A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
- Topic classification is ongoing.
- Please kindly let me know [mingze.gao@mq.edu.au] in case of any errors.
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Results 518 resources
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We develop a revealed preference methodology that allows us toexplore whether time inconsistencies in household choice are theproduct of individual preference nonstationarities or the result ofindividual heterogeneity and renegotiation within the household.An empirical application to household-level microdata highlightsthat an explicit recognition of the collective nature of householdchoice enables the observed behavior to be rationalized by a theorythat assumes preference stationarity at the individual level. Themethodology created in this paper also facilitates the recovery oftheory-consistent discount rates for each individual within particularhousehold under study. (JEL E24, F13, F16)
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This paper uses a unique panel dataset of consumer financial transactions to study how consumers respond to an exogenous unanticipated income shock. Consumption rose significantly after the fiscal policy announcement: during the ten subsequent months, for each 1 received, consumers on average spent 0.80. We find a strongannouncement effect – 19 percent of the response occurs during thefirst two-month announcement period via credit cards. Subsequently,consumers switched to debit cards after disbursement before finallyincreasing spending on credit cards in the later months. Consumerswith low liquid assets or with low credit card limit experienced strongerconsumption responses. (JEL D12, D14, E21)
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A principal allocates an object to one of I agents. Each agent valuesreceiving the object and has private information regarding the valueto the principal of giving it to him. There are no monetary transfers,but the principal can check an agent's information at a cost.A favored-agent mechanism specifies a value v* and an agent i*. Ifall agents other than i* report values below v*, then i* receives thegood and no one is checked. Otherwise, whoever reports the highestvalue is checked and receives the good if and only if her report isconfirmed. All optimal mechanisms are essentially randomizationsover optimal favored-agent mechanisms. (JEL D82)
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Do lobbyists provide issue-specific information to members ofCongress? Or do they provide special interests access to politicians?We present evidence to assess the role of issue expertise versus connections in the US Federal lobbying process and illustrate how bothare at work. In support of the connections view, we show that lobbyistsfollow politicians they were initially connected to when thosepoliticians switch to new committee assignments. In support of theexpertise view, we show that there is a group of experts that evenpoliticians of opposite political affiliation listen to. However, we finda more consistent monetary premium for connections than expertise.(JEL D72, D82)
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We show that the risk-shock business cycle model ofFernández-Villaverde et al. (2011) must be recalibrated becauseit underpredicts the targeted business cycle moments by a factorof three once a time aggregation error is corrected. Recalibratingthe corrected model for the benchmark case of Argentina, the peakresponse and the contribution of interest rate risk shocks to businesscycle volatility increase. However, the recalibrated model doesworse in capturing the business cycle properties of net exports oncean additional error in the computation of net exports is corrected.
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The volume of new issuances in secondary loan markets fluctuatesover time and falls when collateral values fall. We develop a modelwith adverse selection and reputation that is consistent with suchfluctuations. Adverse selection ensures that the volume of trade fallswhen collateral values fall. Without reputation, the equilibrium hasseparation, adverse selection is quickly resolved, and trade volume isindependent of collateral value. With reputation, the equilibrium haspooling and adverse selection persists over time. The equilibriumis efficient unless collateral values are low and originators' reputationallevels are low. We describe policies that can implement efficientoutcomes. (JEL D82, G11, G21, G28)
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Private equity critics claim that leveraged buyouts bring huge joblosses and few gains in operating performance. To evaluate theseclaims, we construct and analyze a new dataset that covers USbuyouts from 1980 to 2005. We track 3,200 target firms and their150,000 establishments before and after acquisition, comparing tocontrols defined by industry, size, age, and prior growth. Buyoutslead to modest net job losses but large increases in gross job creationand destruction. Buyouts also bring TFP gains at target firms,mainly through accelerated exit of less productive establishmentsand greater entry of highly productive ones. (JEL D24, G24, G32,G34, J23, J63, L25)
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We make use of a new data resource – merged birth and schoolrecords for all children born in Florida from 1992 to 2002 – to studythe relationship between birth weight and cognitive development.Using singletons as well as twin and sibling fixed effects models,we find that the effects of early health on cognitive development areessentially constant through the school career; that these effects aresimilar across a wide range of family backgrounds; and that theyare invariant to measures of school quality. We conclude that theeffects of early health on adult outcomes are therefore set very early.(JEL I12, J13, J24)
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We estimate an insurer-specific preference function which rationalizeshospital referrals for privately insured births in California. The functionis additively separable in: a hospital price paid by the insurer,the distance traveled, and plan- and severity-specific hospital fixedeffects (capturing hospital quality). We use an inequality estimatorthat allows for errors in price and detailed hospital-severity interactions and obtain markedly different results than those from a logit. The estimates indicate that insurers with more capitated physicians are more responsive to price. Capitated plans send patients further to utilize similar quality, lower-priced hospitals; but the cost-quality trade-off does not vary with capitation rates. (JEL G22, H51, I11, I13, I18, J44)
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We conduct the first empirical investigation of common-poolresource users' dynamic and strategic behavior at the micro levelusing real-world data. Fishermen's strategies in a fully dynamicgame account for latent resource dynamics and other players'actions, revealing the profit structure of the fishery. We compare thefishermen's actual and socially optimal exploitation paths undera time-specific vessel allocation policy and find a sizable dynamicexternality. Individual fishermen respond to other users by exertingeffort above the optimal level early in the season. Congestionis costly instantaneously but is beneficial in the long run because itpartially offsets dynamic inefficiencies. (JEL D24, Q21, Q22)
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Journals
- American Economic Review (252)
- Journal of Finance (71)
- Journal of Financial Economics (102)
- Review of Financial Studies (93)
Topic
- Bond (26)
- CEO (16)
- Director (15)
- Mergers and Acquisitions (9)
- Capital Structure (7)
Resource type
- Journal Article (518)