Knowledge that Transforms

The large divergence in the returns of top-performing star firms and the rest of the economy is substantially reduced when we account for the mismeasurement of intangible capital. Star firms produce and invest more per dollar in invested capital, have more valuable innovations as measured by the market value of patents, and are as exposed to competitive shocks as nonstars. Star firms have higher markups that are predicted early in their life cycle at a time when they are small. Overall, after we correct for the mismeasurement of intangibles, the evidence points to the superior ability of star firms.

How much of a loan should a lender retain, and how do loan sales affect loan performance? We address these questions in a model in which a lender originates loans that it can sell to investors. The lender reduces default risk through screening at origination and monitoring after origination, but is subject to moral hazard. The optimal lender-investor contract can be implemented by requiring the lender to initially retain a share of the loan that it gradually sells to investors, rationalizing loan sales after origination. The model generates novel predictions linking loan and lender characteristics to initial retention, sales dynamics, and loan performance.

We develop a quantitative model with imperfections in domestic and international financial markets that generates strong effects of U.S. monetary policy on emerging markets (EMs). Financial imperfections prevent arbitrage both between local EM lending and borrowing rates, and between local-currency and dollar borrowing rates. An adverse feedback effect between financial health and external conditions amplifies the domestic “financial accelerator,” leading to large cross-border spillovers of U.S. monetary policy shocks. The model implies a link between uncovered interest parity violations and local credit spreads, a prediction we show the data strongly supports.

This paper conducts a textual analysis of earnings call transcripts to quantify climate risk exposure at the firm level. We construct dictionaries that measure physical and transition climate risks separately and identify firms that proactively respond to climate risks. Our validation analysis shows that our measures capture firm-level variations in respective climate risk exposure. Firms facing high transition risk, especially those that do not proactively respond, have been valued at a discount in recent years as aggregate investor attention to climate-related issues has been increasing. We document differences in how firms respond through investment, green innovation, and employment when facing high climate risk exposure.

The real estate market is highly intermediated, with 90% of buyers and sellers hiring an agent. However, low barriers to entry and fixed commission rates result in large market share for inexperienced intermediaries. Using micro-level data on 8.5 million listings and a novel research design, we show that house listings by inexperienced agents have a lower probability of selling, and this effect is strongest during the housing bust. We estimate that 3.7% more listings would have been sold in a flexible commission equilibrium. Eighty percent of this improvement comes from competition and the remainder from commission variation across experience.

The classic view assumes banks prioritize immediate repayment by selling assets until default. We endogenize run frequency and study how general settlement rules trade off liquidity provision net of fire sale losses against induced run incentives. Panic runs are eliminated when all illiquid assets are sold under orderly resolution, but liquidity provision in a run is minimal. When suspension after some fire sales is followed by immediate liquidation, run frequency falls then rises in suspension delay. Thus, optimal suspension may require some sale of illiquid assets, in contrast to MMF norms. Ex post discretion induces excessive liquidation and more frequent runs.

We argue that institutional brokerage networks facilitate liquidity provision and mitigate the price impact of large non-information-motivated trades. Using commissions, we map trading networks of mutual funds (institutions) and their brokers. Central funds (institutions) tend to outperform their peripheral counterparts in terms of return gap (execution shortfall). This outperformance is more pronounced when funds experience large outflows and for large trades in less liquid stocks. Central brokers can deliver superior trade execution compared to peripheral brokers, but mainly for central institutions. We use the collapse of Lehman Brothers as a quasi-natural experiment to establish the likely causality of our findings.

We propose a loglinear present-value identity in which investment (“scale”), profitability (“yield”), and discount rates determine a firm’s market-to-book ratio. Our identity reconciles existing influential market-to-book decompositions and facilitates novel insights from three empirical applications: (1) Both investment and profitability are important contributors to the value spread and stock return news variance. (2) Any cross-sectional return predictability has a mirror image in cash-flow fundamentals, providing asset pricing theories with additional moments to match. (3) The investment spread significantly improves the predictability of time-series variation in the value premium and justifies the poor performance of value in recent years.

Hedge fund teams with heterogeneous educational backgrounds, academic specializations, work experiences, genders, and races, outperform homogeneous teams after adjusting for risk and fund characteristics. An event study of manager team transitions, instrumental variable regressions, and an analysis of managers who simultaneously operate solo- and team-managed funds address endogeneity concerns. Diverse teams deliver superior returns by arbitraging more stock anomalies, avoiding behavioral biases, and minimizing downside risks. Moreover, diversity allows hedge funds to circumvent capacity constraints and generate persistent performance. Our results suggest that diversity adds value in asset management.

We exploit the staggered introduction of liability waivers when investors hold stakes in conflicting business opportunities as a shock to venture capital (VC) investment and director networks. After the law changes, we find increases in within-industry VC investment and common directors serving on startup boards. Despite the potential for rent extraction, same-industry startups inside VC portfolios benefit by raising more capital, failing less, and exiting more successfully. VC directors serving on other startup boards are the primary mechanism associated with positive outcomes, consistent with common VC investment facilitating informational exchanges in VC portfolios.