A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
- Topic classification is ongoing.
- Please kindly let me know [mingze.gao@mq.edu.au] in case of any errors.
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Results 518 resources
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We examine the relationship between concentration and price dispersion using variation induced by a merger in the Canadian mortgage market. Since interest rates are determined through a search and negotiation process, consolidation weakens consumers' bargaining positions. We use reduced-form techniques to estimate the mergers' distributional impact, and show that competition benefits only consumers at the bottom and middle of the transaction price distribution, and that mergers reduce the dispersion of prices. We illustrate that these effects can be explained by the presence of search frictions, and that the average effect of mergers on rates underestimates the increase in market power.
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Do mandatory spending programs such as Medicare improve efficiency? We analyze a model with two parties allocating a fixed budget to a public good and private transfers each period over an infinite horizon. We compare two institutions that differ in whether public good spending is discretionary or mandatory. We model mandatory spending as an endogenous status quo since it is enacted by law and remains in effect until changed. Mandatory programs result in higher public good spending; furthermore, they ex ante Pareto dominate discretionary programs when parties are patient, persistence of power is low, and polarization is low.
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To combat adverse selection, governments increasingly base payments to health plans and providers on enrollees' scores fromrisk-adjustment formulae. In 2004, Medicare began to risk-adjustcapitation payments to private Medicare Advantage (MA) plans toreduce selection-driven overpayments. But because the varianceof medical costs increases with the predicted mean, incentivizingenrollment of individuals with higher scores can increase the scopefor enrolling "overpriced" individuals with costs significantly belowthe formula's prediction. Indeed, after risk adjustment, MA plansenrolled individuals with higher scores but lower costs conditionalon their score. We find no evidence that overpayments were on netreduced.
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Implementation theory assumes that participants' choices are rational,in the sense of being consistent with the maximization of a context-independent preference. The paper investigates implementationunder complete information when individuals' choices need not berational.
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We study cascades of failures in a network of interdependent financial organizations: how discontinuous changes in asset values(e.g., defaults and shutdowns) trigger further failures, and how thisdepends on network structure. Integration (greater dependence oncounterparties) and diversification (more counterparties per organization) have different, nonmonotonic effects on the extent of cascades. Diversification connects the network initially, permittingcascades to travel; but as it increases further, organizations arebetter insured against one another's failures. Integration also faces trade-offs: increased dependence on other organizations versus lesssensitivity to own investments. Finally, we illustrate the model withdata on European debt cross-holdings.
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We study the competitive forces which shaped ideological diversity inthe US press in the early twentieth century. We find that householdspreferred like-minded news and that newspapers used their politicalorientation to differentiate from competitors. We formulate a modelof newspaper demand, entry, and political affiliation choice in whichnewspapers compete for both readers and advertisers. We use a combination of estimation and calibration to identify the model's parameters from novel data on newspaper circulation, costs, and revenues. The estimated model implies that competition enhances ideological diversity, that the market undersupplies diversity, and that optimal competition policy requires accounting for the two-sidedness of the news market.
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Using the most comprehensive developing country dataset evercompiled on air and water pollution and environmental regulations,the paper assesses India's environmental regulations with adifference-in-differences design. The air pollution regulations areassociated with substantial improvements in air quality. The mostsuccessful air regulation resulted in a modest but statisticallyinsignificant decline in infant mortality. In contrast, the waterregulations had no measurable benefits. The available evidence leadsus to cautiously conclude that higher demand for air quality promptedthe effective enforcement of air pollution regulations, indicating thatstrong public support allows environmental regulations to succeed inweak institutional settings.
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We investigate Schelling's hypothesis that payoff-irrelevant labels("cues") can influence the outcomes of bargaining games withcommunication. In our experimental games, players negotiate overthe division of a surplus by claiming valuable objects that havepayoff-irrelevant spatial locations. Negotiation occurs in continuoustime, constrained by a deadline. In some games, spatial cues areopposed to principles of equality or efficiency. We find a strong tendency for players to agree on efficient and minimally unequal payoff divisions, even if spatial cues suggest otherwise. But if there are two such divisions, cues are often used to select between them, inducing distributional effects.
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This paper revisits the results of Moskowitz and Vissing-J?gensen(2002) on returns to entrepreneurial investments in the United States.Following the authors' methodology and new data from the Survey ofConsumer Finances, I find that the "private equity premium puzzle"does not survive the period of high public equity returns in the 1990s.The difference between private and public equity returns is positiveand large period-by-period between 1999 and 2007. Whereas inthe 2008-2010 period, overlapping with the Great Recession,public and private equities performances are substantially closer.I validate these results in the aggregate data going back to the 1960s.
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I develop a highly tractable general equilibrium model in whichheterogeneous producers face collateral constraints, and study theeffect of financial frictions on capital misallocation and aggregateproductivity. My economy is isomorphic to a Solow model but withtime-varying TFP. I argue that the persistence of idiosyncratic productivity shocks determines both the size of steady-state productivity losses and the speed of transitions: if shocks are persistent, steady-state losses are small but transitions are slow. Even if financial frictions are unimportant in the long run, they tend to matter in the short run and analyzing steady states only can be misleading.
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Journals
- American Economic Review (252)
- Journal of Finance (71)
- Journal of Financial Economics (102)
- Review of Financial Studies (93)
Topic
- Bond (26)
- CEO (16)
- Director (15)
- Mergers and Acquisitions (9)
- Capital Structure (7)
Resource type
- Journal Article (518)