We examine whether banks better protect themselves against risk-shifting as compared to non-bank lenders by comparing risk management polices across firms that borrow from different lenders using a unique, hand-collected data set of hedging and borrowing practices. Consistent with banks being effective monitors, we find hedging is positively associated with the proportion of bank debt amongst firms with large risk-shifting incentives. We present descriptive evidence showing that banks use covenants as one of the channels to mitigate risk-shifting.

We examine the effects of regulations designed to address the potential conflict of interest that arises when sell-side analyst research is not independent of investment banking. We focus on two types of regulation: (1) internal barriers between equity research and investment banking that restrict communication; and (2) disclosure requirements relating to analyst compensation. We find that information barriers can increase research effort and improve report quality by limiting an investment bank's ability to distort its analyst's incentives. However, this type of regulation can also reduce information production and lower the quality of reports if an investment bank benefits directly from research activity. Disclosure requirements, on the other hand, unambiguously lead to more informative prices and a higher report quality relative to either information barriers or no regulation.

This paper examines the anticipated components of bidder returns by focusing on the banking industry around the passage of interstate deregulation (Riegle Neal Act of 1994). Overall, firms that became bidders after Riegle Neal have large significant positive returns during its passage. Moreover, these positive wealth effects are significantly larger than the effects at the merger announcement. These results suggest that bidder returns are anticipated and focusing only on narrow event windows underestimates gains to bidders. Finally, the positive bidder returns appear to provide evidence against both the entrenchment and hubris hypotheses. Additional tests provide evidence to suggest that mergers are motivated by synergy rather than disciplinary motives.

This paper examines the financing decisions of firms in response to changes in investments and profits. We find that information frictions play important roles in firms' financing decisions. However, we find no evidence that asymmetric information about the value of a firm's assets causes equity to be used only as a last resort. Indeed equity is the predominant source of finance in situations, such as profit shortfalls, investment in intangible assets, and internally generated growth opportunities, where informational asymmetries and agency costs are likely to be high. We also find that firms respond asymmetrically to positive and negative profit shocks. In financing fixed assets, high asymmetric information firms use more short-term debt and less long-term debt, whereas firms with high potential agency problems use significantly more equity and less long-term debt and cash.

Abstract This paper evaluates investment strategies that exploit the deviations from theoretical price parity in a sample of 12 dual-listed companies (DLCs) in the period 1980–2002. We show that simple trading rules produce abnormal returns of up to almost 10% per annum adjusted for systematic risk, transaction costs, and margin requirements. However, arbitrageurs face uncertainty about the horizon at which prices will converge and deviations from parity are very volatile. As a result, DLC arbitrage is characterized by substantial idiosyncratic return volatility and a high incidence of large negative returns, which are likely to impede arbitrage.

Almost one-third of actively managed, diversified U.S. equity mutual funds specify a size and value/growth benchmark index in the fund prospectus that does not match the fund's actual style. Nevertheless, these “mismatched” benchmarks matter to fund investors. Performance relative to the specified benchmark is a significant determinant of a fund's subsequent cash inflows, even controlling for performance measures that better capture the fund's style. These incremental flows appear unlikely to be rational responses to abnormal returns. The evidence is consistent with the notion that mismatched self-designated benchmarks result from strategic fund behavior driven by the incentive to improve flows.

The revelation that scores of firms engaged in the illegal manipulation of stock options’ grant dates (i.e. “backdating”) captured much public attention. The evidence indicates that the consequences stemming from management misconduct and misrepresentation are of first-order importance in this context as shareholders of firms accused of backdating experience large negative, statistically significant abnormal returns. Furthermore, shareholders’ losses are directly related to firms’ likely culpability and the magnitude of the resulting restatements, despite the limited cash flow implications. And, tellingly, the losses are attenuated when tainted management of less successful firms is more likely to be replaced and relatively many firms become takeover targets.

[This paper proposes a representative agent habit-formation model where preferences are defined for both luxury goods and basic goods. The model matches the equity risk premium, risk-free rate, and volatilities. From the intratemporal first-order condition, one can substitute out basic good consumption and the habit level, yielding a stochastic discount factor driven by two observable risk factors: luxury good consumption and the relative price of the two goods. I estimate these processes and find them to be heteroskedastic, implying time variation in the conditional volatility of the stochastic discount factor. These dynamics occur both at the business cycle frequency and at a lower, "generational" frequency. The findings reveal that the time variation in aggregate stock market and Treasury bond risk premiums are consistent with the predictions of the model.]

[In corporate finance and asset pricing empirical work, researchers are often confronted with panel data. In these data sets, the residuals may be correlated across firms or across time, and OLS standard errors can be biased. Historically, researchers in the two literatures have used different solutions to this problem. This paper examines the different methods used in the literature and explains when the different methods yield the same (and correct) standard errors and when they diverge. The intent is to provide intuition as to why the different approaches sometimes give different answers and give researchers guidance for their use.]