Central to the economic theory of sticky costs is the proposition that managers consider adjustment costs when changing resource levels. We test this proposition using employment protection legislation (EPL) provisions in different countries as a proxy for labor adjustment costs. Using a large sample of firms in 19 OECD countries during 1990–2008, we find that the degree of cost stickiness at the firm level varies with the strictness of the country-level EPL provisions. This finding supports the theory that cost stickiness reflects the deliberate resource commitment decisions of managers in the presence of adjustment costs.

This paper provides first evidence of negative peer disclosure (NPD), an emerging corporate strategy to publicize adverse news of industry peers on social media. Consistent with NPDs being implicit positive self-disclosures, disclosing firms experience a two-day abnormal return of 1.6–1.7% over the market and industry. Further exploring the benefits and costs of such disclosures, we find that NPD propensity increases with the degree of product market rivalry and technology proximity and disclosing firms outperform nondisclosing peers in the product markets in the year following NPDs. These results rationalize peer disclosure and extend the scope of the literature beyond self-disclosure.

We study how a significant relaxation of internal migration restrictions affects labor market outcomes of incumbent migrants and natives, exploiting the 2014 hukou reform in China, which substantially removed the migration barriers of cities with an urban population below 5 million (nonmegacities). Using a difference-in-differences method, we find that migrants’ wages in nonmegacities experienced approximately a 2.6%–7.9% decline relative to that in megacities after the policy. The policy had nonnegative impacts on the wages of natives in nonmegacities. These results suggest that the downward wage pressure imposed by new migrants falls primarily on incumbent migrants rather than on natives.

We report the results of an experiment designed to study the role of speculation in the formation of bubbles and crashes in laboratory asset markets. In a setting in which speculation is not possible, bubbles and crashes are observed. The results suggest that the departures from fundamental values are not caused by the lack of common knowledge of rationality leading to speculation, but rather by behavior that itself exhibits elements of irrationality. Much of the trading activity that accompanies bubble formation, in markets where speculation is possible, is due to the fact that there is no other activity available for participants in the experiment.

We investigate how the presence of a college affects local educational attainment. As counterfactuals for current college locations, we use historical “runner-up” locations that were strongly considered to become college sites but were ultimately not chosen. We find that winning counties today have college degree attainment rates 56% higher than runner-up counties and more private-sector employment in human-capital-intensive industries. These effects are not driven primarily by recent in-migration of educated adults, and alternative public investments did not have similar effects on local educational attainment. The results indicate that colleges played an important role in shaping long-run local outcomes.

We investigate the nascent but fast-growing Chinese bond market and credit rating industry. We find Chinese bond ratings are informative and significantly correlated with bond offering yields. In addition, the Chinese bond investors distinguish ratings from different credit rating agencies (CRAs), demanding lower yields on bonds rated by global-partnered CRAs. However, the empirical results suggest that the rating scales used by Chinese CRAs are not comparable to those of international CRAs. Furthermore, Chinese CRAs have very broad rating scales and pool bonds with significantly different default risks into a single rating category, resulting in over 90% of bonds in only three rating categories.

We examine the relation between short-sale constraints and stock price crash risk. To establish causality, we take advantage of a regulatory change from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)’s Regulation SHO pilot program, which temporarily lifted short-sale constraints for randomly designated stocks. Using Regulation SHO as a natural experiment setting in which to apply a difference-in-differences research design, we find that the lifting of short-sale constraints leads to a significant decrease in stock price crash risk. We further investigate the possible underlying mechanisms through which short-sale constraints affect stock price crash risk. We provide evidence suggesting that lifting of short-sale constraints reduces crash risk by constraining managerial bad news hoarding and improving corporate investment efficiency. The results of our study shed new light on the cause of stock price crash risk as well as the roles that short sellers play in monitoring managerial disclosure strategies and real investment decisions.

Between 1995 and 2006 about a quarter of merging firms hired boutique banks as their advisors on mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Boutique advisors, often specialized by industry, are generally smaller and more independent than full-service banks. This paper investigates firms' choice between boutique and full-service advisors and the impact of advisor choice on deal outcomes. We find that both acquirers and targets are more likely to choose boutique advisors in complex deals, suggesting that boutique advisors are chosen for their skill and expertise. After controlling for the endogenous choice of advisors, we find lower deal premiums when acquirers hire boutique advisors. In addition, boutique advisors spend more time, probably on due diligence and negotiation, to complete deals. Overall, our findings suggest that boutique advisors are chosen in more complex deals and they achieve more favorable deal outcomes.

We examine the relationship between shareholder leverage constraints and corporate risk-taking, focusing on its impact on debtholders. Our findings show that mutual fund leverage constraints are related to more risk-taking activities of portfolio companies, inducing higher credit risk and greater risk-shifting concerns for the firms’ debtholders. In response, the debtholders raise borrowing costs and tighten lending conditions. These effects intensify for firms facing higher levels of conflict between debtholders and shareholders and when mutual funds exert greater influence over firms. Econometric analyses, including instrumental variable specifications and asset management company mergers, support a causal interpretation.