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Do Stronger Intellectual Property Rights Increase International Technology Transfer? Empirical Evidence from U. S. Firm-Level Panel Data

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2006 121(1), 321-358
One of the alleged benefits of the recent global movement to strengthen intellectual property rights (IPRs) is that such reforms accelerate transfers of technology between countries. The paper examines how technology transfer among U.S. multinational firms changes in response to a series of IPR reforms undertaken by 12 countries over the 1982-99 period. The analysis of detailed firm-level data reveal that royalty payments for intangibles transferred to affiliates increase at the time of reforms, as do affiliate research and development (R&D) expenditures and total levels of foreign patent applications. Increases in royalty payments and R&D expenditures are more than 20 percent larger among affiliates of parent companies that use U.S. patents more extensively prior to reform and therefore are expected to value IPR reform most.

Nationalism and Economic Exchange: Evidence from Shocks to Sino-Japanese Relations

Review of Financial Studies 2014 27(9), 2626-2660
We study the impact of nationalism and interstate frictions on international economic relations by analyzing market reaction to adverse shocks to Sino-Japanese relations in 2005 and 2010. Japanese companies with high China exposure suffer relative declines during each event window; a symmetric effect is observed for Chinese companies with high Japanese exposure. The effect on Japanese companies is more pronounced for those operating in industries dominated by Chinese state-owned enterprises, whereas firms with high Chinese employment experience lower declines. These results emphasize the role of countries' economic and political institutions in mediating the impact of interstate frictions on firm-level outcomes.

Tax-Exempt Lobbying: Corporate Philanthropy as a Tool for Political Influence

American Economic Review 2020 110(7), 2065-2102 open access
We explore the role of charitable giving as a means of political influence. For philanthropic foundations associated with large US corporations, we present three different identification strategies that consistently point to the use of corporate social responsibility in ways that parallel the strategic use of political action committee (PAC) spending. Our estimates imply that 6.3 percent of corporate charitable giving may be politically motivated, an amount 2.5 times larger than annual PAC contributions and 35 percent of federal lobbying. Absent of disclosure requirements, charitable giving may be a form of corporate political influence undetected by voters and subsidized by taxpayers.

Trading Favors within Chinese Business Groups

American Economic Review 2010 100(2), 429-433
A dominant aspect of ownership in the developing world is pyramidal structures, which allow shareholders to control corporations with relatively low investments. The uneasy relationship between these controlling investors and minority shareholders, and the potential impact on the broader macro economy, has been well studied by corporate governance scholars. On the one hand, the mismatch of cash flow and control rights leads to a range of agency problems and resultant resource misallocations, potentially impacting the macro economy (see Randall Morck, Daniel Wolfenzon, and Bernard Yeung 2005 for a comprehensive overview). Yet pyramids are one important mechanism that enables the formation of diversified business groups that, too, are a dominant feature of business organization in much of the world. The economics and management literature has taken a more ambivalent view of business groups, with their agency problems and rent seeking behaviors often counterbalanced by productive efficiencies from correcting market failures in weak institutional environments (see, in particular, a survey of the business groups literature by Tarun Khanna and Yishay Yafeh 2007 which emphasizes this tension). Often, the channels that enable value extraction by controlling interests overlap with those required to overcome market failures. For example, consider a controlling shareholder of a publicly listed firm that has a separate, completely owned, Trade and The InTernal OrganIzaTIOn Of fIrms

Financial Development and Intersectoral Allocation: A New Approach

Journal of Finance 2004 59(6), 2785-2807
This paper uses a new methodology based on industry comovement to examine the role of financial market development in intersectoral allocation. Based on the assumption that there exist common global shocks to growth opportunities, we hypothesize that country pairs should have correlated patterns of sectoral growth if they are able to respond to these shocks. Consistent with financial markets promoting responsiveness to shocks, countries have more highly correlated growth rates across sectors when both countries have well‐developed financial markets. This effect is stronger between country pairs at similar levels of economic development, which are more likely to experience similar growth shocks.

Trade Credit, Financial Intermediary Development, and Industry Growth

Journal of Finance 2003 58(1), 353-374
Recent work suggests that financial development is important for economic growth, since financial markets more effectively allocate capital to firms with high value projects. For firms in poorly developed financial markets, implicit borrowing in the form of trade credit may provide an alternative source of funds. We show that industries with higher dependence on trade credit financing exhibit higher rates of growth in countries with weaker financial institutions. Furthermore, consistent with barriers to trade credit access among young firms, we show that most of the effect that we report comes from growth in the size of preexisting firms.

Hall of Mirrors: Corporate Philanthropy and Strategic Advocacy

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2021 136(4), 2413-2465
Information is central to designing effective policy, and policy makers often rely on competing interests to separate useful from biased information. We show how this logic of virtuous competition can break down, using a new and comprehensive data set on U.S. federal regulatory rulemaking for 2003–2016. For-profit corporations and nonprofit entities are active in the rulemaking process and are arguably expected to provide independent viewpoints. Policy makers, however, may not be fully aware of the financial ties between some firms and nonprofits—grants that are legal and tax-exempt but hard to trace. We document three patterns that suggest that these grants may distort policy. First, we show that shortly after a firm donates to a nonprofit, the nonprofit is more likely to comment on rules on which the firm has also commented. Second, when a firm comments on a rule, the comments by nonprofits that recently received grants from the firm’s foundation are systematically closer in content to the firm’s own comments, relative to comments submitted by other nonprofits. Third, the final rule’s discussion by a regulator is more similar to the firm’s comments on that rule when the firm’s recent grantees also commented on it.

Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets

Journal of Political Economy 2007 115(6), 1020-1048
We study cultural norms and legal enforcement in controlling corruption by analyzing the parking behavior of United Nations officials in Manhattan. Until 2002, diplomatic immunity protected U.N. diplomats from parking enforcement actions, so diplomats ’ actions were constrained by cultural norms alone. We find a strong effect of corruption norms: diplomats from high corruption countries (based on existing survey-based indices) accumulated significantly more unpaid parking violations. In 2002, enforcement authorities acquired the right to confiscate diplomatic plates of violators. Unpaid violations dropped sharply in response. Corruption norms and (particularly in this context) legal enforcement are both important determinants of corruption.

Political Beta

Review of Finance 2022 26(5), 1179-1215
Using a portfolio theory framework, we introduce the concept of “political beta” to model firm-level export diversification in response to global political risk. Our model predicts that firms are less responsive to changes in political relations with lower beta countries—those that contribute less to the firm’s total political risk. We document patterns consistent with our model using disaggregated Russian firm-by-destination-country data during 2001–2011: Trade is positively correlated with political relations, though the effect is far weaker for trading partners whose political relations with Russia are relatively uncorrelated with those of other partners in a firm’s export portfolio.