This paper analyzes the relationship between the diffusion of new technologies and the decentralization of firms. Centralized control relies on the information of the principal, which we equate with publicly available information. Decentralized control, on the other hand, delegates authority to a manager with superior information. However, the manager can use his informational advantage to make choices that are not in the best interest of the principal. As the available public information about the specific technology increases, the tradeoff shifts in favor of centralization. We show that firms closer to the technological frontier, firms in more heterogeneous environments, and younger firms are more likely to choose decentralization. Using three data sets on French and British firms in the 1990s, we report robust correlations consistent with these predictions.

To understand the thinking process in private information games, we use “Mousetracking” to record which payoffs subjects attend to. The games have three information states and vary in strategic complexity. Subjects consistently deviate from Nash equilibrium choices and often fail to look at payoffs which they need to in order to compute an equilibrium response. Choices and lookups are similar when stakes are higher. When cluster analysis is used to group subjects according to lookup patterns and choices, three clusters appear to correspond approximately to level-3, level-2, and level-1 thinking in level-k models, and a fourth cluster is consistent with inferential mistakes (as, for example, in QRE or Cursed Equilibrium theories). Deviations from Nash play are associated with failure to look at the necessary payoffs. The time durations of looking at key payoffs can predict choices, to some extent, at the individual level and at the trial-by-trial level.

Sacrifice is widely believed to enhance cooperation in churches, communes, gangs, clans, military units, and many other groups. We find that sacrifice can also work in the lab, apart from special ideologies, identities, or interactions. Our subjects play a modified VCM game—one in which they can voluntarily join groups that provide reduced rates of return on private investment. This leads to both endogenous sorting (because free-riders tend to reject the reduced-rate option) and substitution (because reduced private productivity favours increased club involvement). Seemingly unproductive costs thus serve to screen out free-riders, attract conditional cooperators, boost club production, and increase member welfare. The sacrifice mechanism is simple and particularly useful where monitoring difficulties impede punishment, exclusion, fees, and other more standard solutions.

Why did shareholder liability disappear? We address this question by looking at its use by British insurance companies until its complete disappearance. We explore three possible explanations for its demise: (1) regulation and government-provided policyholder protection meant that it was no longer required; (2) it had become de facto limited; and (3) shareholders saw an opportunity to expunge something they disliked when insurance companies grew in size. Using hand-collected archival data, our findings suggest investors attached a risk premium to companies with shareholder liability, and it was phased out as insurance companies expanded, which meant that they were better able to pool risks.

What are the economic determinants of a firm’s market value? We answer this question through the lens of a generalized neoclassical model of investment with quasi-fixed labor and three heterogeneous capital inputs. We estimate the structural model using firm-level data on US firms and find that, on average and depending on the industry, installed labor force accounts for 14–21% of firms’ market value, physical capital accounts for 30–40%, knowledge capital accounts for 20–43%, and brand capital accounts for 6–25%. Our analysis provides direct empirical evidence for the importance of labor and intangible capital inputs for understanding firm value.

This paper develops an overlapping generations model of optimal rebalancing where agents differ in age and risk tolerance. Equilibrium rebalancing is driven by a leverage effect that influences levered and unlevered agents in opposite directions, an aggregate risk tolerance effect that depends on the distribution of wealth, and an intertemporal hedging effect. After a negative macroeconomic shock, relatively risk-tolerant investors sell risky assets, while more risk-averse investors buy them. Owing to interactions of leverage and changing wealth, however, all agents have higher exposure to aggregate risk after a negative macroeconomic shock and lower exposure after a positive shock.

Although it has been well established that financial volatility is related to news and macroeconomic shocks, less emphasis has been placed on the importance of underlying economic and political stability. In this paper we study the behavior of consol returns since 1729 and identify a greater-than-50% decline in volatility from the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 until the First World War. News events and macroeconomic variables cannot account for this extended period of reduced volatility. Underlying political stability under Pax Britannica seems to be a more likely explanation.

We propose a novel human capital model that decomposes aggregate income risk into high- and low-income risk. We find that high-income risk is priced, while low-income risk is insignificant. The high-income factor alone explains 77% of the cross-sectional variation in the twenty-five size and book-to-market portfolios, earns a risk premium of about 7% per year, and its pricing power extends to the full cross-section of individual stocks. It is also related to the value factor, suggesting that the value premium might be compensation for income risk. Overall, our evidence indicates that high-income risk is an important macroeconomic risk factor.

We examine whether a shock to the enforceability of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) limited its ability to restrict the flow of private information between managers and investors. Although prior work provides evidence that Reg FD reduced managers’ selective disclosure of material information immediately following its promulgation, we posit that private information flows returned as a result of the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) public enforcement failure in SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc . Using multiple settings, we find consistent evidence suggesting that Siebel changed the cost–benefit tradeoff for Reg FD compliance and effectively reversed the initial effects of the regulation. We also find that Siebel disrupted the equilibrium of selective disclosure activity, resulting in an unleveling effect among investors with respect to private information advantages. Finally, we find that Siebel also had real effects by altering managers’ capital structure decisions. Our findings run counter to the prevailing “mosaic theory” and gradual learning explanations for private information advantages in the extended post–Reg FD period and highlight the importance of enforcement in achieving intended regulatory outcomes.

We examine the influence of investor sentiment on managers’ discretionary disclosure of “pro forma” (adjusted) earnings metrics in earnings press releases. We find that managers’ propensity to disclose an adjusted earnings metric (especially one that exceeds the GAAP earnings number) increases with the level of investor sentiment. Furthermore, our analyses suggest that, as investor sentiment increases, managers: (1) exclude higher levels of both recurring and nonrecurring expenses in calculating the pro forma earnings number and (2) emphasize the pro forma figure by placing it more prominently within the earnings press release. Additional analyses indicate that the association between investor sentiment and managers’ pro forma disclosure decisions at least partly reflects opportunistic motives. Finally, we find that managers’ own sentiment‐driven expectations also play a role in their pro forma disclosure decisions.