Knowledge that Transforms

Using manager compensation disclosure and intra-family manager cooperation measures, we create indices of family-level competitive/cooperative incentives. Families that encourage cooperation among their managers are more likely to engage in coordinated behavior (e.g., cross-trading and cross-holding) and have less volatile cash flows. Families with competitive incentives generate higher performing funds, a higher fraction of “star” funds, but greater performance dispersion across funds. In examining the determinants of incentive schemes, competitive families are more likely to manage institutional money, and cooperative families are more likely to distribute through brokers, consistent with retail demand for nonperformance characteristics.

This paper documents a significantly negative cross-sectional relation between left-tail risk and future returns on individual stocks trading in the US and international countries. We provide a behavioral explanation to this anomaly based on the idea that investors underestimate the persistence in left-tail risk and overprice stocks with large recent losses. Thus, low returns in the left-tail of the distribution persist into the future causing left-tail return momentum. We find that the left-tail risk anomaly is stronger for stocks that are more likely to be held by retail investors, that receive less investor attention, and that are costlier to arbitrage.

Most short-term interest rates in the euro area are below the European Central Bank deposit facility rate, the rate at which the central bank remunerates banks for excess reserves. This coincided with the start of the Public Sector Purchase Program (PSPP) launched in March 2015. In this paper, we explore empirically the interactions between the PSPP and repo rates. Using proprietary data from PSPP purchases and repo transactions for specific (“special”) securities, we assess the scarcity channel of PSPP and its impact on repo rates. We estimate that purchasing 1% of a bond outstanding is associated with a decline of its repo rate of 0.78 basis points.

We build a dynamic agency model in which the agent controls both current earnings via short-term investment and firm growth via long-term investment. Under the optimal contract, agency conflicts can induce short- and long-term investment levels beyond first best, leading to short- or long-termism in corporate policies. The paper analytically shows how firm characteristics shape the optimal contract and the horizon of corporate policies, thereby generating a number of novel empirical predictions on the optimality of short- versus long-termism. It also demonstrates that combining short- and long-term agency conflicts naturally leads to asymmetric pay-for-performance in managerial contracts.

Using a comprehensive sample of credit card data from a leading Chinese bank, we show that government bureaucrats receive 16% higher credit lines than non-bureaucrats with similar income and demographics, but their accounts experience a significantly higher likelihood of delinquency and debt forgiveness. Regions associated with greater credit provision to bureaucrats open more branches and receive more deposits from the local government. After staggered corruption crackdowns of provincial-level political officials, the new credit cards originated to bureaucrats in exposed regions do not enjoy a credit line premium, and bureaucrats’ delinquency and reinstatement rates are similar to those of non-bureaucrats.

We investigate the effect of cross-border regulatory cooperation in the enforcement of securities laws on global-mutual-fund portfolio allocations. Our research design exploits a shock to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s oversight of foreign firms cross-listed on a US stock exchange around the signing of the Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MMoU), a non-binding, information-sharing arrangement between global securities regulators. In signatory countries, foreign investment in US-cross-listed firms increases by $110 billion relative to non-cross-listed firms. The strongest effects are for investors facing greater information asymmetries, those from countries closely linked to the US, and non-US foreign investors, suggesting significant spillover effects from international regulatory cooperation.

The likelihood of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) jumps discontinuously when the stock price equals the most recent equity offer price. Anchoring on the last offer price holds after considering executive turnovers, stock splits, earnings management, or dividend adjustments. Using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design around this cutoff, which exploits local randomness in stock prices, we investigate the consequences of anchoring in SEOs. We find significant increases in cash holdings and acquisitions of lower quality, with no real effects on investment or employment. Overall, we provide some of the cleanest estimates, to date, of the timing and causal effects of SEOs.

We show that the PIN and the Duarte and Young (2009) (APIN) models do not match the variability of noise trade in the data and that this limitation has severe implications for how these models identify private information. We examine two alternatives to these models, the Generalized PIN model (GPIN) and the Odders-White and Ready (2008) model (OWR). Our tests indicate that measures of private information based on the OWR and GPIN models are promising alternatives to the APIN’s Adj.PIN and PIN.

This paper develops an overlapping generations model of optimal rebalancing where agents differ in age and risk tolerance. Equilibrium rebalancing is driven by a leverage effect that influences levered and unlevered agents in opposite directions, an aggregate risk tolerance effect that depends on the distribution of wealth, and an intertemporal hedging effect. After a negative macroeconomic shock, relatively risk-tolerant investors sell risky assets, while more risk-averse investors buy them. Owing to interactions of leverage and changing wealth, however, all agents have higher exposure to aggregate risk after a negative macroeconomic shock and lower exposure after a positive shock.