Pledgeable assets support more borrowing, which allows for further investment in pledgeable assets. We use this credit multiplier to identify the impact of financing frictions on corporate investment. The multiplier suggests that investment–cash flow sensitivities should be increasing in the tangibility of firms' assets (a proxy for pledgeability), but only if firms are financially constrained. Our empirical results confirm this theoretical prediction. Our approach is not subject to the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) critique, and sidesteps problems stemming from unobservable variation in investment opportunities. Thus, our results strongly suggest that financing frictions affect investment decisions.

We show that callable bonds have both higher yields and lower market prices than matched non-callable bonds of the same issuer-time, reflecting the value of call features to issuers and investors. This “value of callability” as well as the inclusion and the exercise of call rights are jointly determined by issuer credit quality. Critically, our agency-based theoretical and empirical analyses show that callability reduces debt overhang in corporate mergers. Our results help explain the value and increasing prevalence of callable bonds in credit markets.

The 2005 split-share reform in China mandated the conversion of previously non-tradable stocks into tradable status. The reform was swift and changed investors’ability to trade corporate equities in a US$400 billion market. This paper examines the e¤ects of stock markets on …rms ’ real and …nancial outcomes. It does so exploiting multiple institutional features of the Chinese equity conversion program. We …rst examine a pilot trial conducted at the beginning of the reform, which we are able to replicate using the same data and selection criteria that was used by policy-makers. We also take advantage of the staggered nature of the conversion schedule used in the second phase of the reform, whereby over one thousand …rms converted their shares at di¤erent times within a government-dictated window. These various wrinkles produce counterfactuals against which to gauge the economic importance of secondary equity trading. Using a time-varying treatment estimation approach, we identify increases in corporate pro…tability, investment, value, and productivity as shares start to trade freely in organized exchanges. We also identify changes in …rms’propensity to issue new shares and engage in merger deals, as well as changes in their dividend and capital structure policies. Our …ndings provide new insights on the role of stock markets in shaping corporate activity

Big data on job postings reveal multiple facets of the impact of COVID-19 on corporate hiring. Firms disproportionately cut new hiring for high-skill positions, with financially constrained firms reducing skilled hiring the most. Applying machine learning methods to job-ad texts, we find that firms have skewed their hiring toward operationally-core functions. New positions display greater flexibility regarding schedules and tasks. While job posting levels show signs of recovery starting in late-2020, changes to job descriptions and skill profiles persist through early-2022. Financial constraints amplify these changes, with constrained firms’ new hires witnessing greater adjustments to job roles and employment arrangements.

We use a unique data set to show how firms in Europe used credit lines during the financial crisis. We find that firms with restricted access to credit (small, private, non-investment-grade, and unprofitable) draw more funds from their credit lines during the crisis than their large, public, investment-grade, profitable counterparts. Interest spreads increased (especially in “market-based economies”), but commitment fees remained unchanged. Our findings suggest that credit lines did not dry up during the crisis and provided the liquidity that firms used to cope with this exceptional contraction. In particular, credit lines provided the liquidity companies needed to invest during the crisis.

We show theoretically that while cash allows financially constrained firms to hedge future investment against income shortfalls, reducing current debt is a more effective way to boost investment in future high cash flow states. Thus, constrained firms prefer higher cash to lower debt if their hedging needs are high, but lower debt to higher cash if their hedging needs are low. We provide empirical evidence that supports our theory. Our analysis points to an important hedging motive behind cash and debt management policies. It suggests that cash should not be viewed as negative debt in the presence of financing frictions.

We survey 1,050 Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) in the U.S., Europe, and Asia to directly assess whether their firms are credit constrained during the global financial crisis of 2008. We study whether corporate spending plans differ conditional on this survey-based measure of financial constraint. Our evidence indicates that constrained firms planned deeper cuts in tech spending, employment, and capital spending. Constrained firms also burned through more cash, drew more heavily on lines of credit for fear banks would restrict access in the future, and sold more assets to fund their operations. We also find that the inability to borrow externally caused many firms to bypass attractive investment opportunities, with 86% of constrained U.S. CFOs saying their investment in attractive projects was restricted during the credit crisis of 2008. More than half of the respondents said they canceled or postponed their planned investments. Our results also hold in Europe and Asia, and in many cases are stronger in those economies. Our analysis adds to the portfolio of approaches and knowledge about the impact of credit constraints on real firm behavior.

We show that the 2016 Brexit Referendum had multifaceted consequences for corporate America, shaping employment, investment, divestitures, R&D, and savings. The unexpected vote outcome led U.S. firms to cut jobs and investment within U.S. borders. Using establishment-level data, we document that these effects were modulated by the reversibility of capital and labor. American-based job destruction was particularly pronounced in industries with less skilled and more unionized workers. U.K.-exposed firms with less redeployable capital and high input-offshoring dependence cut investment the most. Data on the near universe of U.S. establishments also point to measurable, negative effects on establishment turnover (openings and closings). Our results demonstrate how foreign-born political uncertainty is transmitted across international borders, shaping domestic capital formation and labor allocation.

We study a model in which future financing constraints lead firms to have a preference for investments with shorter payback periods, investments with less risk, and investments that utilize more pledgeable assets. The model also shows how investment distortions towards more liquid, safer assets vary with the marginal cost of external financing and with firm internal cash flows. Our theory helps reconcile and interpret a number of patterns reported in the empirical literature, in areas such as risk-taking behavior, capital structure choices, hedging strategies, and cash management policies. For example, contrary to Jensen and Meckling [Jensen, M., Meckling, W., 1976. Theory of the Firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 305–360], we show that firms may reduce rather than increase risk when leverage increases exogenously. Furthermore, firms in economies with less developed financial markets will not only take different quantities of investment, but will also take different kinds of investment (safer, short-term projects that are potentially less profitable). We also point out to several predictions that have not been empirically examined. For example, our model predicts that investment safety and liquidity are complementary: constrained firms are specially likely to decrease the risk of their most liquid investments.

We show how uncertainty shapes corporate asset allocation, composition, and productivity using data from the shipping industry. Firms curtail both ship acquisitions and disposals when uncertainty increases, primarily through cuts in new ship orders and ship demolitions — decisions that are costlier to reverse vis-à-vis secondary market transactions. Uncertainty also prompts firms to concentrate their fleets into narrower, less productive portfolios. We corroborate our findings using the 2009–2011 spike in Somali pirate attacks as an uncertainty shock to shipping activity. Uncertainty hampers “creative destruction,” slowing both the adoption of innovation embodied in new capital and the disposal of old capital.