Knowledge that Transforms

“Founder-friendly” venture financings and nontraditional venture investors have both flourished over the past decade. Using detailed contract data, we study open-end mutual funds investing in private venture-backed firms. We posit that conflicts between early-stage venture investors and liquidity-constrained later-stage ones influence the classic agency problems affecting entrepreneurs and investors. We find that mutual funds with more stable funding are more likely to invest in private firms and that financing rounds with mutual fund participation have stronger redemption, stronger IPO-related rights, and less board representation. These findings are consistent with our conceptual framework.

We show that there is cross-sectional variation in the quality of shareholder proposals. On average, proposals submitted by the most active individual sponsors are less likely to receive majority support, but they occasionally pass if shareholders mistakenly support them and may even be implemented due to directors’ career concerns. While gadfly proposals destroy shareholder value if they pass, shareholder proposals on average are value enhancing in firms with more informed shareholders. We conclude that more informed voting could increase the benefits associated with shareholder proposals.

We analyze the price effect of the introduction of collective action clauses (CACs) in newly issued sovereign bonds of eurozone countries as of January 1, 2013. By allowing a majority of creditors to modify payment obligations, such clauses reduce the likelihood of holdouts, while facilitating strategic default by the sovereign. We find that CAC bonds trade in the secondary market at lower yields than otherwise similar no-CAC bonds. The yield differential widens in countries with worse ratings and in those with stronger legal systems, especially if of midrange quality. Hence, CACs are seen as pro- rather than anticreditor provisions.

We examine entrepreneurial activity following the staggered adoption of modern-day fraudulent transfer laws in the United States. These laws strengthen unsecured creditors’ rights and are particularly important for entrepreneurs whose personal assets commingle with the firm’s. Using administrative data from the U.S. Census Bureau, we document declines in startup entry—particularly among riskier entrants—and closures of existing firms after these laws pass. Firm financial data shows that entrepreneurs lower leverage by reducing demand for unsecured credit. Our results suggest that strong creditor protections can limit entrepreneurs’ appetite for risk, which may reduce churning along the extensive margin among the smallest firms in the economy.

We analyze a tractable rational expectations equilibrium model with margin constraints. We argue that constraints affect and are affected by informational efficiency, leading to a novel amplification mechanism. A decline in wealth tightens constraints and reduces investors’ incentive to acquire information, lowering price informativeness. Lower informativeness, in turn, increases the risk borne by financiers who fund trades, leading them to further tighten constraints faced by investors. This information spiral leads to (a) significant increases in risk premium and return volatility in crises, when investors wealth declines, (b) complementarities in information acquisition in crises, and (c) complementarities in margin requirements.

This paper documents that mortgage market deregulation helps mitigate the risk of population aging by affecting a foundational family-level decision: the choice to have children. Using a U.S. federal regulator ruling, I show that young households fully exposed to mortgage market deregulation increase their probability of purchasing a home and having a child by 6 percentage points. Supplemental tests reject alternative hypotheses based on income or housing wealth growth and, instead, suggest that access to space is the relevant economic mechanism. Collectively, the evidence indicates that increased access to mortgage credit affects the total number of children in the economy.

The COVID-19 pandemic severely disrupted financial markets and the real economy worldwide. These extraordinary events prompted large monetary and fiscal policy interventions. Recognizing the unusual nature of the shock, the academic community has produced an impressive amount of research during the last year. Macro-finance models have been extended to analyze the impact of epidemics. Empirical papers study the origins and consequences of the disruptions and the impact of policy interventions. New research evaluates the ongoing financial fragility and its relation to previous episodes and regulations. This special issue contains early contributions to this important and rapidly developing literature.1

Strong regulatory actions are needed to combat climate change, but climate policy uncertainty makes it difficult for investors to quantify the impact of future climate regulation. We show that such uncertainty is priced in the option market. The cost of option protection against downside tail risks is larger for firms with more carbon-intense business models. For carbon-intense firms, the cost of protection against downside tail risk is magnified at times when the public’s attention to climate change spikes, and it decreased after the election of climate change skeptic President Trump.

We examine the Indian bank asset quality review, which doubled the declared loan delinquency rate. Relative economic stability during the exercise and the absence of a capital backstop together make it unique. We find that the expected reduction in information asymmetry does not automatically lead to the recapitalization of banks by markets. The consequent undercapitalization leads to underinvestment and risk-shifting through zombie lending. The impact flows to the real economy through borrowers, including shadow banks, and adversely impacts growth. These findings show that bank cleanup exercises not accompanied by policies aimed at recapitalization may be insufficient even during normal times.

Marketing and distribution expenses are responsible for about one-third of the cost of active management in the mutual fund industry. Estimating a structural model with costly investor search and learning about fund skill, we find that marketing is nearly as important as performance and fees in determining fund size. Eliminating marketing substantially improves welfare: capital shifts toward cheaper funds and competition decreases fees; active funds shrink and capital allocation becomes more closely aligned with skill. Declining investor search costs imply a reduction in marketing expenses and management fees as well as a shift toward passive investing, as observed empirically.