This paper studies the role of trust in incumbent lenders (banks) as an entry barrier to emerging FinTech lenders in credit markets. The empirical setting exploits the outbreak of the Wells Fargo scandal as a negative shock to borrowers’ trust in banks. Using a difference-in-differences framework, I find that increased exposure to the Wells Fargo scandal leads to an increase in the probability of borrowers using FinTech as mortgage originators. Utilizing political affiliation to proxy for the magnitude of trust erosion in banks in a triple-differences specification, I find that, conditional on the same exposure to the scandal, a county experiencing a greater erosion of trust has a larger increase in FinTech share relative to a county experiencing less of an erosion of trust. Estimating treatment effect heterogeneity using generic machine learning inference suggests that borrowers with the greatest decrease in trust in banks and the greatest increase in FinTech adoption have similar characteristics.

Using mutual fund flows, we evaluate prospect theory with choice outcomes in the market. We provide strong support for prospect theory: under a standard set of parameters, funds whose past returns generate higher prospect theory value attract significantly larger future flows; we also find corroborative evidence using account-level data. Taking a revealed preference approach, we estimate the prospect theory parameters through a discrete choice model and find that our field-based estimates align well with previous experiment-based estimates. Moreover, we show that prospect theory offers a new framework for understanding flows, as it has explanatory power beyond existing drivers.

I identify a “slope” factor in the cross section of commodity futures returns: high-basis commodity futures have higher loadings on this factor than low-basis commodity futures. Combined with a level factor (an index of commodity futures), this slope factor explains most of the average excess returns of commodity futures portfolios sorted by basis. More importantly, I find that this factor is significantly correlated with investment shocks, which represent the technological progress in producing new capital. I investigate a competitive dynamic equilibrium model of commodity production to endogenize this correlation. The model reproduces the cross-sectional futures returns and many asset pricing tests.

Durable consumption growth is persistent and predicted by the price–dividend ratio. This provides strong and direct evidence for the existence of a highly persistent expected component. Durable consumption growth is left-skewed and exhibits time-varying volatility. I model durable consumption growth as containing a persistent expected component and driven by counter-cyclical volatility, nondurable consumption as a random walk, and dividend growth as exposed to the expected component of durable consumption growth. Together with nonseparable Epstein-Zin preferences, the model demonstrates that long-run risk in durable consumption can explain major asset market phenomena. The model also generates an upward-sloping real term structure.

Does the early-career exposure of bank CEOs to the 1980s savings and loans (S&L) crisis affect the outcomes of banks they subsequently managed? We measure the S&L crisis exposure by the bank failure rate in the states where CEOs worked during the S&L crisis. Armed with this measure, we find that banks managed by CEOs with higher S&L crisis exposure took on less risk and that these banks better survived the financial crisis of 2008. In particular, CEOs adjusted risk attitudes in areas causing the S&L crisis: their more intense crisis experience reduced banks’ interest rate risk, exposure to risky financial innovation and credit risk. We establish the causal interpretation of the findings by evaluating the impact of crisis exposure via CEO hometown states and exploiting quasi-exogenous turnovers due to CEO retirement. Overall, CEOs learned from the past industry crisis which helped curtail their institutions’ risk exposures and enhance later crisis performance.

Asset pricing predictions from the investment CAPM depend on the cross-sectional relation between investment and profitability. In samples of U.S. stocks featuring high cross-sectional investment-profitability correlation, both investment and profitability premiums are weak. Consistent with the conditional predictions from the investment CAPM, triple sorts on size, investment, and profitability as in Hou et al. (2015)’s q-factors resurrect the premiums in the high-correlation samples. We find similar results using cash-based profitability, consistent with the dynamic investment CAPM. Our work has important implications for constructing asset pricing factors and interpreting out-of-sample asset pricing test results, in particular the insignificance of historical investment and profitability premiums.

Privately issued money often bears default risk, which creates transaction frictions when used as a medium of exchange. The late 19th century US provides a unique context to evaluate the real effects of supplying a new type of money that is safe from default. We measure the local change in “monetary” transaction frictions with a market access approach derived from general equilibrium trade theory. Consistent with theories hypothesizing that lowering transaction frictions benefits the traded and inputs-intensive sectors, we find an increase in traded goods production, in the share of manufacturing output and employment, and in innovation.

Time-preference shocks affect agents’ preferences for assets with different durations. We consider longevity risk as a source of time-preference shocks and model it in the recursive preferences setting. This implies a consumption-based three-factor model, including longevity risk, consumption growth rate, and the market portfolio, where longevity has a negative price of risk. Empirically, this model explains many well-known cross-sectional portfolios. Notably, we find that longevity risk and the momentum factor share a common business cycle component, i.e., short-run consumption risks. Prior winners (losers) provide hedging against mortality (longevity) risk and thus have higher (lower) expected returns, because winners have higher dividend growth and shorter equity durations than losers. Time-varying longevity risk captures most momentum profits over time, including the large momentum crashes observed in the data.

We develop a model to illustrate that equity-based compensation for non-executive employees and product market decisions are related. When the product market is competitive and employees have low bargaining power , the unique equilibrium is for each firm’s owners to offer equity-based compensation to their employees. In this setting, equity-based compensation leads to a lower wage rate, which makes each firm more competitive with its rival. However, this unique equilibrium is a Prisoner’s Dilemma for the firms’ original owners. Our results are consistent with several empirical regularities and provide predictions on when firms will offer equity-based compensation to their employees.

We find that ownership by different types of institutional investors has varying implications for future firm misvaluation and governance characteristics. Dedicated institutional investors decrease future firm misvaluation, in both direction and magnitude, relative to fundamentals. In contrast, transient institutional investors have the opposite effect. Using the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Regulation FD as an exogenous shock to information dissemination, we find evidence consistent with dedicated institutions having an information advantage. Similarly, dedicated investors are associated with better future governance characteristics, while transient investors are not. The valuation effects are primarily driven by institutional portfolio concentration while the governance effects are driven by portfolio turnover. These results imply a more nuanced relationship between institutional ownership and firm value and corporate governance.