Knowledge that Transforms

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This paper aims to develop and compare bounds on the pricing formulas for European type discrete Asian options. The lower bound is found by conditioning the maturity payment of the Asian option by the geometric average and the bound derived can be expressed as a portfolio of delayed payment European call options. Several exercise price-dependent upper bounds are derived. Like the lower bound, one of the upper bounds is expressed as a portfolio of delayed payment European call options. Through a numerical analysis, we conclude that more information is gained from the readily calculated bounds than from the usually applied pricing approximations. From the closed-form solutions of the bounds, hedging positions are finally derived.

We consider a market in which an expert must exert costly but unobservable effort to identify the service that meets the consumer's need. In our model, experts offer competing contracts and the consumer may gather multiple opinions. We explore the incentives that a competitive sampling of prices and opinions provides for experts to exert effort and find that there is a tension between price competition and the equilibrium effort. In particular, the equilibrium fails to realize the second best welfare optimum. An intervention, that limits price competition via price control, increases welfare.

This paper shows that supervision with soft information is valuable whenever supervisors and supervisees collude under asymmetric information and proceeds then to derive an Equivalence Principle between organizational forms of supervisory and productive activities. We consider an organization with an agent privately informed on his productivity and a risk averse supervisor getting signals on the agent's type. In a centralized organization, the principal can communicate and contract with both the supervisor and the agent. However, these two agents can collude against the principal. In a decentralized organization, the principal only communicates and contracts with the supervisor who in turn sub-contracts with the agent. We show that the two organizations achieve the same outcome. We discuss this equivalence and provide various comparative statics results to assess the efficiency of supervisory structures. Copyright 2003, Wiley-Blackwell.

We characterize competitive equilibria with perfect foresight in a deterministic, three-period pure-exchange overlapping generations economy with perfect information and no commitment to loan contracts. Commitment is replaced by an enforcement mechanism that excludes defaulters from asset markets for one period. For hump-shaped endowment profiles, young individuals face endogenous debt constraints that ration current consumption. Changes in current and future yields affect these constraints, inducing an additional income effect on rationed household demand that makes current and future consumption complements. This mechanism can lead to multiple steady states, persistent indeterminacy and regime switching. We show that sensitivity to shocks and complex dynamic behaviour are consistent with endogenous debt limits but not with exogenous liquidity constraints.

When human capital accumulation generates pecuniary externalities across professions, and capital markets are imperfect, persistent inequality in utility and consumption is inevitable in any steady state. This is true irrespective of the degree of divisibility in investments. However, divisibility (or fineness of occupational structure) has implications for both the multiplicity and Pareto-efficiency of steady states. Indivisibilities generate a continuum of inefficient and efficient steady states with varying per capita income. On the other hand, perfect divisibility typically implies the existence of a unique steady state distribution which is Pareto-efficient.

We consider a dynamic general equilibrium asset pricing model with heterogeneous agents and asymmetric information. We show how agents' different methods of gathering information affect their chances of survival in the market depending upon the nature of the information and the level of noise in the economy.

During the 1980's, all Japanese automobile producers opened assembly plants in North America. Industry analysts and previous research claim that these transplants are more productive than incumbent plants and that they produce with a substantially different production process. I compare the production processes by estimating a model that allows for heterogeneity in technology and productivity, both of which are intrinsically unobservable. The model is estimated on a panel of assembly plants, controlling for capacity utilization and price effects. The results indicate that the more recent technology uses capital more intensively and it has a higher elasticity of substitution between labour and capital. Hicks-neutral productivity growth is estimated to be lower, while capital-biased (labour-saving) productivity growth is higher for the new technology. Using the estimation results, I decompose industry-wide productivity growth and find plant-level changes in lean plants to be the most important contributor. Plant-level productivity growth is further decomposed to reveal the importance of capital-biased productivity growth, increases in the capital-labour ratio, and returns to scale.

We add to the methods for conditioning out serially correlated unobserved shocks to the production technology. We build on ideas first developed in They show how to use investment to control for correlation between input levels and the unobserved firm-specific productivity process. We show that intermediate inputs (those inputs which are typically subtracted out in a value-added production function) can also solve this simultaneity problem. We discuss some theoretical benefits of extending the proxy choice set in this direction and our empirical results suggest these benefits can be important.

This paper asks how a household should choose between a fixed-rate (FRM) and an adjustable-rate (ARM) mortgage. In an environment with uncertain inflation a nominal FRM has a risky real capital value, whereas an ARM has a stable real capital value but short-term variability in required real payments. Numerical solution of a life-cycle model with borrowing constraints and income risk shows that an ARM is generally attractive, but less so for a risk-averse household with a large mortgage, risky income, high default cost, or low moving probability. An inflation-indexed FRM can improve substantially on standard nominal mortgages.