A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
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- Please kindly let me know [mingze.gao@mq.edu.au] in case of any errors.
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Results 250 resources
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A model of plea bargaining with asymmetric information is presented. The prosecutor's private information consists of the strength of the case, while the defendant's private information consists of h is guilt or innocence. In equilibrium, a fraction of cases are dismis sed because they are too likely to involve an innocent defendant; in the remaining cases, the prosecutor's offer of a sentence in exchange for a plea of guilty reveals the strength of the case. It is shown t hat unlimited prosecutorial discretion may be socially disadvantageou s since it carries with it the requirement of sequential rationality. Copyright 1988 by American Economic Association.
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This paper views all interpersonal trade as Ricardian, while all international trade reflects each country's factor endowment. The model provides the logical link betwe en Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardo. The strength of the model is that it allows simpler and more robust theorems about trade, welfare, and fac tor payments. Factor price equalization holds universally and Stolper -Samuelson is not tied to the number of goods or factors. A key resul t is that the old Mill theorem that the small country gains all from trade is incorrect. Trade patterns with three factors and two goods a re completely characterized. Copyright 1988 by American Economic Association.
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This paper develops strategic monetary policies using a standard two-country macro model under flexible exchange rates. The equilibria considered include feedback Nash and feedback Stackelberg, both of which are compared to the Pareto optimal cooperative equilibrium. The optimal policies are obtained as feedback rules in which real money supplies are adjusted to movements in the real exchange rate. The properties of these policies and their welfare implications are analyzed using numerical simulations. The contrast in the present results with those obtained previously for a short-run horizon suggest the importance of both intertemporal and intratemporal tradeoffs in the d etermination of optimal strategic policies. Copyright 1988 by American Economic Association.
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This paper studies the effects of contract duration on the incentive to invest in a relationship when its parties are rational and have perfect information, and contracts are complete, ex cept that short-term contracts specify only current-period actions. T hen, short-term contracting distorts investment decisions only when t he efficient plan involves mainly sunk-cost investment and the relati onship plays a consumption-smoothing role. There is a general, but no t universal, tendency to underinvest. Copyright 1988 by American Economic Association.
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This paper develops and implements a method for estimating price elasticities of demand using cross-sectional household survey data. Geographically clustered households report unit values, which when corrected for quality effects and for measurement error, indicate the underlying spatial variation in prices, and can be matched to variation in demand patterns. A simple model of quality choice is proposed, while the correction for measurement error exploits the clustered design of such surveys. Data from a 1979 household survey from the Ivory Coast are used to estimate price elasticities for beef, meat, fish, cereals, and starches. Copyright 1988 by American Economic Association.
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