A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.

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Results 518 resources

  • We study collective decisions by time-discounting individuals choosinga common consumption stream. We show that with any heterogeneityin time preferences, utilitarian aggregation necessitates apresent bias. In lab experiments three quarters of "social planners"exhibited present biases, and less than two percent were time consistent. Roughly a third of subjects acted as if they were pure utilitarians, and the rest chose as if they also had varying degrees ofdistributional concerns. (JEL C91, D12, D71, D72)

  • Ambiguous choice problems which involve three or more outcomevalues can reveal aspects of ambiguity and ambiguity aversionwhich cannot be displayed in the classic two-outcome Ellsberg urnproblems, and hence are not always captured by models designedto accommodate them. These aspects include Allais-type preferencesover purely subjective acts, attitudes toward different sources involving different amounts of ambiguity, and attitudes toward ambiguity at different outcome levels. This paper presents a few such examples, and examines the standard models' predictions and performance in such cases. (JEL D81)

  • Every year housing markets in the United Kingdom and the UnitedStates experience systematic above-trend increases in prices andtransactions during the spring and summer ("hot season") andbelow-trend falls during the autumn and winter ("cold season").House price seasonality poses a challenge to existing housing models.We propose a search-and-matching model with thick-market effects.In thick markets, the quality of matches increases, rising buyers' willingness to pay and sellers' desire to transact. A small, deterministicdriver of seasonality can be amplified and revealed as deterministicseasonality in transactions and prices, quantitatively mimicking seasonal fluctuations in UK and US markets. (JEL C78, R21, R31)

  • How large are optimal tariffs? What tariffs would prevail in a worldwidetrade war? How costly would a breakdown of internationaltrade policy cooperation be? And what is the scope for future multilateral trade negotiations? I address these and other questionsusing a unified framework which nests traditional, new trade, andpolitical economy motives for protection. I find that optimal tariffsaverage 62 percent, world trade war tariffs average 63 percent, thegovernment welfare losses from a breakdown of international tradepolicy cooperation average 2.9 percent, and the possible governmentwelfare gains from future multilateral trade negotiations average0.5 percent. (JEL F12, F13, O19)

  • By allowing for an extensive margin in the standard quantity-quality model, we generate new insights into fertility transitions. We test the model on Southern black women aected by a large-scale school construction program. Consistent with our model, women facing improved schooling opportunities for their children were more likely to have at least one child but chose to have smaller families overall. By contrast, women who themselves obtained more schooling due to the program delayed childbearing along both the extensive and intensive margins and entered higher quality occupations, consistent with education raising opportunity costs of child rearing.

  • We develop a framework where mismatch between vacancies and job seekers across sectors translates into higher unemployment by lowering the aggregate job-finding rate. We use this framework to measure the contribution of mismatch to the recent rise in U.S. unemployment by exploiting two sources of cross-sectional data on vacancies, JOLTS and HWOL. Our calculations indicate that mismatch, across industries and 3-digit occupations, explains at most 1/3 of the total observed increase in the unemployment rate. Occupational mismatch has become especially more severe for college graduates, and in the West of the United States. Geographical mismatch unemployment plays no apparent role.

  • Hume (1748) challenged the idea that a general claim (e.g. "allswans are white") can be validated by empirical evidence, no matter how compelling. We examine this issue from the perspective of a tester who must accept or reject the forecasts of a potential expert. If experts can be skeptical about the validity of claims then they can strategically evade rejection. In contrast, if experts are required to conclude that claims backed by su cient evidence are likely to be true, then they can be tested and rejected. These results provide an economic rationale for claim validation based on incentive problems.

  • We collect a new dataset on capital punishment in the US and we propose a test of racial bias based upon patterns of sentence reversals. We model the courts as minimizing type I and II errors.If trial courts were unbiased, conditional on defendants race the error rate should be independent of the victims race. Instead we uncover 3 and 9 percentage points higher reversal rates in Direct Appeal and Habeas Corpus cases, respectively, against minority defendants who killed whites. The pattern for white defendants is opposite but not statistically significant. This bias is confined to Southern States.

  • We survey 561 students from U.S. medical schools shortly after they submit choice rankings over residencies to the National Resident Matching Program. We elicit (a) these choice rankings, (b) anticipated subjective well-being (SWB) rankings, and (c) expected features of the residencies (such as prestige). We find substantial differences between choice and anticipated-SWB rankings in the implied tradeoffs between residency features. In our data, evaluative SWB measures (life satisfaction and Cantril's ladder) imply tradeoffs closer to choice than does affective happiness (even time-integrated), and as close as do multi-measure SWB indices. We discuss implications for using SWB data in applied work.

  • Motivated by empirical evidence I uncover on the dynamics ofFrench firms exports, I offer a novel theory of trade frictions.Firms only export into markets where they have a contact. Theydirectly search for new trading partners, but also use their existing network of contacts to remotely search for new partners. Icharacterize the dynamic formation of an international networkof exporters in this model. I structurally estimate this model onFrench data and confirm its predictions regarding the distributionof the number of foreign markets accessed by exporters and thegeographic distribution of exports.

Last update from database: 5/15/24, 11:01 PM (AEST)