Since the global financial crisis, interest rate swap rates, which represent future uncollateralized interbank borrowing, have fallen below maturity-matched Treasury rates. This is surprising, because US Treasuries, which are deemed expensive because of superior liquidity and safety, should produce yields that are lower than those of swap rates. We show, by no-arbitrage, that sovereign default risk explains negative swap spreads even without frictions such as balance sheet constraints, convenience yield, and hedging demand. We support this explanation with an equilibrium model that jointly accounts for macroeconomic fundamentals and the term structures of interest and US credit default swap rates.

This paper presents a new model for the valuation of European options, in which the volatility of returns consists of two components. One is a long-run component and can be modeled as fully persistent. The other is short-run and has a zero mean. Our model can be viewed as an affine version of Engle and Lee [1999. A permanent and transitory component model of stock return volatility. In: Engle, R., White, H. (Eds.), Cointegration, Causality, and Forecasting: A Festschrift in Honor of Clive W.J. Granger. Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 475–497], allowing for easy valuation of European options. The model substantially outperforms a benchmark single-component volatility model that is well established in the literature, and it fits options better than a model that combines conditional heteroskedasticity and Poisson–normal jumps. The component model's superior performance is partly due to its improved ability to model the smirk and the path of spot volatility, but its most distinctive feature is its ability to model the volatility term structure. This feature enables the component model to jointly model long-maturity and short-maturity options.

We examine wealth changes for all 1283 publicly traded debt and equity securities of firms involved in 260 pure stock-for-stock mergers from 1963 to 1996. We find no evidence that conglomerate stock-for-stock mergers create financial synergies or benefit bondholders at stockholders' expense. Instead, we document significant net synergistic gains in nonconglomerate mergers and generally insignificant net gains in conglomerate mergers. Conglomerate bidding-firm stockholders lose; all other securityholders at least break even. Convertible securityholders experience the largest gains, due mostly to their attached option values. Certain bond covenants are value-enhancing while leverage increases are value-reducing.

Using multiple measures of attack proximity, we show that CEOs employed at firms located near terrorist attacks earn an average pay increase of 12% after the attack relative to CEOs at firms located far from attacks. CEOs at terrorist attack-proximate firms prefer cash-based compensation increases (e.g., salary and bonus) over equity-based compensation (e.g., options and stocks granted). The effect is causal and it is larger when the bargaining power of the CEO is high. Other executives and workers do not receive a terrorist attack premium.

We examine whether Delaware is a domestic tax haven. We find that taxes play an economically important role in determining whether U.S. firms locate subsidiaries in Delaware and that a Delaware-based state tax avoidance strategy lowers state effective tax rates by between 0.7 and 1.1 percentage points, on average. The tax savings represent a 15–24% decrease in the state income tax burden and translate to an increase in net income of 1.04–1.47%. However, we find that the tax benefits of Delaware tax strategies are diminishing over time in response to initiatives by state governments to limit multistate tax avoidance.

Both market timing and investment-based theories of corporate financing predict under-performance after firms raise capital, but only market timing predicts that the composition of financing (equity compared with debt) should also forecast returns. In cross-sectional tests, we find that the amount of net financing is more important than its composition in explaining future stock returns. In the time series, investment-based factor models explain abnormal stock performance following a variety of corporate financing events that previous studies link to market timing. At the aggregate level, the amount of new financing is also more important for future market returns than its composition. Overall, our joint tests reveal that measures of real investment are correlated with future returns and measures of managerial market timing are not.

Rating agencies consult with local government officials several days prior to official announcements of sovereign debt rating changes, making information leakage likely. Using cross-country data from 1988 to 2012, we find evidence of information leakage. In particular, we find statistically and economically significant negative daily abnormal stock index returns prior to downgrade announcements. These effects are more pronounced in countries with lower institutional quality, and they persist during times with no downgrade rumors and no concurrent bad news in general. A mild post-announcement reversal consistent with overreaction to pre-event downgrade rumors highlights the adverse effects of such leakage and, thus, should be a policy concern for capital market regulators.

Transaction costs have a first-order effect on the performance of currency portfolios. Proportional costs based on quoted bid–ask spread are relatively small, but when a fund is large, costs due to the trading volume price impact are sizable and quickly erode returns, leaving many popular strategies unprofitable. A mean–variance-transaction-cost optimized approach (MVTC) that accounts for costs in the optimization efficiently tackles the problem with only relatively minor negative implications on before-cost profitability. MVTC is robust even when the price impact of trading is severe. Finally, we introduce an accurate extrapolation approach to expand the sample of the realized Amihud measure of Ranaldo and Santucci de Magistris (2022) from 12 to 26 currencies and from 2012 back in time to 1986.

Using more than 50,000 firm-years from 1988 to 2015, we show that the empirical relation between a firm's Tobin's q and managerial ownership is systematically negative. When we restrict our sample to larger firms, as in the prior literature, we confirm earlier findings of an increasing and concave relation between q and managerial ownership. We show that cumulative past performance and liquidity can explain these seemingly contradictory results. Better performing firms have more liquid equity, which enables firms and insiders to more easily sell shares after the IPO, and they also have a higher Tobin's q.

Machine-learning methods exploit fund characteristics to select tradable long-only portfolios of mutual funds that earn significant out-of-sample annual alphas of 2.4% net of all costs. The methods unveil interactions in the relation between fund characteristics and future performance. For instance, past performance is a particularly strong predictor of future performance for more active funds. Machine learning identifies managers whose skill is not sufficiently offset by diseconomies of scale, consistent with informational frictions preventing investors from identifying the outperforming funds. Our findings demonstrate that investors can benefit from active management, but only if they have access to sophisticated prediction methods.