This paper studies the asset pricing implications of a firm's opportunities to replace routine‐task labor with automation. I develop a model in which firms optimally undertake such replacement when their productivity is low. Hence, firms with routine‐task labor maintain a replacement option that hedges their value against unfavorable macroeconomic shocks and lowers their expected returns. Using establishment‐level occupational data, I construct a measure of firms' share of routine‐task labor. Compared to their industry peers, firms with a higher share of routine‐task labor (i) invest more in machines and reduce more routine‐task labor during economic downturns, and (ii) have lower expected stock returns.

This paper characterizes informed trade when speculators can acquire distinct signals of varying quality about an asset's value at different dates. The most reasonable characterization of private information about stocks is that while information is long‐lived, new information will arrive over time, information that may be acquired by others. Hence, while a speculator may know more than others at a moment, in the future, his information will become stale, but not valueless. In an environment that allows for arbitrary correlations among signals, we characterize equilibrium outcomes including trading, prices, and profits. We provide explicit numerical characterizations for different informational environments.

Do investment tax incentives improve job prospects for workers? We explore states' adoption of a major federal tax incentive that accelerates the depreciation of equipment investments for eligible firms but not for ineligible ones. Analyzing massive establishment‐level data sets on occupational employment and computer investment, we find that when states expand investment incentives, eligible firms immediately increase their equipment and skilled employees; whereas they reduce routine‐task employees after a delay of up to two years. These opposing effects constitute an overall insignificant effect on the firms' total employment and shed light on the nuances of job creation through investment incentives.

Firm location affects firm risk through local factor prices. We find more procyclical factor prices such as wages and real estate prices in areas with more cyclical economies, namely, high “local beta” areas. While procyclical wages provide a natural hedge against aggregate shocks and reduce firm risk, procyclical prices of real estate, which are part of firm assets, increase firm risk. We confirm that firms located in higher local beta areas have lower industry‐adjusted returns and conditional betas, and show that the effect is stronger among firms with low real estate holdings. A production‐based equilibrium model explains these empirical findings.

Asset pricing predictions from the investment CAPM depend on the cross-sectional relation between investment and profitability. In samples of U.S. stocks featuring high cross-sectional investment-profitability correlation, both investment and profitability premiums are weak. Consistent with the conditional predictions from the investment CAPM, triple sorts on size, investment, and profitability as in Hou et al. (2015)’s q-factors resurrect the premiums in the high-correlation samples. We find similar results using cash-based profitability, consistent with the dynamic investment CAPM. Our work has important implications for constructing asset pricing factors and interpreting out-of-sample asset pricing test results, in particular the insignificance of historical investment and profitability premiums.

Controlling shareholders dominate corporations and shareholder exit behavior is usually accompanied by the transfer of control. Using China's A-share listed companies as data from 2000 to 2017, this study investigates the effect of corporate litigation on the exit of controlling shareholders and related mechanisms for the first time. Empirically, we find that if a firm is involved in a lawsuit as a defendant, then the possibility of the controlling shareholder's exit increases. This finding is robust to various checks, including the parallel-trend assumption, placebo, instrumental variable tests, and the consideration of other potential factors. The tests reveal that this effect is mainly due to an increase in three aspects—the uncertainty of the firm's future cash flow, corporate risk, and external financing costs. Heterogeneity analyses find that contract lawsuits exhibit the strongest positive predictive powers over the subsequent exits of controlling shareholders. The firm's majority controlling shareholders, and institutional, non-family, and non-financial controlling shareholders are more likely to exit upon litigation.

Entrepreneurs often face undiversifiable idiosyncratic risks from their business investments. We extend the standard real options approach to an incomplete markets environment and analyze the joint decisions of business investments, consumption/savings, and portfolio selection. For a lump-sum investment payoff and an agent with a sufficiently strong precautionary savings motive, an increase in volatility can accelerate investment, contrary to the standard real options analysis. When the agent can trade the market portfolio to partially hedge against investment risk, the systematic volatility is compensated via the standard CAPM argument, and the idiosyncratic volatility generates a private equity premium. Finally, when the investment payoff is a series of flows, the agent's idiosyncratic risk exposure alters both the implied option value and the implied project value, causing a reversal of the results in the lump-sum payoff case.

We study a continuous‐time contracting problem under hidden action, where the principal has ambiguous beliefs about the project cash flows. The principal designs a robust contract that maximizes his utility under the worst‐case scenario subject to the agent's incentive and participation constraints. Robustness generates endogenous belief heterogeneity and induces a tradeoff between incentives and ambiguity sharing so that the incentive constraint does not always bind. We implement the optimal contract by cash reserves, debt, and equity. In addition to receiving ordinary dividends when cash reserves reach a threshold, outside equity holders also receive special dividends or inject cash in the cash reserves to hedge against model uncertainty and smooth dividends. The equity premium and the credit yield spread generated by ambiguity aversion are state dependent and high for distressed firms with low cash reserves.

We provide a theory of rational stock price bubbles in production economies with infinitely-lived agents. Firms meet stochastic investment opportunities and face endogenous credit constraints. They are not fully committed to repaying debt. Credit constraints are derived from incentive constraints in optimal contracts which ensure default never occurs in equilibrium. Stock price bubbles can emerge through a positive feedback loop mechanism and cannot be ruled out by transversality conditions. These bubbles command a liquidity premium and raise investment by raising the debt limit. Their collapse leads to a recession and a stock market crash.

This paper presents an infinite-horizon model of production economies in which firms face idiosyncratic productivity shocks and are subject to endogenous credit constraints. Credit-driven stock price bubbles can arise which can relax credit constraints and reallocate capital more efficiently among firms. The collapse of bubbles causes a fall of total factor productivity.