Exploiting staggered changes in state-level corporate income taxes, we document that corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance improves substantially following tax cuts, reflecting firms' reliance on internal funds for CSR investments. However, tax increases do not significantly weaken CSR performance, implying that CSR commitments are sticky on the upside. Tax cuts enhance CSR performance more for firms with greater tax exposure, tighter financial constraints, better corporate governance, stronger prosocial preferences, or higher risk. Additional analysis of the 2017 federal tax reform substantiates the CSR effect of tax cuts. Overall, our findings highlight essential CSR features and illustrate how corporate tax policy drives corporate sustainability.

We investigate the effect of stock market liberalization on technological innovation. Using a sample of 20 economies that experience stock market liberalization, we find that these economies exhibit a higher level of innovation output after liberalization and that this effect is disproportionately stronger in more innovative industries. The relaxation of financial constraints, enhanced risk sharing between domestic and foreign investors, and improved corporate governance are three plausible channels that allow stock market liberalization to promote innovation. Finally, we show that technological innovation is a mechanism through which stock market liberalization affects productivity growth and therefore economic growth. Our paper provides new insights into the real effects of stock market liberalization on productivity growth and the economy.

We provide empirical evidence on the positive effect of non-executive employee stock options on corporate innovation. The positive effect is more pronounced when employees are more important for innovation, when free-riding among employees is weaker, when options are granted broadly to most employees, when the average expiration period of options is longer, and when employee stock ownership is lower. Further analysis reveals that employee stock options foster innovation mainly through the risk-taking incentive, rather than the performance-based incentive created by stock options.

Using a sample from 38 economies, we examine the relation between bank regulators’ supervisory power and loan spreads. We find that loans issued by banks in economies with more powerful supervisors have higher spreads. The positive association is more pronounced when firms have lower credit quality, when the relationships between firms and banks are less established, when syndicate loans involve fewer lenders, and when lead banks have a riskier profile. Further analyses reveal that loans issued by banks that operate under more powerful supervisors have smaller size and shorter maturity, and the loans are more likely to have collateral requirements and restrictive covenants. Overall, these results suggest that stronger supervisory power of bank regulators affects loan contracting by mitigating lenders’ excessive risk taking.

We show that credit default swap (CDS) trading on a firm's debt positively influences its technological innovation output measured by patents and patent citations. This positive effect is more pronounced in firms relying more on debt financing or being more subject to continuous monitoring by lenders prior to CDS trade initiation. Moreover, after CDS trade initiation, firms pursue more risky and original innovations and generate patents with higher economic value. Further analysis suggests that CDSs improve borrowing firms’ innovation output by enhancing lenders’ risk tolerance and borrowers’ risk- taking in the innovation process, rather than by increasing Research and Development (R&D) investment. Taken together, our findings reveal the real effects of CDSs on companies’ investments and technological progress.

We document that firms in more politically corrupt regions of China adopt more conservative accounting. The relation between local political corruption and accounting conservatism weakens after China’s anticorruption campaign launched in 2012 and in firms with a lower risk of expropriation by corrupt officials, stronger incentives to report earnings aggressively, or greater gains from corruption. Further analysis shows that accounting conservatism and alternative corporate strategies complement each other in shielding firms against corrupt officials’ expropriation of corporate resources. Our study provides novel evidence about an accounting approach used by firms in response to perceived political costs.