Economics is characterized by well-developed predictive theories of human behavior. A wide variety of empirical tests of models based on those theories have been developed, as well as extensive and reliable data bases to test the theories. Thus, one can experiment with and simulate economic behavior. For these reasons, the conventional lecture-discussion format may be the least effective way to teach economics. Rather, the most effective teaching method may be as a laboratory science. We report here on two efforts to adapt economic instruction to a laboratory format. The purpose of adapting the lecture-laboratory format to economics is to permit a more active learning environment in which students can be meaningfully engaged by the material, with other students, and with the instructor. We report on two recent efforts to convert economics to a true, experimental, laboratory social science. The first, beginning in 1988, is a demonstration project conducted at Denison University for majors in economics. The second, beginning in 1993, is a true experiment conducted at Washington State University for all students taking introductory microand macroeconomics. I. The Demonstration Project for Economics Majors at Denison University

US health care expenditures reached $2.5 trillion in 2009, representing 17.6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and $8,086 per person (US Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2011). Since health care represents a large and growing share of the economy, and factors such as population aging imply that chronic disease treatment will continue to expand as a share of health expenditures, developing methods for assessing the value of quality improvement for chronic disease spending is of increasing importance for accurately measuring real economic activity. This paper develops a method for assessing the value of quality changes associated with health care for patients living with one important chronic disease, diabetes mellitus, using 11 years of detailed data on spending and quality of care for over 800 patients. We first provide an overview of measurement issues for health care quality, and then present our data, methods, results, and a brief discussion.

We combine a theoretical discrete-choice model of vehicle purchases, an econometric analysis of electricity emissions, and the AP2 air pollution model to estimate the geographic variation in the environmental benefits from driving electric vehicles. The second-best electric vehicle purchase subsidy ranges from $2,785 in California to −$4,964 in North Dakota, with a mean of −$1,095. Ninety percent of local environmental externalities from driving electric vehicles in one state are exported to others, implying they may be subsidized locally, even when the environmental benefits are negative overall. Geographically differentiated subsidies can reduce deadweight loss, but only modestly.

We use employee-level panel data from a single firm to explore the possibility that individuals may select insurance coverage in part based on their anticipated behavioral ("moral hazard") response to insurance, a phenomenon we label "selection on moral hazard." Using a model of plan choice and medical utilization, we present evidence of heterogeneous moral hazard as well as selection on it, and explore some of its implications. For example, we show that, at least in our context, abstracting from selection on moral hazard could lead to over-estimates of the spending reduction associated with introducing a high-deductible health insurance option.

Leading financial scholars present essays examining the performance of the basic financial functions underlying global financial systems: payments, lending and investing, pooling funds, allocating risk, providing information, and dealing with incentive issues - with particular emphasis on how their performance is changing and implications for the future.

We introduce a new method to measure the temporal discounting of money. Unlike preceding methods, our method requires neither knowledge nor measurement of utility. It is easier to implement, clearer to subjects, and requires fewer measurements than existing methods.

Reviews various books related to accounting. "Advanced Accounting," 3rd ed., by Floyd A. Beams; "Three Degrees Above Zero: Bell Labs in the Information Age," by Jeremy Bernstein; "Wiley-Ronald Auditing Service," by D.R. Carmichael and Martin Benis; "Dictionary of Accounting Terms," by Derek French.

Using a natural experiment from a retail gasoline antitrust case, we study how asymmetric information sharing affects oligopoly pricing. Empirically, price competition softens when, following case settlement, information sharing shifts from symmetric to asymmetric, with one firm losing access to high-frequency granular rival price data. We provide theory and empirics illustrating how strategic ignorance creates price commitment, leading to higher price-cost margins. Using a structural model, we find substantial profit-enhancing effects of asymmetric information sharing. These results provide a cautionary tale for antitrust agencies regarding the potential unintended consequences of limiting price information sharing among firms.

Globally, access to preschool has increased dramatically but its quality is often poor. We evaluate two interventions aimed at improving the quality of public preschools in Colombia. The first, designed by the government and rolled-out nationwide, provided preschools with significant extra funding, mainly earmarked for hiring teaching assistants (TAs). The second, for a small additional cost, also offered training for existing teachers. We show that the first intervention did not improve child development, while the second led to significant improvements in children’s cognitive development, especially for those from more disadvantaged backgrounds. We argue these dramatic differences can be explained by the two interventions having different impacts on teachers’ behavior. The first led teachers to reduce the time they spent in the classroom, including on learning activities. The addition of the training offset this adverse effect of TA provision on teachers’ learning activities and improved the quality of teaching.

We use a series of field experiments in rural Burundi to examine the impact of exposure to conflict on social, risk, and time preferences. We find that conflict affects behavior: individuals exposed to violence display more altruistic behavior towards their neighbors, are more risk-seeking, and have higher discount rates. Large adverse shocks can thus alter savings and investments decisions, and potentially have long-run consequences—even if the shocks themselves are temporary.