Knowledge that Transforms

We develop a dynamic model of costly stock short-selling and lending market and obtain implications that simultaneously support many empirical regularities related to short-selling. In our model, investors’ belief disagreement leads to shorting demand, whereby short-sellers pay shorting fees to borrow stocks from lenders. Our main novel results are as follows. Short interest is positively related to shorting fee and predicts stock returns negatively. Higher short-selling risk can be associated with lower stock returns and less short-selling activity. Stock volatility is increased under costly short-selling. An application to GameStop episode yields implications consistent with observed patterns.

This paper provides novel evidence that increased student loan debts, caused by rising tuitions, increase borrowers’ demand for additional consumer debt, while simultaneously restricting their ability to access it. The net effect of student loan debt on consumer borrowing varies by market, depending on whether the supply or demand channel dominates. In loosely underwritten credit markets, increased student loan debt causes borrowing to increase, while in tightly underwritten markets, increased student loan debt reduces credit use. These findings match predictions of a standard life cycle model of household consumption and borrowing, augmented by a realistic student loan repayment contract. (JEL G51, D15, I22, D14)

This paper studies tax-minimizing investment, whereby firms tilt capital purchases toward year-end to reduce taxes. We use this pattern to characterize how taxes affect investment behavior. We exploit variation in firm tax positions from administrative data to confirm that tax minimization causes spikes. Spikes increase when firms face financial constraints or higher option values of waiting. Cumulative investment does not completely reverse after spikes. We develop an investment model with tax asymmetries to rationalize these patterns. Both depreciation motives (later investments face lower effective tax rates) and option value motives (tax asymmetry implies time-varying opportunities to minimize taxes) are necessary to fit the data. (JEL G31, G38, H25)

We estimate short-term dividend strip prices from 27 years of S&P 500 index options data (1996-2022). We use option-implied interest rates when estimating strip prices and longer holding period returns to mitigate measurement error. We find that Sharpe ratios for short-term strips are similar to or higher than Sharpe ratios for the market. Short-term strips also have a low market beta and a positive alpha. Over the business cycle, realized term premiums (ie, the difference between market and strip returns) and the term structure of Sharpe ratios move countercyclically, whereas the term structure of alphas moves procyclically.

Our paper reexamines whether 29 variables from 26 papers published after Goyal and Welch 2008, as well as the original 17 variables, were useful in predicting the equity premium in-sample and out-of-sample as of the end of 2021. Our samples include the original periods in which these variables were identified, but end later. More than one-third of these new variables no longer have empirical significance even in-sample. Of those that do, half have poor out-of-sample performance. A small number of variables still perform reasonably well both in-sample and out-of-sample.

The large divergence in the returns of top-performing star firms and the rest of the economy is substantially reduced when we account for the mismeasurement of intangible capital. Star firms produce and invest more per dollar in invested capital, have more valuable innovations as measured by the market value of patents, and are as exposed to competitive shocks as nonstars. Star firms have higher markups that are predicted early in their life cycle at a time when they are small. Overall, after we correct for the mismeasurement of intangibles, the evidence points to the superior ability of star firms.

How much of a loan should a lender retain, and how do loan sales affect loan performance? We address these questions in a model in which a lender originates loans that it can sell to investors. The lender reduces default risk through screening at origination and monitoring after origination, but is subject to moral hazard. The optimal lender-investor contract can be implemented by requiring the lender to initially retain a share of the loan that it gradually sells to investors, rationalizing loan sales after origination. The model generates novel predictions linking loan and lender characteristics to initial retention, sales dynamics, and loan performance.

We develop a quantitative model with imperfections in domestic and international financial markets that generates strong effects of U.S. monetary policy on emerging markets (EMs). Financial imperfections prevent arbitrage both between local EM lending and borrowing rates, and between local-currency and dollar borrowing rates. An adverse feedback effect between financial health and external conditions amplifies the domestic “financial accelerator,” leading to large cross-border spillovers of U.S. monetary policy shocks. The model implies a link between uncovered interest parity violations and local credit spreads, a prediction we show the data strongly supports. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

This paper conducts a textual analysis of earnings call transcripts to quantify climate risk exposure at the firm level. We construct dictionaries that measure physical and transition climate risks separately and identify firms that proactively respond to climate risks. Our validation analysis shows that our measures capture firm-level variations in respective climate risk exposure. Firms facing high transition risk, especially those that do not proactively respond, have been valued at a discount in recent years as aggregate investor attention to climate-related issues has been increasing. We document differences in how firms respond through investment, green innovation, and employment when facing high climate risk exposure.

We propose a security design model in which a potential acquirer approaches a firm with a value-add plan. The target has a single owner, who possesses private information: he alone knows whether his firm is compatible with the plan. The owner agrees that the acquirer will add value but believes that the value-add will not be as much as what the acquirer expects. Although the acquirer can choose any monotone limited liability security to offer along with cash, we show that, under general conditions, any security that is employed always takes the form of nonrecourse debt provided by the seller. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online