill the social contract. The authors apply the solut ion to show how an equilibrium without excessive capital taxation can be enforced, despite an ongoing temptation to impose ex post capital levies. Copyright 1988 by American Economic Association.
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