This paper documents an increase in the comovement between credit default swap (CDS) spread changes during the 2007–2009 crisis and investigates the source of that increase. One possible explanation is that comovement increased because fundamental values became more correlated. However, I find that changes in fundamentals account for only 23% of the increase in covariance. The remaining increase is attributed to changes in liquidity and the market price of default risk. In contrast, counterparty risk played an insignificant role. Although both contributed, the increase in covariance was driven more by variation in exposures than factor variance–covariance

In over-the-counter markets, dealers facilitate trade by providing liquidity and acting as intermediaries. We use proprietary data on US single-name credit default swap trades and positions to study how dealer intermediation networks shape liquidity. For each reference entity, we reconstruct interdealer and dealer-to-client networks and introduce Shapley value-based measures of dealer and market connectivity. We present a cooperative game framework that links these measures to predictions for the liquidity that dealers provide at both individual and market levels. Empirically, we find that Shapley values are strongly associated with trade volumes, inventory management, execution costs, and bid–ask spreads

Credit default swap (CDS) spreads display pronounced regime specific behaviour. A Markov switching model of the determinants of changes in the iTraxx Europe indices demonstrates that they are extremely sensitive to stock volatility during periods of CDS market turbulence. But in ordinary market circumstances CDS spreads are more sensitive to stock returns than they are to stock volatility. Equity hedge ratios are three or four times larger during the turbulent period, which explains why previous research on single-regime models finds stock positions to be ineffective hedges for default swaps. Interest rate movements do not affect the financial sector iTraxx indices and they only have a significant effect on the other indices when the spreads are not excessively volatile. Raising interest rates may decrease the probability of credit spreads entering a volatile period

We find that a firm’s stock price reaction to its credit rating downgrade announcement is muted by 44–52% when credit default swaps (CDSs) trade on its debt. We explore the role of the CDS markets in providing information ex ante and relieving financing frictions ex post for downgraded firms. We find that the impact of CDS trading is more pronounced for firms whose debt financing is more dependent on credit ratings (e.g., those rated around the speculative-grade boundary, those with a higher number of rating-based covenants). Reductions in debt and investment, and the increase in financing costs are less severe for CDS firms than non-CDS firms following an identical credit rating downgrade. Our results suggest that CDSs mute the stock market reaction to a credit rating downgrade by alleviating the financing frictions faced by downgraded firms

We provide a model of nonredundant credit default swaps (CDSs), building on the observation that CDSs have lower trading costs than bonds. CDS introduction involves a trade-off: it crowds out existing demand for the bond, but improves the bond allocation by allowing long-term investors to become levered basis traders and absorb more of the bond supply. We characterize conditions under which CDS introduction raises bond prices. The model predicts a negative CDS-bond basis, as well as turnover and price impact patterns that are consistent with empirical evidence. We also show that a ban on naked CDSs can raise borrowing costs

This paper examines the interaction between default risk and interest-rate risk in determining the term structure of credit default swap spreads at different industry sectors and credit-rating classes. The paper starts with a parsimonious three-factor interest-rate dynamic term structure and projects the credit spread at each industry sector and rating class to these interest-rate factors while also allowing the projection residual dynamics to depend on the level of the interest-rate factors. Estimation shows that credit risk exhibits intricate dynamic interactions with the interest-rate factors

Leverage represents both a fundamental component of equity volatility and a long-run selection variable. Based on this premise, we investigate the influence of leverage on the long-run cross-sectional predictability of future realized equity volatility. Leverage makes equity volatility significantly less predictable than underlying firm asset volatility, a result that is robust to different predictors of future realized volatility: credit default swap implied, historical, and option implied volatility. A simple model of optimal capital structure, wherein companies maximize tax benefits subject to a common maximum default probability (minimum credit rating) target, helps explain this finding

We develop a framework to analyse the credit default swap (CDS) market as a network of risk transfers among counterparties. From a theoretical perspective, we introduce the notion of flow-of-risk and provide sufficient conditions for a bow-tie network architecture to endogenously emerge as a result of intermediation. This architecture shows three distinct sets of counterparties: (i) Ultimate Risk Sellers (URS), (ii) Dealers (indirectly connected to each other), (iii) Ultimate Risk Buyers (URB). We show that the probability of widespread distress due to counterparty risk is higher in a bow-tie architecture than in more fragmented network structures. Empirically, we analyse a unique global dataset of bilateral CDS exposures on major sovereign and financial reference entities in 2011–2014. We find the presence of a bow-tie network architecture consistently across both reference entities and time, and that the flow-of-risk originates from a large number of URSs (e.g. hedge funds) and ends up in a few leading URBs, most of which are non-banks (in particular asset managers). Finally, the analysis of the CDS portfolio composition of the URBs shows a high level of concentration: in particular, the top URBs often show large exposures to potentially correlated reference entities

We use credit default swaps (CDS) trading data to demonstrate that the credit risk of reference firms, reflected in rating downgrades and bankruptcies, increases significantly upon the inception of CDS trading, a finding that is robust after controlling for the endogeneity of CDS trading. Additionally, distressed firms are more likely to file for bankruptcy if they are linked to CDS trading. Furthermore, firms with more “no restructuring” contracts than other types of CDS contracts (i.e., contracts that include restructuring) are more adversely affected by CDS trading, and the number of creditors increases after CDS trading begins, exacerbating creditor coordination failure in the resolution of financial distress

Credit default swaps (CDSs) are a major financial innovation related to debt contracting. Because CDS markets facilitate bad news being incorporated into equity prices via cross-market information spillover, CDS availability may curb firms’ information hoarding. We find that CDS trading on a firm’s debt reduces the future stock price crash risk. This effect is stronger in active CDS markets, when the main lenders are CDS market dealers with securities trading subsidiaries, or when managers have more motivation to hoard information. Our findings suggest that debt market financial innovations curtail the negative equity market effects of firms withholding bad news