A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.
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Results 518 resources
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A key feature of arbitration is the possibility for conicting parties to participate in the selection of the arbitrator, the individual who will rule the case. We analyze this problem of the selection of arbitrators from the perspective of implementation theory. In particular, theoretical analyses document problems with veto-rank,a simultaneous procedure that is commonly used in practice, anddevelop a new sequential procedure, shortlisting, with better properties. Experimental results are consistent with the theoretical predictions, highlighting both the disadvantages associated with theveto-rank procedure and the advantages associated with the short-lising procedure.
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We quantitatively investigate the allocative and welfare effects ofsecondary markets for cars. An important source of gains fromtrade in these markets is the heterogeneity in the willingness topay for higher-quality (newer) goods, but transaction costs are animpediment to instantaneous trade. Calibration of the model successfully matches several aggregate features of the U.S. and French used-car markets. Counterfactual analyses show that transaction costs have a large effect on volume of trade, allocations, and the primary market. Aggregate effects on consumer surplus and welfare are relatively small, but the effect on lower-valuation households can be large.
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This paper reconsiders the traditional approach to human capital measurement in the study of cross-country income differences. Within a broader class of neoclassical human capital aggregators, traditional accounting is found to be a theoretical lower bound on human capital difference across economies. Implementing a generalized accounting empirically illustrates the possibility that capital variation may now account (even fully) for the large income variation between rich and poor countries. These findings reject the constraints on human capital variation that traditional accounting has imposed.
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We provide conditions under which contingent claim and asset demands are consistent with state independent Expected Utility maximization. The paper focuses on the case of a single commodity and demands are allowed to be functions of probabilities and not just prices and income. We extend prior analyses by deriving three distinct tests for demands to be rationalized by Expected Utility: (i) a contingent claim analogue to the certainty strong axiom of revealed preference, (ii) a characterization of the functional form for demand and (iii) necessary and sufficient conditions based on the Slutsky matrix.
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Hiring inexperienced workers generates information about their abilities. If this information is public, workers obtain its benefits. If workers cannot compensate firms for hiring them, firms will hire too few inexperienced workers. I determine the effects of hiring workers and revealing more information about their abilities through a field experiment in an online marketplace. I hired 952 randomly-selected workers, giving them either detailed or coarse public evaluations. Both hiring workers and providing more detailed evaluations substantially improved workers' subsequent employment outcomes. Under plausible assumptions, the experiment's market-level benefits exceeded its cost, suggesting that some experimental workers had been inefficiently unemployed.
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In this paper, I offer two ways in which firms can collude: secret monitoring and infrequent coordination. Such collusion is enforceable with intuitive communication protocols. I make my case in the context of a repeated Cournotoligopoly with flexible production, prices that follow a Brownian motion and no monetary side payments, an environment where it has previously been argued that any collusion is impossible. Trade associations can easily facilitate collusion by mediating communication amongst firms.
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We consider a growth model in which intergenerational transfersare made via stocks of private and public capital. Private capital isthe outcome of individuals' private savings while decisions regarding public capital are made collectively. We hypothesize that private saving choices evolve through individual selection while publicsaving decisions are the result of group selection. The main resultof the paper is that the equilibrium rate of return to private capital is at least 2-3% more than the rate of return to public capital.In other words, social choices involving intertemporal trade-offsexhibit much more patience than individual choices do.
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If workers self-select into industries based upon their relativeproductivity in different tasks, and comparative advantage is alignedwith absolute advantage, then the average efficacy of a sector'sworkforce will be negatively correlated with its employment share.This might explain the difference in the reported productivity growthof contracting goods and expanding services. Instrumenting withdefense expenditures, I find the elasticity of worker efficacy withrespect to employment shares is substantially negative, albeitimprecisely estimated. The estimates suggest that the view thatgoods and services have similar productivity growth rates is aplausible alternative characterization of growth in developedeconomies.
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In this paper, we demonstrate the efficiency of seller entry in a modelof competing auctions in which we allow for both buyer and sellerheterogeneity. This generalizes existing efficiency results in the competitive search literature by simultaneously allowing for nonrival(many-on-one) meetings and private information.
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We document three remarkable features of the Opower program, inwhich social comparison-based home energy reports are repeatedlymailed to more than six million households nationwide. First, initialreports cause high-frequency "action and backsliding," but thesecycles attenuate over time. Second, if reports are discontinued aftertwo years, effects are relatively persistent, decaying at 10-20 percentper year. Third, consumers are slow to habituate: they continue torespond to repeated treatment even after two years. We show that theprevious conservative assumptions about post-intervention persistence had dramatically understated cost effectiveness and illustrate how empirical estimates can optimize program design.
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Journals
- American Economic Review (252)
- Journal of Finance (71)
- Journal of Financial Economics (102)
- Review of Financial Studies (93)
Topic
- Bond (26)
- CEO (16)
- Director (15)
- Mergers and Acquisitions (9)
- Capital Structure (7)
Resource type
- Journal Article (518)