Knowledge that Transforms

We hypothesize that, in weak‐institution countries, firms adjust the ‘timing’ of dividend payments by committing to distribute a percentage of current earnings as dividends, revealing the extent of firm‐level agency conflicts to future investors and facilitating the raising of external capital. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that, on average, firms in weak‐institution countries have a higher speed of adjustment ( SOA ) to their target payout ratio, pay dividends earlier in the life cycle, and are more likely to disclose a dividend policy committing to pay a minimum percentage of earnings. Within‐country tests show that, in weak‐institution countries, the firms with the highest SOA dividend policies have fewer agency problems and an increased ability to raise external capital. Finally, returns tests around earnings announcements show that high‐ SOA dividend policies are associated with larger market reactions to earnings in weak‐institution countries. Collectively, our findings suggest that dividend policy helps to alleviate agency conflicts in weak‐institution countries between firms and (future) investors.

Recent corporate governance scandals have been attributed to a lack of board independence because of the influence CEOs have over their boards. However, CEOs can also affect board efficacy without compromising its independence by strategically choosing directors. We offer a theoretical framework to examine how CEOs can strategically choose director characteristics (such as expertise and skill set) to influence the inner workings of the board. We examine how director expertise affects the board's equilibrium voting strategies and show that some “passivity” on the part of directors can in fact be desirable equilibrium behavior. More importantly, we show that managers can strategically appoint independent outside directors to influence board voting in their favor. Surprisingly, contrary to what we might expect, we find that opportunistic (principled) managers may not always appoint the least (most) able directors to the board. We also examine whether CEOs would prefer a “captured” board (i.e., an insider‐dominated board) and show that the value of director input (i.e., the board's advising role) and the financial markets can discourage CEOs from pursuing such appointments.

In early 2017, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) mandated the disclosure of audit participants, including the lead audit partner and other audit firms participating in the audit (“component auditors”). In this study, we examine whether investors use these disclosures in a way that influences their investment decisions, a primary goal of the PCAOB. Using trading volume, absolute abnormal returns, and bid–ask spreads, we find little evidence of a significant investor response following the disclosure of partner identity or component auditor participation in the first three years of the requirement. We also examine instances where these disclosures are most likely to be informative (e.g., partners associated with restatements or component auditors with PCAOB deficiencies) and find no significant investor response. Taken together, we find little evidence that capital markets respond to partner and component auditor identity in the United States.

Most firms covary more positively with downmarkets than upmarkets—a phenomenon I refer to as “risk asymmetry.” I predict and find that risk asymmetry is caused, at least in part, by a firm's ability to selectively obfuscate poor performance. Risk asymmetry decreases significantly when firms are required to adhere to the more stringent auditing standards mandated under Section 404 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act, however this decrease is more muted for firms with weak internal controls. Consistent with my predictions, these patterns are stronger for more market‐sensitive firms and weaker for firms that include relative performance evaluation in their CEOs' pay packages. Taken together with prior literature (which documents that risk asymmetry is priced), my results suggest that a firm can lower its cost of capital by credibly reducing its ability to obfuscate value‐relevant information.

We examine the relation between disclosure quality and information asymmetry among market participants following an exogenous shock to macroeconomic risk. In 2015, the Swiss National Bank abruptly announced that it would abandon the longstanding minimum euro‐Swiss franc exchange rate. We find evidence suggesting that firms with more transparent disclosures regarding their foreign exchange risk exposure ex ante exhibit significantly lower information asymmetry ex post . The information gap in bid‐ask spreads appears within 30 minutes of the announcement and persists for two weeks, during which new information gradually substitutes for past disclosures. We validate the information dynamics of past risk disclosures with three field surveys: (1) Sell‐side analysts emphasize the importance of existing (risk) disclosures in evaluating the translational and transactional effects of the currency shock. (2) Lending banks’ credit officers rely on past disclosures as the primary information source available for smaller (unlisted) firms in the immediate aftermath of the shock. (3) Investor‐relations managers use existing financial filings as a key resource when communicating with external stakeholders. The results suggest that historical disclosures help investors attenuate information asymmetry in light of unexpected news.

This paper evaluates the role of accrual accounting in improving firms' production decisions and resource allocation across firms. I introduce two imperfect firm‐performance measures, cash flows and accounting earnings, into a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms under imperfect information. The model demonstrates that improvements in measurement systems lead to more informed decisions on the part of firms and ultimately to allocation of greater resources to high‐productivity firms via the product and input markets. Estimated parameter values are consistent with accrual accounting improving managers' information about current productivity by providing a better measure of historical firm performance. Quantitative analysis suggests that introducing accrual‐accounting information on top of cash‐accounting information leads to a 0.5% increase in aggregate U.S. productivity and a 0.7% increase in aggregate U.S. output via improved resource allocation. The corresponding estimates for China and India, as benchmarks for developing countries, are larger: a 1.5% to 2.3% increase in aggregate productivity and a 2.3% to 3.4% increase in aggregate output. I conclude that accrual accounting plays a significant role in determining aggregate productivity via improved resource allocation.

This paper examines the impact of mandatory reporting and auditing of firms’ financial statements on industry‐wide resource allocation. Using threshold‐induced variation in the share of mandated firms in a given industry, I document that reporting mandates facilitate ownership dispersion in capital markets and spur competition in product markets. I, however, do not find that reporting mandates unambiguously improve the efficiency of industry‐wide resource allocation. With respect to auditing mandates, I find only that they impose a fixed cost on firms, deterring smaller entrants.

We use complaints filed with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to study the interplay between social norms and the effectiveness of consumer protection laws. We find that a higher level of trust in a given location is associated with a lower number of complaints filed against financial institutions in that location. Employing a difference‐in‐differences approach, we further find that, after the establishment of the CFPB, banks in low‐trust areas reduce fees charged to consumers more compared to banks in high‐trust areas. Our results suggest that the threat of consumer complaints to a government agency affects how banks treat their customers, and they shed light on the interaction between informal culture and formal institutions, as well as on stakeholders’ influence in corporate policies.

We examine whether firms that imitate peer companies’ strategies (copycats) profit from such behavior and how their success may cause competitive harm to disclosing companies. We identify copycat companies by tracking the digital footprints of investment companies that view disclosures on the SEC EDGAR Web site. We find that copycat companies are able to identify profitable trades that outperform other trades disclosed by the copycatted companies by 5.5% annually. Such stock‐screening skills are related to investment sophistication and research intensity. Furthermore, copycats inflict greater damage on the performance of disclosing companies when they possess superior copycat skills, when disclosed trading strategies take longer to complete, and when disclosed stock holdings are characterized by high information asymmetry.

Accounting for credit losses under U.S. GAAP is transitioning from an incurred to an expected loss model. The model change was motivated by concerns that reporting only incurred losses does not provide investors with sufficient and timely information about banks’ credit risk. In this paper, I develop a measure of lifetime expected credit losses using vintage analysis to examine whether stock prices reflect information about unrecognized expected credit losses in an incurred loss regime. Consistent with investors being able to obtain information about expected losses that are not recognized in the financial statements, I find that unrecognized expected credit losses are negatively associated with bank stock prices. The pricing of these losses is stronger for larger banks, consistent with lower costs of obtaining this information for banks with better information environments. I also find that recorded allowances were less than estimated expected losses, on average, consistent with concerns that implementing the expected loss model will adversely impact regulatory capital adequacy.