Knowledge that Transforms

The existence of collective reputation implies an important externality. Among firms trading internationally, quality shocks about one firm's products could affect the demand of other firms from the same origin country. We study such a reputation spillover in the context of a large-scale scandal that affected the Chinese dairy industry in 2008. Leveraging detailed firm-product level administrative data and official quality inspection reports, we document sizable reputation spillovers on uncontaminated firms. We further investigate potential mechanisms that could mediate the strength of collective reputation, including information accuracy, observability of the supply chain, and prior export experience.

Since the Great Recession in 2007–2009, U.S. real GDP has failed to return to its previously projected path, a phenomenon widely associated with secular stagnation. We investigate whether this stagnation was due to hysteresis effects from the Great Recession, a persistent negative output gap following the recession, or slower trend growth for other reasons. To do so, we develop a new Markov-switching time series model of output growth that accommodates two different types of recessions: those that permanently alter the level of real GDP and those with only temporary effects. We also account for structural change in trend growth. Estimates from our model suggest that the Great Recession generated a large, persistent negative output gap rather than any substantial hysteresis effects, with the economy eventually recovering to a lower trend path that appears to be due to a reduction in productivity growth that began prior to the onset of the Great Recession.

We study the effect of Internet diffusion on childbirth procedures performed in England between 2000 and 2011. We show that broadband Internet access increased cesarean sections (C-sections): mothers living in areas with better Internet access are 2.5% more likely to obtain a C-section. The effect is driven by first-time mothers who are 6% more likely to obtain a C-section. The increased C-section rate is not accompanied by changes in health care outcomes; thus health care costs increased with no corresponding medical benefits. We show evidence documenting the growing importance of the Internet as a source of health-related information.

We examine price negotiation in the payment card industry by exploiting a unique merchant-, industry-, and city-level data set. Motivated by the substantial variation in acquirer fees and heterogeneous merchant card transactions, we use Nash bargaining to model the negotiation over the acquirer fee between an acquirer and a merchant. We find that the merchants secure a larger incremental surplus than the acquirer on average. Moreover, merchants might face upward pressure on acquirer fees as the card penetration rate rises over time, and policies that weaken the acquirer's bargaining power could relieve the upward fee pressure.

Berkson errors are commonplace in empirical microeconomics. In consumer demand, this form of measurement error occurs when the price an individual pays is measured by the (weighted) average price paid by individuals in a group (e.g., a county) rather than the true transaction price. We show the importance of Berkson errors for demand estimation with nonseparable unobserved heterogeneity. We develop a consistent estimator using external information on the true price distribution. Examining gasoline demand in the United States, we document substantial within-market price variability. Accounting for Berkson errors is quantitatively important. Imposing the Slutsky shape constraint reduces sensitivity to Berkson errors.

Over the past fifteen years, eleven states have restricted employers' access to the credit reports of job applicants. We estimate that county-level job vacancies have fallen by 5.5% in occupations affected by these laws relative to exempt occupations in the same counties and national-level vacancies for the same occupations. Cross-sectional heterogeneity suggests that employers use credit reports as signals of a worker's ability to perform the job: vacancies fall more in counties with a large share of subprime residents and less for occupations with other commonly available signals. Vacancies fall most for occupations involving routine tasks, suggesting that credit reports contain information relevant for these types of jobs.

We study a dynamic game in which players compete for a prize. In a waiting game with two-sided private information about strength levels, players choose fighting, fleeing, or waiting. Players earn a “deterrence value” on top of the prize if their opponent escapes without a battle. We show that this value is a key determinant of the type of equilibrium. For intermediate values, sorting takes place, with weaker players fleeing before others fight. Time then helps to reduce battles. In an experiment, we find support for the key theoretical predictions and document suboptimal predatory fighting.

We study the importance of social interactions on occupational choice in Victorian London using a multinomial choice model within an incomplete social network. Individuals form heterogeneous rational expectations about their peers' behaviors, taking into account their characteristics and the strength of their ties. We show the conditions under which the endogenous, exogenous, and correlated effects can be identified and a unique equilibrium can be established, Using a novel data set, we proxy social groups by parish boundaries and strength of ties by geographic distances, Our results show the importance of the endogenous effects and reveal distinct effects by occupation.

We document measurable, lasting gains in student achievement caused by a change in teachers' evaluation incentives. A short-lived rule created a discontinuity in teachers' incentives when allocating effort across their assigned students: students who failed an initial end-of-year test were retested a few weeks later, and then only the higher of the two scores was used when calculating the teacher's evaluation score. One year later, long after the discontinuity in incentives had ended, retested students scored 0.03σ higher than nonretested students. Otherwise identical students were treated differently by teachers because of evaluation incentives, despite arguably equal returns to teacher effort.

We exploit inheritance episodes to provide novel causal evidence on the long-run effects of a large financial windfall on saving behavior. For identification, we combine a longitudinal panel of administrative wealth reports with variation in the timing of sudden, unexpected parental deaths. We show that after inheritance, net worth converges toward the path established before parental death, with only one-third of the initial windfall remaining after nine years. We interpret these findings through the lens of a generalized consumption-saving framework. To quantitatively replicate this behavior, life-cycle consumption models require impatient consumers and strong precautionary saving motives.