In this paper, we examine why Chinese reverse merger (RM) firms have lower financial reporting quality than U.S. IPO firms. We find that the financial reporting quality of U.S. RM firms is similar to that of matched U.S. IPO firms, but Chinese RM firms exhibit lower financial reporting quality than Chinese ADR firms. We also find that Chinese RM firms exhibit lower financial reporting quality than U.S. RM firms. These results indicate that the use of the RM process is associated with poor financial reporting quality only in firms from China, where legal enforcement and investor protection are weak. In addition, we find that compared with Chinese ADR firms, Chinese RM firms have weaker bonding incentives (as measured by CEO turnover-performance sensitivity) and poorer corporate governance. These factors, in turn, contribute to the lower financial reporting quality of Chinese RM firms. Overall, our results suggest that the less scrutinized RM process allows the Chinese firms with weak bonding incentives and poor governance to gain access to U.S. capital markets, resulting in poor financial reporting quality.

We investigate the informational risk and price efficiency of Chinese firms undertaking a foreign IPO on the Hong Kong stock exchange between 1996 and 2012. Specifically, using intraday tick data, we examine the spreads, asymmetric information component of the bid-ask spread, autocorrelations of intraday returns, variance ratios and return predictability of the order flow for foreign IPO firms. We contrast these measures against those of comparable IPO firms on both the Chinese stock exchanges and the Hong Kong stock exchange matched based on the year of IPO, industry and firm size. We find that while the foreign IPO firms largely operate in China, they are generally perceived as having a similar level of information asymmetry and price efficiency as Hong Kong IPO firms. In contrast, IPOs on the Chinese exchanges have much higher proportions of information asymmetry in their spreads and lower price efficiency than foreign IPO firms. Our findings are generally robust to the use of the Heckman two-stage procedure that controls for potential self-selection bias. Our results provide further evidence that it is the location of trading that is important for pricing of firms rather than the location of their business.

Building on the growing literature on interfirm links and limited attention, we find evidence of return predictability across alliance partners. A long–short portfolio sorted on lagged returns of strategic alliance partners provides a return of 89 basis points per month that is robust to a number of specifications. Investor inattention and limits to arbitrage may be the source of the underreaction of a firm’s returns to that of its partners.

We find strong evidence that firms with employee-friendly workplaces achieve greater innovative success, particularly in industries where innovation is more difficult to achieve. Furthermore, employee-friendly firms were also more inclined to sustain R&D investment during the recent crisis. These findings are consistent with the view that an employee-friendly workplace helps to develop tolerance for failure, which encourages engagement in innovation. We find no support for alternative explanations, such as employee-friendly workplaces helping to attract and retain talented employees and reducing career concerns of executives, which could nurture innovation.

Using hand-collected data on changes of government officials in 277 Chinese cities, we examine how political turnover affects corporate investment in a transitional economy. We find that political turnover leads firms to significantly reduce corporate investment, particularly when the new official is an outsider appointed by a higher level government. The effect of political turnover on corporate investment is stronger for state-owned enterprises, capital intensive firms, and firms deemed locally important. Overall, the volatility of corporate investment increases with political turnover. Finally, the investment decline due to political turnover has significantly negative impact on the profitability of private firms, but not state-owned firms.

Sales decreases affect earnings more than sales increases because of cost stickiness. We hypothesize that this correlated omitted variable constitutes a confounding effect in standard asymmetric timeliness models. Controlling for a piecewise linear effect of sales changes in these models decreases the measured asymmetric timeliness significantly and changes inferences about the average level of conservatism and the extent of cross-sectional variation in conservatism. Validation tests confirm that the asymmetry for sales changes is consistent with sticky costs and is distinct from conditional conservatism. Future empirical research on conditional conservatism should recognize the potential confounding effect of sticky costs.

Do stock markets act as a spare tire during banking crises, providing an alternative corporate financing channel and mitigating the economic severity of these crises? Using firm-level data in 36 countries from 1990 through 2011, we find that the adverse consequences of banking crises on equity issuances, firm profitability, employment, and investment efficiency are smaller in countries with stronger shareholder protection laws. These findings are not explained by the development of stock markets or financial institutions prior to the crises, the severity of the banking crisis, or overall economic, legal, and institutional development.

We examine the relation between political uncertainty and cash holdings for firms in China. We document that, during the first year of a new city government official's appointment, a firm, on average, holds less cash, which is consistent with the grabbing hand hypothesis of politician. Our results are robust to alternative measures of cash holdings, instrumental variable estimation, sub-samples without firms in four major cities, a matched sample approach, and placebo tests. In addition, our additional analyses suggest that a firm holds significantly less cash if: (a) the newly appointed official is from a different city relative to that from the same city, (b) it faces high political extraction risk, and (c) it has strong twin agency conflicts. Lastly, our extended results suggest that the market value of cash holdings is significantly negative during periods of political uncertainty and firms hide their cash by moving it to related firms via related party transactions.

Did regulatory reforms that lowered barriers to competition increase or decrease the quality of information that banks disclose to the public? By integrating the gravity model of investment with the state-specific process of bank deregulation that occurred in the United States from the 1980s through the 1990s, we develop a bank-specific, time-varying measure of deregulation-induced competition. We find that an intensification of competition reduced abnormal accruals of loan loss provisions and the frequency with which banks restate financial statements. The results suggest that competition reduces bank opacity, potentially enhancing the ability of markets to monitor banks.

We explore a new mechanism by which investors take correlated shortcuts and present evidence that managers—using sales management—take advantage of these shortcuts. Specifically, we exploit a regulatory provision wherein a firm's primary industry is determined by the highest sales segment. Exploiting this regulation, we provide evidence that investors classify operationally nearly identical firms as starkly different depending on their placement around this sales cutoff. Moreover, managers appear to exploit this by manipulating sales to be just over the cutoff in favorable industries. Further evidence suggests that managers engage in activities to realize large, tangible benefits from this opportunistic action.